| QUOTE |
| Soviet tactical innovations: The Soviet Ground Forces developed the bronegruppa concept to use the firepower of the personnel carriers in an independent reserve once the motorized rifle soldiers had dismounted. It was a bold step, for commanders of mechanized forces dislike separating their dismounted infantry from their carriers. However, terrain often dictated that the BMPs, BMDs and BTRs could not follow or support their squads. The bronegruppa concept gave the commander a potent, maneuverable reserve which could attack independently on the flanks, block expected enemy routes of withdrawal, serve as a mobile fire platform to reinforce elements in contact, serve as a battle taxi to pick-up forces (which had infiltrated or air-landed earlier and had finished their mission), perform patrols, serve in an economy-of-force role in both the offense and defense, and provide convoy escort and security functions. The Soviet Ground Forces adopted bounding overwatch for their mounted ground forces. One combat vehicle, or a group of combat vehicles, would occupy dominant terrain to cover another vehicle or groups of vehicles as they would advance. The advancing group would then stop on subsequent dominant terrain to cover the forward deployment of their covering group. When dismounted, however, the Soviet motorized rifle units normally placed some crew-served weapons in overwatch positions, but did not usually bring them forward periodically to cover the advance. Reconnaissance forces, however, used bounding overwatch when dismounted. ... The concept of the motorized rifle force was a marriage of soldiers and armored personnel carriers. The soldier was never supposed to be more than 200 meters from his carrier. His load-bearing equipment, uniform, weaponry, and other field gear reflected this orientation. Yet, Afghanistan was a light-infantryman's war--and the Soviets had very little light infantry. In general, the Soviet ground soldier remained tied to his personnel carrier and to the equipment which was designed to be carried by that personnel carrier. Consequently, the standard flak jacket weighed 16 kilograms (35 pounds). This was acceptable when dismounting a carrier and assaulting for less than a kilometer. However, a dismounted advance of three kilometers in flak jackets would stall due to troop exhaustion. The reconnaissance flak jacket was lighter and better, but in short supply. ... The Soviet emphasis on massed firepower instead of accuracy meant that the dismounted soldier carried a lot more ammunition than his Western counterpart would. Further, heavy crew-served weapons always accompanied the dismounted force. The 12.7 mm heavy machine gun weighs 34 kg (75 pounds) without its tripod and ammunition. The AGS-17 automatic grenade launcher weighs 30.4 kg (66 pounds) and each loaded ammunition drum weighs 14.7 kg (32 pounds). Dismounted Soviet soldiers were less agile and could not catch up with the Afghan guerrillas ... Not all Soviet soldiers avoided their duty. Many Soviet soldiers fought valiantly throughout the entire war. In particular, soldiers in Spetsnaz, airborne, air assault, and mountain rifle units, as well as those in separate motorized rifle brigades continually sought to close with the freedom fighters in close combat. But, these forces were accustomed to fighting outside of their armored vehicles and had not developed the "mobile bunker" mentality. Soviet tactics and equipment were designed solely to operate within the context of a theater war against a modern enemy who would obligingly occupy continuous defensive positions. The Soviet Army planned to contend with this defensive belt by physically obliterating hectares of defensive positions through the weight of massed artillery fires and then driving through the subsequent gap to strike deep and pursue the shattered foe. Future war was seen as a lethal, high tempo event where forces and firepower were carefully choreographed. Consequently, Soviet tactics were simple. They were designed to be implemented rapidly by conscripts and reservists and not to get in the way of the unfolding operation. Spacing between vehicles and the ability to dismount a personnel carrier, form a squad line and provide suppressive small-arms fire were prized components of motorized rifle tactics. Tactical initiative was not encouraged as it tended to upset operational timing. The mujahideen did not accommodate the Soviet Army by fighting conventional war. They refused to dig in and wait for Soviet artillery. The Soviets found that massed artillery and simple battle drills had little effect on the elusive guerrillas. Tactics had to be reworked on site. Air-ground coordination, artillery adjustment and coordinataion among maneuver units was often poor and required constant "quick-fixes" throughout the war. The most tactical innovation was seen among the airborne, air assault and Spetsnaz forces and the two separate motorized rifle brigades. These forces did the best in counterinsurgency battle. Far less innovation was apparent among the motorized rifle regiments. Tanks were of limited value in this war, but helicopters were a tremendous asset. Engineers were always in demand. |
