China admits taking, burying US POW
By ROBERT BURNS, AP Military Writer
Fri Jun 20, 11:51 AM ET

After decades of denials, the PRC Chinese have acknowledged burying an American prisoner of war in China, telling the U.S. that a teenage soldier captured in the Korean War died a week after he "became mentally ill," according to documents provided to The Associated Press.

China had long insisted that all POW questions were answered at the conclusion of the war in 1953 and that no Americans were moved to Chinese territory from North Korea. The little-known case of Army Sgt. Richard G. Desautels, of Shoreham, Vt., opens another chapter in this story and raises the possibility that new details concerning the fate of other POWs may eventually surface.

Chinese authorities gave Pentagon officials intriguing new details about Desautels in a March 2003 meeting in Beijing, saying they had found "a complete record of 9-10 pages" in classified archives.

Until now, this information had been kept quiet; a Pentagon spokesman said it was intended only for Desautels' family members. The details were provided to Desautels' brother, Rolland, who passed them to a POW-MIA advocacy group, the National Alliance of Families, which gave them to AP this week.

In a telephone interview Thursday, the brother said he did not follow up on the information he got in 2003 because he did not believe it. He was not aware it marked the first time China had acknowledged taking a U.S. POW from North Korea into Chinese territory or burying an American there.

Two months after the March 2003 meeting, the Pentagon office responsible for POW-MIA issues sent Rolland Desautels a brief written summary of what a Chinese army official had related about the case.

"According to the Chinese, Sgt. Desautels became mentally ill on April 22, 1953, and died on April 29, 1953," the summary said. It added that he had been buried in a Chinese cemetery but the grave was moved during a construction project "and there is no record of where Desautels' remains were reinterred."

The reported circumstance of Desautels' death — sudden mental illness — may sound improbable. But the key revelation — that he was taken from North Korea to a city in northeastern China and then buried — matches long-held U.S. suspicions about China's handling, or mishandling, of American POWs during and after the war.

It raises the possibility that wartime Chinese records could shed light on the fate of other U.S. captives who were known to be held in Chinese-run POW camps but did not return when the fighting ended in 1953.

And it appears to undercut the Pentagon's public stance that China returned all POWs it held inside China. The Pentagon has focused more on the related issue of China's management of POW camps inside North Korea during the war, which Chinese troops entered in the fall of 1950 on North Korea's side.

Desautels' reported burial site — the city of Shenyang, formerly known as Mukden — is interesting because it is far from the North Korean border and was often cited in declassified U.S. intelligence reports as the site of one or more prisons holding hundreds of American POWs from Korea. Some U.S. reports referred to Mukden as a possible transshipment point for POWs headed to Russia.

Desautels was an 18-year old corporal, a member of A Company, 2nd Engineer Battalion, 2nd Infantry Division, when his unit encountered a swarming Chinese assault near Kunu-ri, North Korea, on Dec. 1, 1950. According to a Pentagon account, Desautels and his fellow captives were marched north to a POW compound known as Camp 5, near Pyoktong, on the North Korean side of the border with China.

Subsequent events are a bit fuzzy, but Desautels was moved among prison camps and apparently was used by the Chinese army as a truck driver. A number of U.S. POWs told American interrogators after their release from captivity that they had seen Desautels alive and well in Camp 5.

One who said he spent four months with Desautels said that in March 1952 Desautels said that if he should disappear, others should make inquiries with the proper military authorities. Numerous returned POWs said Desautels had spent several months inside China before being returned to Camp 5 in 1952.

Rolland Desautels, 81, recalls his older brother as "a strong character who came off the farm," enlisted in the Army at age 17 and was stationed at Fort Lewis, Wash., before being shipped to Korea in August 1950, two months after the war began with North Korea's invasion of the South.

The Pentagon has taken an interest in the Desautels case for many years. A June 1998 Pentagon cable to the U.S. Embassy in Beijing said the case was one of several on which China should be pushed to provide answers, that "we believe the Chinese should be able to account for these individuals."

Now it turns out that China did provide an accounting, although it is incomplete and was kept under wraps for five years.

Larry Greer, a spokesman for the POW-MIA office at the Pentagon, said Thursday that although U.S. officials asked to see the 9-10 page file on Desautels, China has yet to provide it or additional information.

Mark Sauter, an author and researcher on the subject of POWs from the Korean War, said in an interview that Beijing authorities are to be commended for finally providing useful information.

"The case of Sgt. Desautels has been a focal point of a six-decade cover-up by the Chinese government," Sauter said. "This is the first crack in the dike. From what we can tell, the Pentagon has not aggressively followed up, either on the Desautels case or those of hundreds of other Americans for whom the Chinese should be able to account."

American officials believed from the earliest days of the armistice that concluded the Korean War without a formal peace treaty in July 1953 that the Chinese and North Koreans withheld a number of U.S. POWs, possibly in retaliation for U.S. refusal to repatriate those Chinese and North Korean POWs who chose not to be returned to their home country out of fear of retribution.

Gen. Mark W. Clark, the American commander of U.S.-led forces during the final stages of the Korean War, wrote in a 1954 account that "we had solid evidence" that hundreds of captive Americans were held back by the Chinese and North Koreans, possibly as leverage to gain a China seat on the U.N. Security Council.

Over time, however, U.S. officials muted their concerns, while periodically pressing the Chinese in private. Publicly, the Pentagon's stance today is that China returned all the U.S. POWs it held.

"Some U.S. POWs spent time across the (Yalu) river in Manchuria, but to the best of our knowledge, all have returned," the Pentagon's POW/MIA office says in a summary of wartime POW camps.

http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20080620/ap_on_...Q0NaUYemQJg.3QA
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On the Net:

Pentagon's POW-MIA office: http://www.dtic.mil/dpmo/index.htm

This thread should at least be moved to the coffeeshop

Columbia Chinese Spy Ring Revealed
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NGs62fuOx0s



4 Charged With Giving U.S. Secrets to China
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OuBWxfYxmvY&feature=related

China expands influence through electronics

Facilities in the South China Sea reflect technologies otherwise hidden.

As with other maritime forces, China has been seeking to network disparate assets, and to meet that requirement, it has been establishing signal stations on islands and atolls throughout the South China Sea. These facilities, which range from communications relays to radar units, both demonstrate China's expanding regional reach and provide a rare glimpse of the country's military electronics technologies.
China has been actively expanding south from Hainan Island since 1974 when it seized the Paracel Islands from the Vietnamese, and its activities continued in the 1990s with construction on several Spratley Islands reefs. Locations of Chinese military electronics on the mainland are largely hidden, and any photographs are classified. But, facilities on the South China Sea islands and reefs place this technology out in the open.

Based on electronics and facilities observed, Woody Island in the Paracels and Fiery Cross Island in the Spratleys seem to be the main control links to China's South Fleet Guangzhou headquarters. Other armed Chinese islands or reefs are linked via satellite communications and radio to the local and fleet commanders. The electronics and combat systems of the Chinese aircraft, warships and paramilitary ships greatly augment the island-based electronics.

The only electronic systems directly off the south China coast are ones that involve offshore naval operations. A large over-the-horizon (OTH) backscatter (OTH-B) radar faces south near the southern coast of China. In the 1970s, the experimental OTH radar had a 2,300-meter antenna and could pick up surface ships at 250 kilometers. A series of technical papers describing a skyway OTH radar in the early 1990s leads to the conclusion that operational deployment would have been in that period.

The fact that Guangzhou is the headquarters of the South China Fleet indicates a major complex of tactical and strategic space and land-based communication and long-range radars in that area. They would be focused south into the South China Sea.

Radio beacon navigation-differential global positioning system (GPS), or RBN-DGPS, are located at the southern ports of Zhanjiang, Fangcheng and Luyu. DGPS manufactured by Communication Systems International can be accurate to within 5 to 10 meters with a 300-kilometer range. The vessel traffic service (VTS) is located at Zhanjiang. Western imported technology is an integral part of these electronic systems because the DGPS is Australian and VTS is from Lockheed Martin in Syracuse, New York.

