Title: Forum Page letter on SAF training death
ChineseJunk - September 29, 2009 09:20 AM (GMT)
xtemujin - September 29, 2009 11:33 AM (GMT)
I've read your blog and it seems like these people are from another universe and they can't do no wrong.
It's sad to see this happen but I hope that they'll see the light at the end of the tunnel before the light close shop.
Welcome to the suck and blows at the same time.
It's sad to see this happen but I hope that they'll see the light at the end of the tunnel before the light close shop.
Welcome to the suck and blows at the same time.
Grunt - September 29, 2009 11:52 AM (GMT)
| QUOTE (ChineseJunk @ Sep 29 2009, 05:20 PM) |
| Fallout from the Forum Page letter on the SAF training death |
We are better as a country because we don't tolerate certain types of crap and are willing to be black listed for it. I applaud you for doing the right thing.
I know an Israeli trained armour officer who left service because he did not want to tolerate crap from his superior officer (to protect his subordinate). GKS, our first defence minister knew him and wrote to retain him. He said no. He said that he will not work for a superior officer who wanted to lay-blame. GKS had a measure of the type of man his superior officer was from the incident. He stood up for what is right, paid a personal price and made the SAF a better place - from this incident. BTW, he took 28 months to become an armour officer back then - having to go through infantry section leader course/armour section leader course and thereafter OCS, for infantry, followed by OCS for armour. If you want names, I'll have to do it by PM.
I've also watched my former reserve CO stand-up for what he thinks is right. He stood his ground against a higher ranking officer in an overseas training exercise and we respected him for it. All it takes is a little personal courage.
A few years later, it was my turn. I also stood up against a higher ranking officer within my reserve unit to protect my subordinates. There was an investigation within my reserve unit. My reserve unit did the right thing and for the rest of my reserve cycle he did not have command responsibility for me or my subordinates. BTW, I was promoted by personal letter by my CO thereafter and my reserve unit won the best unit competition twice. Specific names and unit are available by PM.
Stand-up for what is right. Our country is better for it.
valice - September 29, 2009 12:21 PM (GMT)
| QUOTE (xtemujin @ Sep 29 2009, 07:33 PM) |
| I've read your blog and it seems like these people are from another universe and they can't do no wrong. It's sad to see this happen but I hope that they'll see the light at the end of the tunnel before the light close shop. |
Some officers are like that. They come in, they wanna exert their authority and do something "safe" to ensure that they can carry on with their ROA.
There are incidents where the right things are just not done, because people don't want to risk their 3-crabs. They are just looking to have a peaceful little time, get their 1-star after the stint... :(
IAF - September 29, 2009 01:35 PM (GMT)
More power to the whistle blowers!
AREA-51 - September 30, 2009 04:05 AM (GMT)
This type of behaviour are also in the Civilian world.
When you stand up to defend or fight what is right for your team, you will be branded as negative by the top ppls. They feel that you are making their life a bit hot around the collar. They would rather you stay quiet so that they can sail along and climb the coperate ladder.
I have my fair share of this craps......
When you stand up to defend or fight what is right for your team, you will be branded as negative by the top ppls. They feel that you are making their life a bit hot around the collar. They would rather you stay quiet so that they can sail along and climb the coperate ladder.
I have my fair share of this craps......
bdique - September 30, 2009 06:03 AM (GMT)
| QUOTE (AREA-51 @ Sep 30 2009, 12:05 PM) |
| This type of behaviour are also in the Civilian world. When you stand up to defend or fight what is right for your team, you will be branded as negative by the top ppls. They feel that you are making their life a bit hot around the collar. They would rather you stay quiet so that they can sail along and climb the coperate ladder. I have my fair share of this craps...... |
Hey, I'm a student and I get that as well :angry:
stand up for what is your right. its not like we've resorted to under-the-belt methods, we're just blowing the whistle.
weasel1962 - September 30, 2009 06:44 AM (GMT)
| QUOTE (bdique @ Sep 30 2009, 02:03 PM) | ||
Hey, I'm a student and I get that as well :angry: stand up for what is your right. its not like we've resorted to under-the-belt methods, we're just blowing the whistle. |
When one starts working, one would learn that its not about blowing the whistle but how one blows the whistle that counts.