| QUOTE (Grunt @ Mar 24 2009, 07:17 PM) |
| Good link, very interesting to see all the Soviet problems at that time. I believe the Royal Marine Commandos are also using the Viking (to be replaced by the Bronco) in Afghanistan. I'm wondering: What is the difference in the concept of operations in the use of armoured personnel carriers here? |
| QUOTE (UK Mod Website) |
| Taliban Hooked By 42 Commando Surprise Operation 19th Mar 2009 - Over 500 Marines from 42 Commando Group, partnered with soldiers from the Afghan National Army, have completed a gruelling month-long operation into the southern-most regions of Helmand Province. Using helicopter insertions, long desert marches and vehicle patrols throughout the ‘Fish Hook’ area of the Helmand Valley, their aim was to gather intelligence and gain an understanding of an area previously little-visited by ISAF troops. As well as carrying out a large-scale reconnaissance manoeuvre, working closely with the local population, the Commando Group deliberately disrupted the enemy and were engaged in a number of significant contacts – not least, in the town of Khan Neshin – an area known for Taliban influence. Here, they took on the enemy in the town, defeating suicide bombers, clearing compounds and engaging in fierce close-quarters combat. 42 Commando Group operate as the Regional Battlegroup South, used across the whole of southern Afghanistan by the Regional Commander. As part of a wider operation, Operation Aabi Toorah (Pashtu for Blue Sword), they provided the main assaulting force for this stage in southern Helmand. This is the first time such a sizeable reconnaissance force had been into the area - notorious as an ungoverned space allowing the insurgents freedom of movement for fighters, equipment and narcotics. The Marines spent nearly a month in the field, laying up in the desert between operations and being resupplied by helicopter drop. It all began on the 22nd February, when the force inserted into an area 100km south of Garmsir, into the lush Green Zone area on the banks of the River Helmand, in an area known as the ‘Fish Hook’, due to the prominent bend in the river. Royal Marines in their heavily-armed and highly manoeuvrable VIKING and JACKAL vehicles took up position, whilst another 300 Royal Marines were flown in by RAF Chinook helicopters. Joined by around 60 soldiers of the Afghan National Army, the joint force began their mission by moving rapidly eastwards through the area. Not just interested in enemy strength and movements, the force was bolstered with specialist Non-Kinetic Effects Teams (NKETs) – experts in the Baluch and Pashtun culture – who were able to gain a better understanding of the region and its dynamics. For nearly a week the force scoured the region, clearing over 40 square kilometres and spanning 70km of the River Helmand, holding Shura, or meetings, with local elders. They left with a wealth of information to assist those who will come back to the area later and informing the next stage of the operation – one that was to be far more aggressive. As with many of the British operations in Helmand, surprise was to form a vital weapon against the insurgents. On 29th January, the joint force gathered in a desert holding area 20km north west of the town Khan Neshin – a settlement surrounding an ancient fort and a bazaar known for drug and weapon dealing. The town had been identified by intelligence as a hotbed of Taliban activity – mingling with the local population and exerting significant influence over them in their brutal and oppressive way. Before dawn, the men of Lima Company 42 Commando Group left their desert hideaway in VIKING vehicles before ‘yomping’ the final distance over tough terrain, undetected, towards their target. As they broke into the village, compounds were secured and searched, with the Afghan forces taking the lead. Whilst the ground manoeuvre force cleared the main bazaar, the Commando Reconnaissance Force, a JACKAL-borne company of recce and heavy weapon experts, covered their approach.. A number of insurgent-held compounds were discovered and bitter close-quarters fighting broke out. As the Commandos stormed the enemy compounds, both they and the insurgents within traded grenades over compound walls. There were regular sporadic attacks and ambushes using automatic rifles and rocket-propelled grenades, but they were soon suppressed, causing the enemy to flee in disarray. As they moved through the area, two attempts were made to attack the Marines by suicide bombers - but due to the vigilance of the patrol the bombers only succeeded in killing themselves. Both detonated within metres of the marines and their Afghan comrades, but no-one was injured in either incident. As they systematically moved through the town the fighting intensified as they got closer to the main bazaar. With the insurgents attacking from urban firing points, showing