Although appearing to be a tourist island of native tribes and small villages, Hainan Island features an embedded, but nearly invisible, strong military electronic infrastructure. The emergency landing of a U.S. Navy EP-3C at Lingshui airfield in 2001 was a peek into this. Mainland Chinese governments prior to World War II minimally touched Hainan, although there was a naval station at "Hoihow" (now Haikou) in the early 1900s. During the seven-year Japanese occupation in World War II, the island had an extensive military and industrial buildup. This included large coal and ore mines as well as the first railroads connecting to a new major Japanese submarine base at Yulin. Although today the locations of Hainan long-range air search sites are classified, Japan had sites at Yulin, Basuo and Haikou in 1944.

Work started in the late 1970s on three high-power radio navigation aids in south China, but they were not online until 1983. Modern RBN-DGPS navigation aids are located at Sanya, Haikou and Haifou. The VTS with radar and a computer tracking/control station are located on the west coast at Dong Fang (formerly Basuo) and in Haikou. The Haikou facility has one local and three remote dual X-band radars, a local and remote very high frequency (VHF) communication system and a remote VHP direction finder. This vessel traffic management system controls traffic in the Qiongzhou Channel between Hainan and the mainland. A digital GPS beacon station of 295 kilohertz was activated in 1999 at Sanya, and two more followed at Yangpu and Baohujiao.

Hainan certainly has one or more major electronics intelligence (ELINT) stations, but references are usually vague or disagree in details. Because of the continuing threat of conflict with Vietnam, a major ELINT site probably was built on mountaintops on southwest Hainan. The most detailed description available discusses a large facility at Lingshui air base on the southeast coast. This complex reportedly was established in 1968 and greatly expanded in 1995, with about 1,000 signal analysts located there. A large satellite downlink facility with an associated computer complex and links to Beijing is at Changcheng. It is allegedly a State Oceanographic Agency site for weather data connected to a Chinese weather outpost in Antarctica.

The first high-power low frequency (LF) station was built on Hainan in 1965. The large submarine base at Yulin, which is not on most maps anymore, has extensive communication links for the 3rd Submarine Flotilla headquarters. These include very low frequency (VLF) communications to submarines and surface ships in the South China Sea area. This may have been one of the first Chinese VLF stations, since construction activities had been reported from 1969 until 1982. Even navigation charts showing Yulin stated it was "closed to foreign commercial vessels" due to World War II mines in the approach.
The Paracel Islands were occupied by Vietnam until China seized them in occupation assaults supported by naval warships in 1974. A 1980s photograph of a naval base in the Paracels shows a huge multiantenna array of 16 yagi antennas aimed skyward. Each antenna consisted of 8 yagi cross arms. This probable VHF monstrous array is not described or named in open literature references. One publication with this illustration described it as a satellite communication antenna, while another stated it was a Moon early warning radar. The antenna appears similar to a smaller truck-mounted 400-megahertz wind-tracking yagi radar designated Type 701 by China. This may be a meteorological weather antenna that is located on Woody Island.
Woody Island is a classic example of how a crude outpost can grow over time into a significant threat equivalent to an unsinkable aircraft carrier. A helicopter landing pad was built within one year, and this would have required ground-to-air links-probably the Ote Alenia imported radios used throughout China. In 1990, China constructed a 1,200-foot runway on Woody Island that was suitable for jet fighter aircraft. In 1998, the runway was extended to 7,300 feet and finally to 8,100 feet in 1990 for heavier aircraft such as H-6 bombers or large transports for resupply. This requires the Chinese Type 791 X-band precision approach radar (PAR), which is based on the old Soviet Two Spot RSP-7. It has a 20-degree-azimuth and six-degree-elevation antenna beam pattern and a cone-shape antenna for VHF and ultrahigh frequency (UHF) air communications. A larger pier and airplane hangers augmented the island's single jetty, and fuel storage has been added.

In June 2001, HY-2 antiship cruise missiles appeared. They would require a long-range surface-search radar to detect surface ship targets. In mid-1995, a new signals intelligence (SIGlNT) station entered service on Rocky Island, which is near Woody Island. This station could support air or surface warning for air missions or ship targeting, especially because Rocky Island has the highest peak in the Paracel Islands.

The largest island in the Paracels is Pattle Island, which had a weather station when Vietnam lost it in 1974. The port facilities on Duncan Island, the second largest island, are being enlarged, which would indicate increased military construction and electronic equipment. Drummond Island, the site of a naval battle in 1974, is not known to have any buildings or electronic equipment.

The only radio beacon south of Hainan is at Robert Island, which is only 500 meters long. There are no modern DGPS navigation beacons in the Paracels, so this must be an older type installed in the late 1970s.

Another disputed island group claimed by China is the Spratley Islands. Popular opinion tends to state that the Spratley Islands largely were uninhabited until the recent construction. In fact, during World War II, Japan built bases on Danger Reef, Tizard Bank and Namyit Island, which are occupied by Vietnam and the Philippines today.
In the 1980s, cruises in the Spratleys by nonmilitary fishermen and later ocean research ships soon were followed by Chinese warship visits. In 1988-1989, several dozen Chinese warships conducted large naval exercises coinciding with occupation of reefs in the Spratleys. In November 1990, China completed a lengthy hydrological survey with "research" ships in the Spratleys. In the 1990s, construction began on crude huts and octagonal wooden structures on wooden pilings. These were called "typhoon shelters for fishermen" by the Beijing government.
In 1995, China built its first structures on one point of the circular Mischief Reef. In October 1998, these were expanded with three additional clusters of more octagonal wooden structures. Each cluster of structures has a 2.5-meter satellite communication dish aimed skyward. The northern and southern clusters had two-story cement buildings constructed, which resembled forts with the usual satellite communication and high frequency (HF) whip antennas. The southern building was about 36 meters long, and the northern building was 122 meters long. Two years later, major electronic and weapon emplacements were added to the smaller northern building. Additional piers, a helicopter pad and several antiaircraft guns were added along with an unidentified missile weapon system. The new weapon system could be HY-2 or newer C-801 anti-surface-ship cruise missiles. A white rectangular antenna was placed on top of the building control tower. It resembles a navy navigation radar, which would have a range of about 25 miles around the semi-submerged "island." It could be an imported Racal Decca 1290 Arpa radar or a Chinese Model 756 navigation radar with a dual X-band and S-band antenna.

After civilian and scientific vessels reconnoitered the area in October 1987, China seized Fiery Cross Island in March 1988. It sits in the eastern Spratleys deep in Philippine waters. A photo of a 200-foot-long cement building on Fiery Cross Island shows a standard naval HF yagi radar antenna based on the Soviet Knife Rest. The Chinese copy, designated Bean Sticks, operates in the 70- to 73-megahertz frequencies with a range of about 180 kilometers.

Two other small electronic countermeasures (ECM) radomes on the building appear similar to the RWS-1 mounted on navy destroyers. Land-based ECM domes such as these are not identified in references. Several whip communication antennas and taller mast antennas also are on the roof.

Chinese radios may be connected to different antennas for different needs. For example, R-series HF radios use a 4-meter whip for up to 25-kilometer communications, and they use an 11-meter mast for ranges out to 40 kilometers. A long wire runs from a mast on one end of the building to the ground, which would be an HF long-line radio antenna. A probable radio would be the large 73-kilogram SR 109 synthesized receiver with a band from 10 kilohertz to 30 megahertz. It is suitable for radio signal surveillance and long-range distance communications. In addition to two roof-mounted 2.5-meter satellite communications dishes, there is a large 4-meter dish mounted on a large pedestal. This probably is a meteorological weather antenna.
On Johnson South Reef, four octagonal huts initially were built on wooden pilings. By 1989 there were two round cement towers on the ends of a two-story white rectangular building on a cement base. At one end is a 2.5-meter satellite communications antenna adjacent to an 8-foot mast antenna, with two more tall mast antennas on the roof. Chigua Island has an identical building structure with a wooden barracks adding greatly increased manning space. Subi Reef in 1997 had the typical wooden barracks structure and a two-story building with one satellite communications antenna. Two unusual features are a huge round helicopter landing pad and a sturdy cement bridge with cement arches connecting it to the headquarters building. These are both unique to Subi Reef.Most of the Chinese outposts have a small tower on top of the two-story cement buildings that are the electronics centers for communications, ELINT and radars. This would be where the duty officer would stand watches. Many of these complexes retain small wooden huts on the end of jetties, which would be a good location for noisy power generators and hazardous toxic materials like fuel barrels for the power sources. Most outposts have helicopter landing pads and small- to medium-size piers to receive personnel or logistic supplies via ships.