total disregard for the safety of civilians, an Apache attack helicopter was called in – its accurate targeting systems and powerful 30mm cannon suppressed their firing points with no civilian casualties, allowing the Marines and ANSF to enter and clear compounds. A quantity of raw opium, weapons and ammunition, including AK-47 variant rifles and RPGs, were seized, along with two suicide vests – ready to be used against targets. Ed Stout, Company Sergeant Major of Lima Company 42 Commando Group, said: “Our engagements with the insurgents only ever end one way. Our overmatch is simply too much for the enemy. We are quite happy to engage him - it plays to our strengths as Commandos and allows us demonstrate our capability to everyone in the area. We can disrupt the insurgent and empower the locals in the same few days. It works.” With the insurgents having fled the area, led by the Afghan National Army, the men of Kilo Company set about conducting reassurance and intelligence gathering patrols, re-introducing a legitimate security presence in the village. Shuras were held with local people, where with the consent of the village elders, they arranged for the commando medics and dentist to run a temporary clinic, proving to the population that they provide more than just force and security. Major Neil Willson, Chief of Staff 42 Commando Group, said: “If we can present a human face, an understanding of local culture, customs and sensitivities, and show that we are honourable warriors in the face of the insurgency, the locals engage with us and respond positively. “They offer honest feedback on their situation and a degree of hospitality that is frankly humbling. I think we have moved the ball forward significantly in this area.” Having significantly disrupted the enemy in Khan Neshin, the Commando Group and their Afghan counterparts continued with their information gathering. The final move of their long operation saw them launch one more surprise move to the western villages of Malakhan and Taghaz, just a few kilometres from the border of Nimruz Province. From the 7th - 14th March they moved through the area, identifying the key infrastructure requirements, assessing the nature of facilities, the level of local governance and the key leaders within the community. Through a series of shuras, the Marines and Afghan forces discussed the priorities for the local people and identified the ways in which ISAF forces and the Government of Afghanistan would be able to expand its own influence and further disempower the insurgency in the region. Finally, their long mission complete, the force extracted back to Camp Bastion where with the hard yards of the operation behind them, the job of analysing and processing the huge amount of information and knowledge gathered will begin. Lt Col Charlie Stickland Royal Marines, Commanding Officer 42 Commando Group, said: “Before our arrival no-one knew what was here – it was largely a blank map. We have walked, fought and talked across a huge area and operated at huge reach. We have drunk endless cups of tea with the local Afghans, and as ISAF’s advance party we have set up the Government - Coalition partnership for significant success here. “This was a reconnaissance in force, and the key was agility; in terms of manoeuvre across a huge area by day and night, through long range desert patrols, helicopter insertion, and a reassuring posture when amongst the villagers. “By appearing unexpected at a time and place of our choosing we owned the space, causing uncertainty in the insurgent’s mind, disrupting his plans. The many shuras we have held are crucial to generating a real and meaningful understanding of this area, and that was my mission. “We have achieved more than we could have imagined a month ago, and ultimately this comes down to the robustness of the Marines and soldiers of the Commando Group, who can operate at such intensity for a month.” http://www.royalmarines.mod.uk/server/show/ConWebDoc.15627 |
| QUOTE (stars @ Mar 25 2009, 01:22 AM) |
| hmm, but then again could go like the way grunt suggested, armour/viking just a battlefield taxi for infantry (replacing tonners with tracked or wheeled for greater mobility) not sure where this might be going. |
| QUOTE (Armour in Afghanistan) |
| Danish Tanks in Serious Fire-Fight in Afghanistan 14-01-2008 - On January 5th, three Danish tanks supporting the British Army against the Taliban proved their value. Danish infantry also came under fire. A British Company (Map 1) under the Danish-led Battle Group Centre, advanced along the east side of the Helmand river. The British came under fire from small arms and RPGs [rocket propelled grenades]. Danish forces were positioned on the west side of the river to prevent any Taliban on that side from joining in the attack on the British. The Danish units were a platoon of mechanized infantry (Map 2) and the crews of three Leopard tanks. (Map 3) However, the Danish mechanized infantry, themselves, came under hostile fire from Taliban positions on the western side of the Helmand River. The Taliban used local compounds to provide some cover for their advance. The Danish infantry successfully blocked a frontal attack by the Taliban and the enemy tried to disengage and flank the Danish unit (a manoeuvre used repeatedly by the Taliban which, if not stopped, can leave ISAF defenders in serious danger). This time, however, Danish tanks were emplaced on high ground on the edge of the desert. From these overwatch positions, Danish tank crews could see down into the “Green Zone” along the river’s edges. When the Taliban tried to move into positions among abandoned compounds to engage the Danish infantry, the enemy were in plain view of Danish tankers. Taken by surprise by the tanks It was a clear mistake by the Taliban not to consider the tanks up above the Green Zone. With a great deal of machinegun fire and 20 rounds fired from the guns, the Danish Leopard tank crews engaged the Taliban both out in open terrain and when the enemy forces took cover in compounds. In this situation, the tanks’ supporting fire was a big help to the Danish infantry. Easier reconstruction By engaging the Taliban on either side of the river, the Danish and British ground forces reduced the need for air support. Tank fire, which is frightenly accurate, pentetrates walls but usually does not level a mud-brick compound the way large bombs dropped by aircraft can. This makes reconstruction in the area far easier once the Taliban have been removed. Calm in the area After the riverside clash, there has been very little hostile activity in the area. This may be due to the extreme cold in Helmand at present. But it may also be that the enemy suffered great losses as a result of precision shooting by the Danish Leopard tank gunners. At any rate, cooperation between the tanks and infantry is seen to be vital in the fight against the Taliban in the Green Zone. http://www.casr.ca/ft-leopard-2a5-denmark-2.htm |
| QUOTE (cbcnews) |
| Military will need break when Afghan mission ends: Canadian army chief The military may need a one-year break from operations starting July 2011 when the Afghanistan mission winds down, the head of Canada's army said Monday. Lt.-Gen. Andrew Leslie told the Senate defence committee Monday that the Canadian Forces have been strained by the mission that began seven years ago and need time to regroup. "In the mid-term and beginning in July 2011, we will have to explore the possibility of taking a short operational break, that is well-organized and synchronized, of at least one year," he said. Parliament agreed last year to extend Canada's military mission in Afghanistan to 2011 from the previous 2009 pull-out date. In addition, Canada currently has less than 100 soldiers deployed as part of a dozen other operations around the world. A break may be needed, Leslie said, because the military is suffering from shortages of personnel, particularly experienced senior officers, as well as equipment. Despite shortages, some equipment is not in use But some equipment apparently isn't even being used. There are 40 Leopard 2 battle tanks sitting unused in a Montreal warehouse and another 40 stored somewhere in Europe awaiting the federal government to hire a firm to refurbish them, Leslie said. The tanks need to be outfitted with heavy armour to resist roadside bomb blasts. The slightly used tanks have been in storage in Montreal since last November after Canada bought 100 surplus tanks from the Netherlands in 2007. The Canadian army had borrowed 20 Leopard A6Ms from Germany in the summer of 2007 to quickly replace its own nearly 30-year-old Leopard tanks, which were not suited for use in Afghanistan. The German loaners were returned once the newer Dutch tanks were delivered. "Until such time as the contract is let and they're actually delivered from the manufacturer, who is going to refurbish them, into the hands of the army, they don't belong to the army," Leslie said outside the committee room. Defence Minister Peter MacKay said the government intends to get the Leopard 2's into action expeditiously, though he didn't elaborate. "Clearly the intention is to get those into theatre as quickly as possible. So we're determining how to do that," he said. "Those Leopard tanks are lifesavers. They are game changers, and we want to get those tanks where they can be used to save lives and to further the aims of the mission." Neither the Public Works Department, which is responsible for awarding government contracts, nor the Defence Department were immediately available to comment on the tanks. Most military base equipment out of service Earlier, Leslie told senators that more than 70 per cent of equipment used on military bases across Canada to train soldiers before they deploy to Afghanistan is out of service at any given time. Vehicles aren't being repaired because the military lacks skilled mechanics and technicians, he said. And as more vehicles break down, he added, fewer are available for soldiers to train on before deploying to Afghanistan. Citing figures from last