On the far western edge of the South China Sea is a Chinese electronic activity aimed at India. In 1992, construction began on a SIGINT station on Coco Island near the Indian navy's large base on Andaman Island.

Just friendly Chinese govt intending to promote mainland Chinese radio stations' programmes to Southeast Asia!!! :lol: :P :lol: :P

Nothing wrong actually....the area is traditional Chinese territory.... the region is afterall known as South China Sea.....

What about PRC's activities in the Indian ocean? Any articles on that side of the world?

Boosting Maritime Capabilities in the Indian Ocean
Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury
New Delhi, India

Maritime power represents military, political, and economic power, exerted through an ability to use the sea or deny its use to others. It has traditionally been employed to control "use-of-the-sea" activities undertaken by nations for their general economic welfare and, often, even for their very survival. Maritime power and naval power are not synonymous, the latter being a sub-set of the former. Traditional land powers are more and more focusing on developing their maritime capabilities to safeguard their economic interests and extend their sphere of influence.

Historically, China has been a land power. However, over the past two decades, it has found itself increasingly dependent on resources and markets accessible only via maritime routes. This has left Beijing with the dilemma of how to safeguard its trade routes and flow of resources in a world in which the United States is the dominant naval power, and both India and Japan — China's neighbors and strategic rivals — are stepping up their own naval capabilities.

Ensuring a continuous supply of energy has come to be the most important prerequisite for China in building an advanced, industrialized state. Despite being the world's sixth largest oil producer, China has been a net importer of oil since 1994. It imported 40 million metric tons in 1999 and is projected to import 100 million tons by 2010. China's dependence on seafood has increased in recent years. China will therefore have to ensure security of its sea lanes and shipping industry to ensure its continued development As of today, 85 percent of China's trade is sea-based. Also, with its 26 shipyards, China has emerged as the world's fourth largest shipbuilder. Thus for both reasons, China needs assured access and control over its adjacent oceans.

China and Indian Ocean Nations
China's perceptions regarding other major powers, especially Moscow and Washington, have been the most important external factor molding its Indian Ocean vision and policy initiatives. While initially it was American containment that explained all their activities in the Indian Ocean, the Sino-Soviet split in the early 1960's made China suspicious of Moscow's initiatives and intentions in this region.

In the recent years, a new great game has begun between India and China to bring the Maldives and Sri Lanka under their respective sphere of influence in the Indian Ocean Region (I.O.R.). After Myanmar and Bangladesh, to complete the "arc of influence" in South Asia, China is determined to enhance military and economic cooperation with the Maldives and Sri Lanka. China's ambition to build a naval base at Marao in the Maldives, its recent entry into the oil exploration business in Sri Lanka, the development of port and bunker facilities at Hambantota, the strengthening military cooperation and boosting bilateral trade with Colombo, are all against Indian interests and ambitions in the region.

Although China claims that its bases are only for securing energy supplies to feed its growing economy, the Chinese base in the Maldives is motivated by Beijing's determination to contain and encircle India and thereby limit the growing influence of the Indian Navy in the region. The Marao base deal was finalized after two years of negotiations, when Chinese Prime minister Zhu Rongzi visited Male' in May 2001. Once Marao comes up as the new Chinese "pearl," Beijing's power projection in the Indian Ocean would be augmented.

Recently, Sri Lanka allocated an exploration block in the Mannar Basin to China for petroleum exploration. This allocation would connote a Chinese presence just a few miles from India's southern tip, thus causing strategic discomfort. In economic terms, it could also mean the end of the monopoly held by Indian oil companies in this realm, putting them into direct and stiff competition from Chinese oil companies. At Hambantota, on the southern coast of Sri Lanka where Beijing is building bunkering facilities and an oil tank farm. This infrastructure will help service hundreds of ships that traverse the sea lanes of commerce off Sri Lanka. The Chinese presence in Hambantota would be another vital element in its strategic circle already enhanced through its projects in Pakistan, Myanmar and Bangladesh.

It is Sri Lanka's strategic location that has prompted Beijing to aim for a strategic relationship with Colombo. Beijing is concerned about the growing United States presence in the region as well as about increasing Indo-U.S. naval cooperation in the Indian Ocean. China looks at using the partnership with Sri Lanka to enhance its influence over strategic sea lanes of communication from Europe to East Asia and oil tanker routes from the Middle East to the Malacca Straits. China has been consolidating its access to the Indian Ocean through the Karakoram Highway and Karachi, through the China-Burma road to Burmese ports and through the Malacca Straits, especially once they have established their supremacy over the South China Sea.

China's Indian Ocean policy has been clearly influenced by its ties with the other major powers. Its interest in the Indian Ocean started partly as a reaction to its perception that increasing United States presence there was aimed at encircling China. The policy has also been directly linked to its problems with New Delhi. China feels India is facilitating the American presence in the Indian Ocean region as a means of countering Beijing.

The United States Navy maintains a substantial permanent presence in the I.O.R. from its Fifth Fleet base in the Gulf, its substantial naval and air assets at Diego Garcia as well as by rotational deployments of Seventh Fleet units from the Pacific, centered on one or two nuclear-powered, nuclear-armed aircraft carriers. It was last deployed in major hostilities against Iraq, was briefly involved in Somalia and was on call to resist the Australian preemptive intervention in East Timor.

Chinese Naval Power and the Indian Ocean Region
The Indian Ocean, along with other sea lines of communication, have attracted the attention of Chinese naval planners. The takeover of the Panama Canal by a private Chinese firm after the United States withdrawal in 1999, reported Chinese threats to intervene in the Straits of Malacca and the active Chinese role in the West Asian region indicate unfolding Chinese interest this region. Beginning from the early 1980's, Chinese naval modernization underwent a sea change, partly with the modified perceptions about the value of the oceans.

China has launched an ambitious futuristic weapons development program, including high energy microwave beam-weapons, ship-based laser cannon and space-based weaponry to destroy communication and reconnaissance satellites. The country is the greatest source of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missile technology. History has shown that China is not averse to using force in order to achieve its aims, and its attitude towards its neighbors is a constant source of concern.

Gwadar in Pakistan, Hambantota in Sri Lanka and Sitwe (Akyab) in Myanmar have functioned essentially as fishing harbors. The growing Chinese interest in these places and China's generous offer of assistance to these countries for converting their fishing harbours into maritime ports of international standards has aroused doubts about Beijing's motive in increasing its naval presence in the region.

Beijing is trying to give its Navy a greater visibility, operability and rapid action capability in the Indian Ocean region than it enjoys now. Gwadar, Hambantota and Sitwe form important components of its maritime security strategy. China is also interested in the island nation of Seychelles. It is important to monitor the growing Chinese interest there as part of any study of China's maritime strategic moves.

Beijing has given signal to the world of its aspirations to assume a role beyond its natural geographic and historical maritime boundaries. Any Chinese threat to India's maritime interests in the near future is economic and political as well as military. China is setting up a series of military bases as part of an endeavor to project its power. In Bangladesh, Beijing is seeking extensive naval and commercial access. Dhaka already shares close defense ties with Beijing. In Myanmar, China is also building naval bases and electronic intelligence gathering facilities at Grand Coco Island in the Bay of Bengal. However, the military junta, wary of excessive dependence on China, has turned to New Delhi for military supplies. In Cambodia, Beijing is helping to build a railway line from South China to the sea. In Thailand, China is funding the construction of a $20 billion canal across the Kra Isthmus. This would allow ships to bypass the Strait of Malacca. China has also set up electronic posts near the Persian Gulf to monitor ship traffic through the Strait of Hormuz.