month, Leslie said 33 per cent of the army's light-armoured vehicles (LAVs) are out of service, along with 76 per cent of its Coyotes, 100 per cent of its tracked light-armoured vehicles (TLAVs), 73 per cent of its Bisons and 71 per cent of its Leopard tanks. "This situation is extremely serious because the number and types of equipment that have to be repaired and replaced continues to increase at a rapid pace, and their use is much greater than planned when they were originally purchased," Leslie said. He said the military is now using all its equipment in "extremely demanding" conditions and so time-consuming maintenance and repair is needed. Leslie called on Ottawa to cut some of the red tape that often bogs things down. "We have to eliminate process," he said. "Or reducing the amount of paperwork and the decision time and the decision cycles… to fix equipment that's broken." http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2009/03/09/...tary-break.html |
| QUOTE (FIVE-TWO @ Mar 26 2009, 03:17 AM) |
| actually we have been doing what bdique described for well over 25 years at least. |
| QUOTE (weasel1962 @ Mar 26 2009, 08:32 AM) | ||
The question is... with the acquisition of the L2, will this actually change things have been working for the past 25 years? and if so how. I think bdique's post esp in the last part, does address one possibility how this might work. |
| QUOTE (bdique @ Mar 26 2009, 09:30 PM) |
| hmm...actually for infantry I think there won't be much change in terms of loadout...bronco/terrex will still serve as a battle taxi/mobile MG post (cum mobile bunker?) so as to allow SAF to conduct higher tempo ops + power source for ACMS? here's the funny thing...I believe there'll be organic L2s to the armoured battalions...however won't the Bronco's and Terrexes need heavy firepower aka L2s as well? where will they come from? can't possibly detach them from the SARs rite? or will the role of the SAR change i.e. not only to punch a hole in the enemy front but also to escort the APCs? sorry stars, i know this still doesn't quite answer if we're gonna end up looking like the soviets...altho there's another country I can think of that our armoured units might end up looking like :P |
| QUOTE (CM06 @ Mar 26 2009, 11:49 PM) |
| This is the next step to providing our infantry with greater protection, fire support and mobility. It also allows better performance in urbanised areas (wheels versus tracks) and allows the "Armour" to focus more on their capability. |
| QUOTE (Grunt @ Mar 27 2009, 10:19 AM) |
| Let me explain how I think before I get hammered in this thread... :P In the past, 1 platoon all load up on 1x 3 tonner. Kill the 3 tonner before dismount = loss of 1 platoon. Now place the same platoon in 3 vehicles, need to kill all 3 to be = loss of 1 platoon. Conceptually, we have been using protected mobility with AI since our M113 purchase. The Bx and BxII provides an increase in armour, the ability to provide heavy suppressive fire and increase in big picture situational awareness (because of input from UAVs etc). But protected fire power is not a substitute for using the right tactics (and we should note that the Royal Marines dismounted in their recce by force movement, except for the Commando Reconnaissance Force, a JACKAL-borne company of recce and heavy weapon experts who covered their approach). As infantry, we gain situational awareness of our immediate environment once the platoon dismounts simply because we now have more than 30 pairs of eyes and ears on the ground (and the Mk 1 eye balls is better than a notebook sized screen BMS system). Infantry manage risk by maintaining tactical distance (i.e. don't bunch up). Have you tried reading on a notebook while walking? Can't be done right? The idea is to augment situational awareness for mechanised infantry via BMS. This means enabling updates until dismount. So that at dismount we have better big picture situational awareness provided by the BMS. Not sure if you guys agree but that's my initial thoughts on the subject. |
| QUOTE (weasel1962 @ Mar 27 2009, 03:01 PM) |
| why dismount? MBT-led thunder runs... |
| QUOTE |
| http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/DefenceNews/MilitaryOperations/MarinesShatterillusionOfEnemySafeHaven.htm ....The three-day operation was conducted by 500 Royal Marines from 42 Commando Royal Marines, 120 soldiers of the Danish Battle Group, British Viking armoured support vehicles, elements from the British Army's explosive ordnance disposal teams, and the Afghan National Army's 205 Hero Corps. It was the first of many major operations into this area, and resulted in a resounding defeat for enemy forces with ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) and the Afghan National Army (ANA) setting the conditions for other forces to return to conduct operations in the future. Op AABI TOORAH began with the pre-positioning of the Danish tanks, previously used on Op SOND CHARA in December to great effect, and British Vikings. The first Royal Navy helicopter insertion was of K Company, 42 Commando Royal Marines, followed by the Commando Reconnaissance Force (CRF), both as an outer cordon and into the very centre of the Trikh Nawa district, which is sandwiched between Nad e-Ali and Marjah. This was followed very quickly by further helicopter-borne troops, as Lima Company, 42 Commando Royal Marines, landed covertly in the desert and yomped (walked) several kilometres, each man carrying upwards of 100kg, to the objective codenamed SILVER. There they took the enemy by surprise, hitting them and moving on, constantly putting the enemy on the back foot. The aim was to confuse the enemy and force them to show their locations, flushing them out for the ISAF troops to strike. The three sub-units of the CRF and Kilo and Lima companies worked in concert, one always static in a position to cover the move of the others. In this way, engaging the enemy both from the flanks and from within, the troops' movements were hidden from the enemy and each time ISAF offensive action surprised them, drawing them apart. The enemy's confused reactions enabled the ISAF and Afghan forces to pull them away from their command structures and defeat them in place. Major Rich Cantrill Royal Marines, Officer Commanding Lima Company, reflecting on their position after the first night's fighting, said: "The enemy action we have seen looks to us like an attempt to delay us, as they are focusing on defending Marjah. This really is the gold standard 'tick in a box' for us in terms of the mission we have been given, so we are quite happy with the state of play at the moment." With the CRF initially inserting into the heart of the enemy positions, at helicopter landing site PLATINUM, Kilo Company secured a canal crossing point to the north; this crucial resupply point would both control the area and stop the enemy reinforcing their locations. Simultaneously, Lima Company moved from SILVER towards the southern objective BRASS in order to control vital road access and prevent the enemy fleeing with their arms and explosives, and reporting to their command teams in central Marjah. At the same time the Danish Leopard tanks were in an overwatch position on high ground to the north and west and were used throughout the battle to engage, from range, the well dug-in enemy positions. As the troops moved through their own respective areas they cleared compounds of enemy forces, securing the area and taking time to speak to and reassure the local people, before moving on to the next location. On occasions the pitched battles were fierce but the capability and training of the ISAF and Afghan forces overmatched the enemy at every turn. At the same time, to the north east of the Nad e-Ali area, the ANA was conducting patrols to reassure the local population of the continuing security, stability and governance in the area. Over the three days the enemy tried to rally and put up a strong defence. The fighting was constant but the tempo always controlled by the ISAF and Afghan forces. The enemy, although determined and tenacious, were clearly overmatched in every sense and comprehensively beaten.... |
| QUOTE (stars @ Mar 27 2009, 11:31 AM) |
as it is, our infantry is possibly one of the best equipped in SEA. each section alone has so much weapons and other warfighting kit. new Body armour and emphasis on fire superiority (more ammo needed) will introduce more and more weight for the infantry. |
| QUOTE (ChineseJunk @ Mar 27 2009, 05:19 PM) |
| At the risk of igniting another us versus them pissing match, I'd humbly point out that the Malaysian Army section has 1) more manpower and 2) more firepower than its SAF counterpart. The SAF section delivers its heaviest punch with Matador. But this is a single-shot, throw away weapon compared to the MAF's RPG-7. Yes, I've read all the arguments about RPG rockets losing their accuracy in cross wind etc. But with two Minimis, two RPGs and one multiple grenade launcher, the Malaysian BIS section can hammer their targets repeatedly with a frightful amount of ordnance. In terms of weight of fire and sustainability of firepower during a section versus section engagement, I believe the Malaysian section would prevail. Things may be different with ACMS. The above comments refer mainly to the number of barrels each section brings to play. My 2 Singapore cents. |
| QUOTE |
| for the uninitiated, drinking water from "unknown" water source could lead to a major outbreak of disease that could easily incapacitate an entire battalion. |
| QUOTE (YourFather @ Mar 28 2009, 10:30 AM) | ||
No water purification pills? :o |
| QUOTE (YourFather @ Mar 28 2009, 10:30 AM) | ||
No water purification pills? :o |
| QUOTE (IAF @ Mar 29 2009, 12:06 PM) | ||||
tough mofos |
| QUOTE (bdique @ Mar 29 2009, 06:13 PM) | ||||||
go back to bunk spam charcoal pills |
| QUOTE (VAMPIRE 06) |