New Delhi's Role in the Indian Ocean Region
India has been apprehensive about China's growing naval expansion in the Indian Ocean, which New Delhi views as encirclement. As China's naval diplomacy take roots in the region, India cannot remain a mute spectator and, much like China, has increased its military engagement in the region. India now regularly conducts naval and military exercises with the United States, Japan, and China, as well as with its South Asian and South-East Asian neighbors. New Delhi has signed a defense agreement with Singapore and has cooperative arrangements with many nations stretching from the Seychelles to Vietnam. It has participated in mechanisms to protect maritime traffic passing through the strategic Malacca Straits.

In recent years India has intensified its pace of cooperation with countries in the Indian Ocean littoral. After the success of its tsunami diplomacy, New Delhi is looking forward to evolve new channels of naval diplomacy with these countries. During the past year, the just-retired Indian Navy chief, Admiral Arun Prakash, visited many South East Asian and South Asian capitals. The primary goal of these visits was to enhance bilateral cooperation and strengthen naval ties.

Two Indian warships recently made friendly port calls in Bangladesh and Myanmar. The navies of India and Bangladesh have also discussed possibilities of connecting the Vishakapatnam and Chittagong ports. An access agreement with Dhaka would allow more extensive patrolling, both sea borne and from the air in these sensitive waters. The Indian navy is also keen to maintain vessels at the Bangladeshi ports, to compete with Beijing's strategic gains in that sector. China has signed a training and equipment agreement with Dhaka.

India's geographical location at the natural junction of the busy international shipping lanes that crisscross the Indian Ocean has had a major impact upon the formulation of New Delhi's maritime strategy. The sea area around India is among the busiest in the world, with over 100,000 ships transiting the shipping lanes every year. The Straits of Malacca alone account for some 60,000 ships annually. India itself has a 4,670-mile long (7,516 km) coastline and several far-flung island territories. The 13 major and 185 minor ports that mark India's coastline constitute the landward ends of the country's sea lines of communication. The development of additional ports is a high-priority activity and is taking place all along the western and eastern seaboards of the country. India, today, has a modest, but rapidly-growing merchant-shipping fleet, presently comprising 756 ships and totaling 8.6 million "Gross Registered Tonnes," with an average age of around 17 years, as compared to the global average of 20 years. The Indian Navy and the Indian Coast Guard are major stabilizing forces in the movement of energy across the Indian Ocean, not just for India, but for the world at large.

The region of India's maritime interests, which on primary geographic considerations might suggest itself only as the north Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea, in fact has to take maritime factors into account and developments in distant areas such as the western Pacific, South China Sea, the eastern Mediterranean, the central and southern Indian Ocean. Also under review are islands such as Diego Garcia, Madagascar, Mauritius, Reunion and the Seychelles, in addition to South Africa and Australia as they dominate the southern approaches to the Indian Ocean. This is because of the flexibility and mobility of naval forces and the rapidity with which they can traverse large distances, concentrate, deploy, withdraw or disperse.

India's maritime diplomacy, like its broader diplomatic effort, radiates out in expanding circles of engagement, starting with the country's immediate maritime neighborhood. As a mature and responsible maritime power, New Delhi is contributing actively to capacity building and operational coordination to address threats from non-state actors, disaster relief, support to United Nations peacekeeping and rescue and extrication missions.

In fact, India's maritime diplomacy is now an essential component of New Delhi's "Look East" policy. India has concluded bilateral arrangements with Thailand and Indonesia for joint coordinated patrols by the three navies in the Bay of Bengal at the mouth of the Malacca Straits. New Delhi is also ready to contribute to capacity building of the littoral states in the interests of maritime security. Southeast Asian navies participate in the bi-annual MILAN exercises. At the multilateral level and within the maritime domain, India has launched a series of initiatives to provide an inclusive and mutually-consultative forum in which the navies and maritime security agencies of the region - whether large or small - can meet and discuss common issues that bear upon international security.

Economic growth and opportunities in the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean have attracted China into taking an interest in the region. Beijing feels compelled to look outwards in order to craft joint strategies for achieving faster economic growth and peace and security. China is a long-term concern by reason, not only because of its phenomenal economic growth and military power, but because of its ambitious and determined drive towards great global power status. The drive is already manifesting itself in the modernization of its armed forces — in particular the expansion of its navy and maritime capabilities. The Chinese, however, argue that their initiative towards the Indian Ocean is guided by both strategic and economic compulsions and capabilities, as a significant proportion of its sea borne trade (around 85 percent) passes through the Indian Ocean.

Given its sensitivities to the United States and India, China has supported proposals for the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace. The country's long-term strategic outlook is global and not regional. Beijing seeks to develop its naval capabilities and seek definite sea superiority over other naval powers in the region. Some of China's initiatives in the Indian Ocean are also geared to preventing any littoral country from granting Taiwan their membership. China's ability to deter Taiwan thus is more effective since the Indian Ocean states seem willing to oblige Beijing. Thus, Taiwan is not a member of the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission although it is represented in the fishing associations of the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans.

By 2020 China plans to deploy task forces consisting of two aircraft carriers, two S.S.B.N.s, six S.S.N.s, 18 destroyers and about 30 frigates in the I.O.R. However, until about 2045, it will be difficult for China to deploy its naval forces permanently in the Indian Ocean. By that time, it remains to be seen if Pakistan, Myanmar and other countries in the region become full-fledged Chinese allies.

India is trying to create a balance of power in the I.O.R, as the country is emerging as a major power and is often regarded as a pivotal influence in the region's geopolitics. It has established a "Far Eastern Strategic Command" headquartered in Port Blair to monitor the military situation in the region. However, in order to have a strong hold over the region, India needs economic assets as well as a strong military presence. India must have access in the region of Chinese influence, by establishing political, economic and security ties with East and Southeast Asian countries. New Delhi must strengthen its ties with other major regional and global forums to maintain its sphere of influence. At a strategic level, India will have to attempt to balance China's power realistically, through development of its own economic and military potential and through building strong relationships with neighbors, and regional organizations like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (A.S.E.A.N.).

http://www.worldpress.org/asia/2908.cfm#down

Comment : PRC exercising its muscle in Indian Ocean is no secret, as an economic giant, it is quite natural it wished to protect its SLOC ...lifeline for supplies of raw material...esp. crude oil



China's submarine progress alarms India
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/JE09Df02.html

India, China jostle for influence in Indian Ocean
Possibly dangerous rivalry grows as countries seek to control vital sea lane
June 2008




Click here to read article
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/25024945/


also here....
http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/D915PLBO0.htm

Chinese presence at Maldives

Old article ...Nov 2006
A New Balance of Power Game in The Indian Ocean
India gears up to tackle Chinese influence in Maldives and Sri Lanka

http://www.idsa.in/publications/stratcomme...Kumar241106.htm

whoever says "China historically has been a landpower" need to at least read the book "When China Ruled the Seas" by Louise Leviathes http://www.amazon.com/When-China-Ruled-Sea...3/dp/0195112075

China was able to do trade as far as Afica in 15th contury way before the western countries did. But went into the history, due to bad mindset by Chinese then. That other "soverity states" outside have to pay "tributes/protection money" to them and they do not need the imports then to surive thus closing the door on anicent exploration by the Chinese.