| There’s been a lot in the news lately about what “victory” in Afghanistan looks like. I really don’t know, nor do I want to venture an opinion on that one. People at much higher pay grades than mine can figure that one out. All I can speak for is the little piece of Afghanistan that I share with my ANA and the local populace of Bermel. I’ll tell you this; it’s little things. Try to accomplish much more you’ll begin a slow circle of the drain leading to frustration and self induced psychosis. What I’m about to tell you about is 5 kilometers. That’s 3.1 miles, not very far. But it might as well be a light year here. When we arrived here the fighting season was drawing to a close. The fighting season typically runs from late March to early December. Then snow shuts down the rugged passes used by the Taliban to enter into the country. During the fighting season military operations focus on what’s termed as kinetic, meaning we focus on fighting the enemy directly. As this time drew to a close we were somewhat at a loss for our next course of action. We sat down and started brain storming for a direction in which to proceed. As an ETT in a remote area we have quite a bit of leeway in determining our strategies. We started with the central premise of counterinsurgency (COIN) warfare. Separate the insurgents from the local populace. How could we do this based upon the assets we had at our disposal? ... We noticed that our contact with the enemy and their means of support ran along a north/south road. What I’ll call the line of friction. This is the best description that I can think of as it’s wasn’t open conflict all the time, thus friction seems better than conflict. This line traced the western wall of the desolate valley in which we live. Along this line lay the main villages and it served as the major travel corridor. Our hope was to push this line farther to the east. Next we analyzed our assets. Obviously we had firepower but that didn’t accomplish what we hoped to do. The best asset we had was humanitarian and medical assistance. Tons of food, clothing, cooking oil and blankets were here on the FOB. We also had a US aid station and an ANA aid station from which we could pull medics and medical supplies for use in the local area. We saw these as our conduit to engage with the locals on a frequent and more direct basis allowing them to see the ANA as bringers of hope and not violence. The timeframe to capitalize was limited. We only had between December and late March while the ACM were out of the valley and couldn’t hinder our operations. Thus, we needed to be out of the wire at least three times a week. That doesn’t sound like much but planning and staging a military operation takes time. It was a very high operational tempo to shoot for. Our strategy consisted of two tasks in support of our overarching goal of population separation. One, demonstrate that the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan could assist them materially and in conjunction with this conduct an information operations (IO) campaign. Two, we try to gather intelligence on the local area and personalities in preparation for the upcoming fighting season. All of this was focused on the line of friction. We defined some criteria that would cause us to deviate from the line. I won’t elaborate on those but we stuck to them and didn’t lose our focus. We also decided on criteria that would cause us to go into kinetic operations. Basically; this was self defense only; we would not chase the enemy. We couldn’t allow the enemy to distract us from our task. That may sound strange. However insurgency warfare is theater in the round and often their attacks are conducted just to provoke a response which detracts from the greater purpose. The single theme of our IO campaign was this, “The government is here supporting you during the winter and the ACM is not”. It was as simple as that. We didn’t deviate or elaborate and as the politicians like to say we always stayed on message. Simple to the point and undisputable. The sub-governor, ANP, ANA and CF all communicated this message. If we heard about someone sending a different message we sat down with them and discussed why they’d strayed off the message. Everyone pounded this message into whoever we could anytime we could. Along with the IO; we brought all of the humanitarian assistance that we could find. In fact many of you reading this sent us stuff. We took anything that we could and at times used our own monies to buy firewood, food or cooking oil. We didn’t care where it came from or what it looked like we took it out to the people. Additionally we brought medics and medicine. The CF and ANA medics along with our interpreters would see anyone who came, no matter what the injury or sickness. We attempted to treat anyone; we even looked at some sick goats at one point. We’d treat all comers! The ANA established an SOP for putting these sites up. It was painful and in the beginning there were some near riots, but we worked through it and got the method down. The ANA also ensured that the materials were distributed directly to the people and not through the tribe elders. This ensured that the people knew that the government had provided the materials. |