Some of the mindset is still "instill" in hardcore Mainland Chinese, which is "fightenning". I have seen a fine example during my trip up there last year, and he is a dipolmat too. <_<

While the story about the honey trap is fairly recent......
".....A top aide to Gordon Brown has been a suspected victim of a “honeytrap” operation by Chinese intelligence agents....." B) B)
http://militarynuts.com/index.php?showtopic=2177


Beijing's 16-character policy
Nowhere is the nexus of the military-industrial complex in the PRC more evident than in the codification of the 1997 "16-character policy", which makes it official PRC policy to deliberately intertwine state-run and commercial organizations for casting a cloud of ambiguity over PRC military modernization. In their literal translation, the 16 characters mean as follows:

Jun-min jiehe (Combine the military and civil);
Ping-zhan jiehe (Combine peace and war);
Jun-pin youxian (Give priority to military products);
Yi min yan jun (Let the civil support the military).

The 16-character policy is important because of what it does for the strategic development of the PRC's industrial and economic espionage program: it provides commercial cover for military industrial companies to acquire dual-use technology through purchase or joint-venture business dealings, and at the same time for trained spies who work directly for the PRC's military establishment, whose operational mandate is then to gain access to and steal the high-tech tools and systems developed by the United States and its Western allies [1].

The two primary PRC organizations involved in actively collecting US technological secrets are the Ministry of State Security (MSS) and the Military Intelligence Department (MID) of the People's Liberation Army (PLA). The MSS, now headed by Minister Geng Huichang, relies on professionals, such as research scientists and others employed outside of intelligence circles, to collect information of intelligence value. In fact, some research organizations and other non-intelligence arms of the PRC government direct their own autonomous collection programs [2].

According to US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) estimates, there are currently more than 3,000 corporations operating in the United States that have ties to the PRC and its government technology collection program. Many are US-based subsidiaries of Chinese-owned companies; while in the past they were relatively easy to identify, recent studies indicate that many have changed their names in an effort to distance themselves from their PRC owners.

China's red spider's web
China's espionage efforts targeting proprietary technologies developed in the United States stretch back decades. But China's spy craft has evolved rapidly and now presents a serious challenge that many in the West are unprepared to counter. For example, recent cases investigated by the FBI have involved entire families of naturalized American citizens from China, prompting the bureau to take out a Chinese-language advertisement in San Francisco Bay area newspapers urging Chinese Americans to report suspicious activity. In addition, China has clearly taken a long-term view of espionage against the US technology industry, handling some agents for decades.

One of the most recent cases, for example, involves a former Boeing engineer who now stands accused of giving China proprietary information about several US aerospace programs, including the space shuttle. The affidavit in the case alleges that Chinese intelligence officials first approached Dongfan "Greg" Chung of Orange, California, with intelligence collection requirements in 1979. Chung was arrested on February 11, 2008, and was scheduled to be sentenced this month.

At the same time Chung was arrested and accused of stealing proprietary Boeing information, Chinese businessmen Tai Shen Kuo and Yu Xin Kang were arrested and charged with cultivating several US defense officials, one of whom passed information on projected US military sales to Taiwan for the next five years.

Many PRC domestic intelligence activities are directed against foreign businessmen or technical experts. The data elicited from unsuspecting persons or collected by technical surveillance means is used by Chinese state-run or private enterprises. Prominent Beijing hotels, such as the Palace Hotel, the Great Wall Hotel and the Xiang Shan Hotel, are known to monitor the activities of their clientele.

Chinese government-owned companies have also been involved in schemes to steal the intellectual property of US companies. They have done this using the corporate equivalent of sleeper cells - foreign executives hired by US companies on work visas, as well as naturalized American citizens who then establish US companies for the purpose of gaining access to the proprietary data of other US firms.

http://en.chinaelections.org/NewsInfo.asp?NewsID=18532

Also Fm: A third eye Anja

same thing with the american, the europeans, and the ruskies.

Combining peace and war - euphemism for conducting war under the guise of peace. Hmm. Cyber attacks, large scale espionage... So this is the true meaning of 'peaceful rise'. :lol:

India's modernization and upgrading of its military is 2 pronged, for countering China and maintaining its edge over Pakistan.

In fact its greatest fear is Chinese expansion into the Indian Ocean; which is expected because it is already making its traditional claim on the South China Sea and other surrounding waters therefore their next step is expected to include the Indian Ocean....the Chinese have already been planning this - from their strategic placement of a listening post / base in Myanmar to the similar installation of such bases in Maldives...the Indians are now re-tightening of its presence in this area....and the Indian Navy has taken concrete steps to correct short comings in terms of boosting the Navy and Air Force; they leased and are planning to lease 2 Akula 2 subs which can fire nuclear missiles from Russia....

But the Indians might need to accelerate their plans in order to bring their upgraded hardware on line before the Chinese base on Hainan Island becomes operational....

" ..........The 16-character policy is important because of what it does for the strategic development of the PRC's industrial and economic espionage program: it provides commercial cover for military industrial companies to acquire dual-use technology through purchase or joint-venture business dealings......"

Example here...
Last year...The U.S. State Department said it was investigating how engines made by a Pratt & Whitney subsidiary in Canada turned up in a Chinese attack helicopter.
Pratt & Whitney Canada said last week that 10 engines were sent to China in 2001 and 2002 under a Canadian government export license for use in civilian copters. But the engines, the company said, ended up in prototypes of the Z-10, China's first domestically developed attack copter, designed to carry guided antitank missiles.
While the Canadian government plans no action against Pratt & Whitney over the military diversion, a State Department spokesman, Karl Duckworth, said the U.S. government was continuing an investigation into the company's actions. He declined to provide details, though U.S. export controls prohibit providing certain technology for military use.
It is unclear under what conditions the controls would apply to Pratt & Whitney. Some foreign-made technology uses American components and designs, and Pratt & Whitney is owned by a U.S. company, United Technologies of Hartford, Connecticut.
In an e-mailed statement, Jean-Daniel Hamelin, a spokesman for Pratt & Whitney Canada, said the company was selected by a Chinese aircraft maker in 2000 to provide engines for the civilian variation of a helicopter that was simultaneously being developed for the military. When the company, based near Montreal, applied for an export license, it understood that the Chinese would develop their own engine for the military model, Hamelin wrote.
But, Hamelin added, "the Chinese engine encountered delays, and our engines were used during the development of the common platform." Shipments to China by the company's Canadian unit stopped in 2002. It is unclear why sales were halted.
The Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, which issued the export license, said Friday that it had no concerns about the way the engine sale was handled or the effectiveness of its export control program for technologies with potential military applications.
Also Fm: A third eye Anja

China has a proud history of such abuses.

http://www.wisconsinproject.org/countries/china/divert.html

actually it has been going on for years. in the mid 80s I worked for Digital Equipment Corp (we are like IBM, make big computers that runs the world B) ) and all our machines were under Dept of Commerce export control.

Nevertheless when I was in China for a project, I was brought to this building that was chock full of computers, all of which they aren't supposed to have. they even translated the entire documentation set (we are talking about real documentation, not those magazine "manuals" produced by microsoft :ph43r: )

Incidentally, I heard the Israelis were also notorious for such behavior. I don't remember where I got it from already, but I remember an incident where they stole some equipment, and years later when it broke down, they had the audacity to go back to the manufacturer to ask for help... :lol: Guess this story was funny enough to stay with me all this while...

i wouldn't be surprised, if we do stuff like that as well.

I don't think we could get away with such antiques as easily as the Israelis. They have a strong lobby to protect them. We don't.

That's the bloody problem with US and Eurpoean companies and national laws....they knowingly release such important and sensitive equipment to would be rivals and competitors whose track records are non-existent...these equipment will help the opposite side build hardwares which can kill their servicemen in the event of hostilities.....even during the time of Soviet Union.... the westerners (including US) really have their brains in their asses!!

No wonder in some movies, you have those ultra patriots who want to remove the current administration and perhaps those politicans who are "threatening" their own countrymen...eg The Rock etc....

Really wonder if they think of the consequences or its simply greed and / or corruption.

capitalisim.

China's economic 'bargaining chip'
Massive holdings in U.S. create 'financial muscle'

Nice read....
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/j...argaining-chip/


The article spotlighted the long-term implications of American debt being held by China; it clearly showed a consensus of economists believe that the US has the advantage at this moment but that this will change. The greater concern is , as the article says, that as the Chinese move to diversify their holdings to securities that translate to assets they will gain access to technologies that they otherwise could not get ahold of.

However....some still believed that the US has a 14 trillion dollar economy and have the incredible financial capacity to deal with economic issues.
......and the PRC survives by its exports to the US.
No one can replace the USA in terms of volume of goods imported from China.
Losing the US business would destroy the PRC econically. Moreover, the USA can move to several different places like India or Mexico to set up factories, exports and cheap labor.
Some also believe that the Chinese do not have a nuclear option as mentioned in the article above and PRC actually need the USA more than the other way round with regard to finance.

http://upiasiaonline.com/Security/2008/09/...y_buildup/2379/

wow. i knew the chinese budget was underreported but never to this extent and how they didnt count their expenditure on weapons and other systems platform.

creative accounting or something far more sinister ?

haha, waiting for chino to come flame me over this

anyone who has an interest can access the white paper (tentative translation to english) here :

http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/index.html

I think the whole issue has to do more with the spending of "kopi money" their official with or with uniform and companies take as a S.O.P! If you know how much officials there spend on wine/beer/ladies/and illegal activites. Not to forget Chinese interest with the Afican nations, in "trade" of all sorts especially minerals and arms.

October 12, 2008:

In 1974, China fought a naval battle with the Vietnamese near the Paracel islands, and took control. China has recently been expanding military facilities on these tiny islands. Among the more notable additions has been an expanded electronic monitoring facility, and a lengthened runway, now long enough to support Su-30 fighters. Several large fuel tanks have also been built, indicating an intention to base Su-30 fighters there. About a thousand military personnel are stationed there.

Ukraine to help train China's navy pilots

China has been sending military personnel to the Ukraine to learn how the country trains its aircraft carrier pilots, in preparation for the aircraft carrier battle group it eventually plans to build.

According to a source in the Ukrainian military industry, China first sent a large naval delegation, headed by the deputy chief of the PLA Navy, to visit the Ukrainian Navy Aviation Force training centers in the southern port cities of Odessa and Sevastopol in October, 2006.

The Chinese visited the Research Test and Flying Training Center at Nitka on the Crimean Peninsula, and the two sides discussed the possibility of Ukraine helping to train Chinas navy aviation force and aircraft carrier pilots, the source said. Since then, Chinese engineers, pilots and naval technical experts have made frequent visits to Nitka.

The focus of much of Chinas current military cooperation with Russia and Ukraine is on producing large aircraft and an aircraft carrier. Ukraine has provided China with a prototype of its T-10K shipborne fighter. By dissecting the T-10K an earlier variant of the Su-33 fighter China hopes to acquire the capability to independently develop its own shipborne fighters.

The single T-10K that China purchased from Ukraine was originally based at the Nitka center, which is equipped with a range of simulators to train pilots in jump take-offs, arresting landings and contingency responses. The training modules simulate the release of the arresting hook on take-off and its use on landing at a speed of 250 kilometers (155 miles) per hour.

The Nikta center previously trained a generation of Soviet pilots on the Su-33 and MiG-29K fighters. Now the 297th Fighter Regiment of the Russian Navy Aviation Force is undergoing training there.

As this author reported earlier, China has imported four sets of aircraft carrier landing assistance equipment and arresting hooks. The Chinese are in the process of building their own aircraft carrier training base, which is why they have been so keenly interested in Nitkas simulators, training software, management procedures and technologies.

The training of aircraft carrier fighter pilots is a crucial step in putting together an aircraft carrier fleet. The training program is extremely harsh. According to the Ukrainian source, the most basic training for short-istance take-offs, landings and ski-jumps would take at least six months.

Ukraine was once the main training center for the Soviet Unions aircraft carrier fighter pilots. It now intends to train navy pilots not only for China, but also for India and other countries that aspire to possess aircraft carriers, a source from Nitka says.

The Indian Navy is in the process of purchasing an aircraft carrier from Russia, as well as MiG-29K and MiG-29UBK fighters, the first batch of which is expected to be delivered to India by the end of the year already a year later than scheduled. The pilots for those fighters will most likely be trained at Nitka.

Chinas dealings with Ukraine reconfirm that the PLA Navy is moving forward on its aircraft carrier project. The Chinese carrier is apparently based on a Russian design; otherwise China would not be interested in Ukraines simulators. This means Chinas aircraft carrier will very likely adopt the Russian methods of ski-jump take-off and landing.

China has also taken practical steps to build an aircraft carrier training base. The first step is to train shipborne fighter pilots at this base, followed by basic short distance take-off and landing training on the disabled Soviet aircraft carrier Varyag, which China purchased in 1998.

Sources from the Ukrainian military industry have confirmed on several occasions that the Varyag is unlikely to be restored to an operational fighter aircraft carrier, and will most likely only be used as a training platform.

Although the ship was purchased by a Hong Kong company ostensibly to be converted into a casino, Ukrainian sources say they were aware of Chinas intentions from the beginning to use it for military purposes. The aircraft carrier, repainted with the colors of the PLA Navy, is now in the Chinese port city of Dalian.

What's these....?

http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_vJmHwBt3E48/SXVY...h/ls6lt3lh9.jpg

The LS-6
http://www.defence.pk/forums/weapons-club/...mb-we-need.html

It appears to be an upgrade/conversion kit for iron bombs into guided weapons, much akin to JDAM.

The LT-3 is a LGB with GPS/Laser/Inertial guidance capability if the following link is accurate.

http://www.defence.pk/forums/chinese-defen...ina-2008-a.html

There is an article in www.alert5.com about a key personnel who was involved in the development of the B2 stealth bomber who is charged with selling the infor to China and trying to sell it to Singapore and Australia.

Won't it be a goner for the B2 now that China has that tech infor? I mean they can now develop weapons to counter it and / or develop tech to track it...plus they save time and money in development of their own.... bloody traitor to sell out own country.....

How would SG and Australia, being close allies of US, want to buy this tech illegally??

Apologies I didn't see there is a thread on this topic.

Backfires and the PLA-AF's New 'Strategic Air Force'

Late in June 2004, Hong Kong media revealed that in a resolution recently passed at the PLA-AF's internal session of the 10th Congress of the Communist Party of China, the PLA-AF would seek to become a “strategic air force.” Acquiring the Russian Tu-22M-3 Backfire was noted as vital to this unprecedented policy change.
The media report also stressed that acquiring long-range bombers would be the main challenge. The Backfire was cited repeatedly. This report, unlike many out of Hong Kong, was replete with citations of characteristic CPC language and is remarkably detailed, covering issues of training, doctrine and force structure.
The large-scale build-up in PLA-AF capabilities over the last decade has been and is clear evidence of several fundamental changes in strategic thinking. A large measure of the investment was put into long-range assets. The Su-27SK, Su-30MKK, Su-30MK2, A-50 AWACS, H-6U tankers and Il-78MKK tankers—to name a few examples—are all designed to achieve control of the air and strike capability of beyond 1,000 nautical miles. Until now there has been no stated doctrinal shift in the role of the PLA-AF, which historically was intended to defend Chinese airspace and support PLA land armies and the PLA-N in combat. The 10th CPC Congress announcement does more than formalize the change in the PLA-AF role. It also sets the PLA-AF apart from Army and Navy forces as a service with a unique and independent role—an important shift given the historical early Soviet-like doctrinal basis in PLA-AF thinking. Given these circumstances, there is every reason to regard the 10th Congress report to be accurate. If so, the implications are far reaching.
Recent reports that the chief of the PLA-AF has been elevated to the CMC level of the command heirarchy strongly support this evidence of a deep doctrinal shift in PLA thinking and an increasingly important role for the PLA-AF.

China first attempted to acquire Backfires during the first round of Russian equipment acquisitions after the fall of the Soviet Union. Russia at that time was still uncertain about its future global position and courted Western investment on a large scale. Russian reports claimed the rejection was the result of intensive Japanese and U.S. lobbying.

Much has changed since then: China has become Russia’s largest export client for weapons; Western investment in Russia has dried up; Russia’s relationship with the United States cooled off since the Iraq War; and the Russian Air Force still faces serious funding difficulties. Most of its Backfire fleet is grounded for lack of funds: it cannot afford needed upgrades. India was to lease four Backfires, so an export precedent has been set. The Russians have encouraged competition between India and China, reflected in tit-for-tat acquisitions of Su-30MK, R-77, 3M-54/3M-14E missiles, A-50 AWACS, Il-78 tankers and submarines.

The political and strategic impediments to the mid-1990s Backfire export are now gone. The Sukhoi exports to China and India are, for Rosoboronexport and Tupolev, a prime example of decades of support and upgrade funding. By limiting the weapons package on Backfires targeted for export to China and not fitting internal fuel system plumbing for aerial refuelling probes, Russia can truthfully argue that it is exporting a regional rather than a strategic weapon.
In practical terms it is now inevitable that China will eventually acquire Backfires. The only issue will be how soon, how many and with what weapons package and upgrades.

China has strong strategic incentives to deploy the Backfire. For one, it is competing with India for strategic primacy on the Asian mainland, and several squadrons of Backfires add significant potency to China's position. Closer to home, simmering tensions with Taiwan put a high premium on assets capable of deterring U.S. Navy CVB Gs.

It is reasonable to surmise that increasing tensions over Taiwan have intensified interservice competition for funding in the PLA. The Backfire, which would be instrumental in deterring U.S. CVBGs and blockading Taiwanese shipping lanes, is a good and affordable near-term choice for the PLA-AF, given the monies long earmarked for PLA-N submarines and aircraft carriers. Acquiring the Backfire would also strengthen Beijing’s hand against Washington’s. The United States is now restructuring its PacRim forces by increasing more responsive air and naval power at the expense of ground forces. Deploying the Backfire would effectively frustrate—that is, counterbalance—this U.S. effort.

The likely PLA-AF units to first receive Backfires would be those elements of the 8th (merged with the 48th), 10th and 36th Bomber Divisions, flying the oldest H-6 Badgers in the fleet. The displaced Badgers could be converted to H-6U tankers and assigned to the 2nd and 9th Bomber Divisions, or used as reserve airframes for remaining Badger squadrons. Should a firm Backfire sale be concluded in the next two years, a credible Initial Operational Capability could be achieved around 2010.
Sizing up the Tupolev Tu-22M-3 Backfire C
The latest variant of the Backfire is the third-generation Tu-22M-3 Backfire C model, which remained in production until 1993.
This is a major evolution from the Backfire B, and includes some use of titanium to further reduce weight. The effort was led by the Tupolev Bureau's Deputy Chief Designer Boris E Levanovich.
The weapons suite for the Backfire C reflects its late Cold War Soviet tasking. The primary weapon for Aviatsiya Voenno-Morskovo Flota Backfires were antishipping, antiradiation and nuclear variants of the Raduga Kh-22/AS-4 Kitchen. Antiradiation and nuclear variants were also carried by Dal'naya Aviatsia Backfire C aircraft as defence suppression weapons. Mixes of one, two or three of these capable missiles can be carried.
The bomb bay can also be fitted with a rotary launcher for six Kh-15/AS-16 Kickback defense suppression missiles, a Soviet analogue to the U.S. AGM-69 SRAM. Four rounds can be carried externally, for a total of ten weapons.

Like U.S. heavy bombers in the era predating precision bombs, the Backfire C can also carry a large payload of dumb bombs. External beam racks can be fitted to carry a total of up to 69 500-lb FAB-250 rounds. The external stations can also be used to carry FAB-1500 3,000-lb dumb bombs, for a total of eight rounds.

In terms of performance, the Backfire C compares closely to the now retired SAC FB-111A, but is much larger, carrying around 120,000 pounds of internal fuel. It has Mach 2 class dash speed and a combat radius of between 2,000 and 2,500 nautical miles, subject to weapon payload and profile. Tupolev data indicates that the aircraft is compatible with any runway capable of supporting a later Boeing 767 transport.

The Tu-22M-3 remained in production until 1993, and various sources claim that up to 268 units were built. As IOC was achieved in 1989 and operational flying rapidly curtailed after 1991, the average number of fatigue hours accumulated by the Backfire C fleet is very low, especially for the last aircraft built, which have a calendar age of only 11 years. U.S. sources put Russian Air Force inventory numbers at 70 to 105, Russian naval aviation numbers at 105, and Ukrainian Air Force numbers at 14 (with 16 Backfire B).

Arming China's Backfire C
Sources in Eastern Europe observe that the Russian Air Force has planned for some time to equip the Backfire C with a conventional precision weapons capability, emulating the U.S. heavy bomber fleet. There are no reports as yet that this has materialized, due to the budgetary situation the Russians face.

Russia would not export the Kh-55 / AS-15 Kent strategic cruise missile or the Kh-15A/R/S / AS-16 SRAM-ski as part of an export package.

Conventional variants of the supersonic Kh-22 were apparently offered to India. As the PLA-AF and PLA-N both operate variants of the Silkworm which use a closely related rocket engine and the same propellants, the Kh-22 would be very easy for the PLA to assimilate.

Integrating the 1,000-lb KAB-500L and 3,000-lb KAB-1500L laser guided bombs would be relatively simple, exploiting hardware for the FAB-1500. A FLIR / laser targeting pod like the Sapsan-E could be carried externally, but also repackaged into the existing bombsight fairing under the flight deck.
Clearance of the electro-optical KAB-500Kr/1500Kr would present little difficulty, but inflight retargeting would require an avionic upgrade. The KAB-1500TK would require integration of the APK-9 Tekon pod, already carried by the PLA Su-30MKK.
The satellite-aided inertially guided KAB-500S-E “JDAM-ski” is now being integrated on the Su-27SKM and Su-30MK, with KAB-1500S-E integration—software and wiring changes—now planned. There are no fundamental obstacles to integrating the KAB family weapons on the Backfire C, and the prospect of the PLA funding such long sought developments is likely to be very attractive to the cash strapped RuAF.

Indian sources claimed that integrating the Kh-31/AS-17 Krypton series of supersonic anti-radiation and anti-shipping missiles, which the PLA-AF adopted for the Su-30MKK and already has in inventory, was a likely prospect for the planned Indian Backfire C lease. Similar claims were also made for the Kh-35U Kharpunski anti-ship cruise missile, which could also be integrated on suitable launchers.

It is to be expected that the PLA-AF would seek to carry its planned strategic Air Launch Cruise Missiles (ALCM) on the Backfire C. Because the Chinese ALCM will have unique software requirements, it would likely be a later rather than earlier addition to the aircraft.
The Strategic Impact of a PLA-AF Backfire

China's claimed intention to field the Backfire reflects multiple agendas and, accordingly, roles. At the upper end of the spectrum, the Backfire, using a range of supersonic and subsonic precision-guided weapons, provides a strategic regional, strike capability. It replicates the formidable sea control capability of the former Soviet AV-MF. Yet with a precision-guided bomb capability, it also provides battlefield interdiction and close air support capabilities much like that of U.S. heavy bombers.

Given the age and fatigue hours in the existing Russian stock of Backfire Cs, a service life into the 2040 timescale is a reasonable expectation for factory refurbished and well maintained aircraft. In terms of survivability, the Backfire compares closely to the SAC FB-111A and current B-1B. Its supersonic high altitude penetration profile remains very difficult to stop. Armed with even a 200-nautical mile class stand-off weapon, it provides limited opportunities for defending interceptors to successfully engage it.

The useful footprint of the Backfire, operating from Hainan Island and Meiktila (in Burma), extends almost to Diego Garcia to the west, northern Australia to the south and Guam to the east. The Backfire can hold at risk any surface target within this footprint, without aerial refuelling support.

In any confrontation with the United States, the Backfire is a tool to threaten navy surface fleet assets in the Indian Ocean, South China Sea and Pacific Ocean, as well as air force basing in Okinawa, Guam and South Korea. The impending loss of the F-14 leaves the United States Navy without a competitive interceptor to challenge the Backfire – the United States Air Force F-15 and new F/A-22A will provide a highly credible interception capability but constrained to land basing.

In a standoff with India, the Backfire is a tool to attack strategic targets and to deter India's growing surface fleet, especially its carrier forces. A secondary, but no less important capability, derives from the Backfire's ability to inflict heavy losses on maritime traffic, especially vital tanker traffic carrying crude oil to Indian shipping terminals. Without self-sufficiency in fossil fuels, India is extremely vulnerable to naval blockade operations.

Against smaller Pacrim nations, the Backfire can threaten strategic targets, naval targets and commercial sea lanes throughout the Far East and South East Asia. It provides a means of blockading Taiwan's sea lanes using missiles and naval mines, and doing so with a very large exclusion zone around the island. Japan, South Korea, Vietnam, Singapore, the Philippines and Australia could be subjected to similar coercion.

How much of this strategic potential China can develop will depend on how many Backfires it can acquire and on what weapons package and avionics upgrades it applies to them.

anjathirdeye.com

The Americans are definitely gonna keep their carriers very very far away from Backfire bases.

However, having said that, they are useless unless the Chinese are able to achieve some level of parity in terms of air dominance capabilities. No use having those bombers if they are gonna be shot down 10 minutes later.

maybe the PLAAF really have such faith and belief in the capabilities of their Su-30s, J-10s and J-11s.

the nearest raptor position is at kadena, and even then, the raptors are severely outnumbered. with their achilles heel being tanker support (like in the RAND report), doubly difficult to sustain air dominance ?

Thats what they have in-theatre at the moment, which is hardly an indicator of the level of firepower they would have if hostilities kick off.

Against a country like China, I would expect no less than 4 carriers in the Pacific Pond, while the USAF ACC starts moving more in.

What the Raptors do represent, is a token of US's will to ensure peace and stability in the area.

Of course, Sino-US ties seem to be warming up a bit with Hillary Clinton's (Broomstick1) visit to China.

China plans to begin building two aircraft carriers next year, a Japanese newspaper reported Wednesday, in what would be its first attempt at fixed-wing naval aviation and a potentially major new variable in the strategic calculus of the Pacific.

The two flattops each would be between 50,000 and 60,000 tons, be conventionally powered and patrol the South China Sea, according to the report in Japans Asahi Shimbun newspaper, which cited Chinese shipbuilding sources. The carriers could be in the fleet by 2015, the story said.

China is one of the worlds largest builders of commercial ships, although its biggest indigenous warship so far has been no more than about 17,000 tons. The Asahi Shimbun reported that the carriers would be built at a new shipyard outside Shanghai and include components already on order from Russia.

A Chinese naval officer told the newspaper that one of the carriers primary missions would be to guard the sea lanes that connect energy-ravenous China with oil and mineral resources in the Middle East and Africa.

The story is the latest in a series of reports from around the world about Chinese ambitions to field an aircraft carrier. The official Peoples Liberation Army Daily newspaper reported in September that 50 pilots from the Dalian Naval Academy were training for ship borne aircraft flight. Official Russian press agencies reported in October that China had purchased as many as 50 Su-33 Flanker-D fighter jets, an updated version of the Su-27K carried aboard Russias sole aircraft carrier. Since then, British and American news agencies have quoted top Chinese officials as expressing great interest in seaborne airpower.

The Chinese government would seriously consider relevant issues with factors in every aspects on building its first ever aircraft carrier, said navy spokesman Huang Xueping, according to a Dec. 23 report by the official Xinhua news agency. China has a long coastline and the sacred duty of Chinas armed forces is to safeguard the countrys marine safety and sovereignty over coastal areas and territorial seas, he said.

Chinas carriers if the Japanese report is accurate would likely be comparable to the Royal Navys Queen Elizabeth-class ships, now just beginning construction. Slightly larger, at 65,000 tons, the Queen Elizabeth is designed for a complement of around 1,400 sailors, including its ships company and air wing, and designed to carry about 40 strike aircraft, plus additional helicopters, according to Combat Fleets of the World.

Because the Chinese carriers are smaller and shorter-ranged than their American counterparts, the U.S. shouldnt view them as a threat, the Chinese naval official told the Asahi Shimbun.

China Seriously Considering Carriers

The most controversial naval issue of the post-Cold War era has been whether or not China is planning to procure aircraft carriers. In late December the senior national defense spokesman, Huang Xueping, declared that China is "seriously" considering adding an aircraft carrier to its navy.

While this may be the most definitive statement to date by a Chinese official, more significant was the Chinese Navy's decision this past fall when 50 naval officers began a pilot training program at the Dalian Naval Academy to provide a cadre of carrier-based aviators.

Thus, speculation about a future Chinese carrier force continues albeit still without any public indications of whether such ships would be constructed in China or possibly purchased from a foreign source, in particular Ukraine, which contains the Black Sea Shipyard in Nikolayev. That yard produced all Soviet-era aircraft carriers. Also, no definitive time table has been put forward by any Chinese officials.

And, much more significant from a viewpoint of the future of China's Navy, on 26 December a three-ship task force departed Sanya in Hainan Province for operations off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden to help deter pirate attacks on international merchant shipping. Although Chinese warships have carried out long-range visits to other countries, those could not be considered operational missions.

(The last time that China sent a naval expedition to East Africa was during the Ming Dynasty when the emperor's envoy Zheng He led a large armada in the early 15th Century to the region for goodwill port calls.)

The modern Chinese task force consists of two missile destroyers and a replenishment oiler. The destroyers are the Haikou and Wuhan. These are two of China's newest warships. The Haikou, completed in 2005, is an advanced air-defense ship, the Chinese equivalent of a Western Aegis-type warship. With a full load displacement of about 6,500 tons, the Haikouhas a heavy anti-air and anti-ship missile armament as well as anti-submarine weapons. Two helicopters are embarked.

The Wuhan, completed in 2004, is the same size, also with a multi-mission capability, although without the advanced 30N6E multi-function radar (Western code name Tombstone). One helicopter is carried.

The replenishment oiler Weishanhu, a 22,000-ton ship, completes the anti-pirate force.

About 800 officers and sailors man the three ships, commanded by Rear Admiral Du Jingchen. Upon sailing, Admiral Du stated that, "China definitely has neither the intention of threatening interests of any sovereign parties nor the interest in breaking up power equilibrium in the region."

A Defense Ministry spokesman said in an earlier statement that Chinese naval forces would observe United Nations Security Council resolutions and relative international laws in fulfilling its obligations. Almost 1,300 Chinese merchant ships have passed through the Gulf of Aden in 2008, with seven being attacked. One fishing ship and her 18 crew members are still being held by pirates. Negotiations for their rescue are underway.

China's increasing world-wide political and economic interests have rarely been supported by military forces. Thus, the anti-pirate operation will provide excellent training for Chinese naval forces in such operations while at the same time giving their officers experience in tactical operations with other navies. And, for Western navies operating in the area, it will provide an excellent opportunity for intelligence collection against modern Chinese warships their procedures.

"The main draw back of China in this issue is" an American officer concluded the issue "China either have the main catapult technolgy or the aircrafts.so the question does not raise when will they finish the project".

Video: (Just virtually) on potential PRC aircraftt carrier possibllility
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wmm8iQzlIRQ&feature=related

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UuztXxUPjgE&feature=related

http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/editions/i52/22.pdf

"Chinese Disaster Relief Operations - Identifying Critical Capability Gaps" JFQ 1st Quarter 2009

Yes, very true PLAAF not having enough of deployable medium & heavy helicopters and light medium fixed wing transport aircraft like the M28 skytruck

The US Air Force Special Operations Command will receive its first of 10 M-28 Skytrucks — a light cargo and passenger plane — in June.

http://www.skytruck.us/special_mission.html