Sometimes if its a problem with the process, its less productive to blame the people/organisation responsible for the process than blaming the process itself. When one gets personal, don't expect the other party not to get personal.
IQ vs EQ. I would guess we all appear to have very good IQ being able to spot and/or recognise the problem. EQ enables us to communicate that problem effectively.
The above is just a general comment on how I would approach the issue and not targeted at any specific post.
Personally, I don't think the letter from CJ was the cause of the AOH incident. It could have been easily a number of other factors.
Grunt - September 30, 2009 07:21 AM (GMT)
| QUOTE (weasel1962 @ Sep 30 2009, 02:44 PM) |
| Sometimes if its a problem with the process, its less productive to blame the people/organisation responsible for the process than blaming the process itself. When one gets personal, don't expect the other party not to get personal. |
But sometimes it is the person (not an issue with IQ or EQ). The three examples I gave relate to integrity and when you weigh the alternatives, they are all unpleasant. In that case, as a leader/person, you just have to stand your ground. And the SAF will just have to learn to respond professionally to honest commentary. If they can't do it in peace time, they will be eaten alive by foreign media, if we ever need to deal with them over 'no dove' incidents overseas. BTW, I have specific confirmation from an American journalist/writer that he has had problems with our Mindef Public Affairs and that he was unhappy. So I know that our stock of good-will is not high. And I don't think anyone can accuse our Mindef Public Affairs of being a slick public relations machine.
eg. What if our navy had to be involved in a shooting incident with pirates and a civilian sailor was killed (in our patrols in the Gulf of Aden)? {touch wood} What did you think about the Indian navy sinking the Thai fishing vessel that was used by pirates as a mothership? You mean this can't happen, as we take more risks? If the answer is yes, then we better shape up.
Even people like Michael Yon is having problems with a specific officer in the British Army in relation to Public Affairs in Afghanistan. And he is much harsher than any local journalist/writer will ever be. That officer, Maj Major Ric Cole has been specifically named by another blog.
| QUOTE |
| By Michael Yon 25 September 2009 - Bullshit Bob The surprise discontinuation of my embedment from the British Army left my schedule in a train wreck. Until that decisive moment, I am told, that my embed with the British Army had lasted longer than anyone else’s; other than Ross Kemp’s. I’ve also been told that I’ve spent more time with the British Army in Iraq than any correspondent. So it’s fair to say, we have good history together. In the last 12 months, I’ve embedded with the British Army in Helmand Province, Afghanistan, then over to the jungles of Brunei to attend a man-tracking school, and again back in Afghanistan. During that time, I’ve also been with U.S. forces in Iraq, the Philippines, and Afghanistan. I’ve accompanied the Lithuanians in Afghanistan and also been downrange for months without any troops or official assignment. This dispatch, and many others, should have been about soldiers at war. But it’s not. This dispatch is being written in downtown Kandahar City and I have not seen a soldier in days. The Taliban is slowing winning this city. There have been many bombings and shootings since I arrived in disguise. In 2006, Iraq was melting down and I had just written twelve dispatches that clearly stated we were losing in Afghanistan. Those dispatches caused a public uproar and the consequences were such that U.S. military refused to let me back into Iraq. Because of the U.S. military censorship in Iraq, I published a dispatch in the Weekly Standard titled, Censoring Iraq. General Petraeus emailed to me immediately, and if not for his intervention, there would have been Censoring Iraq II, III, IV, V…. Ultimately, dozens of dispatches about soldiers have been forever lost. I returned to Iraq in 2006, and in 2007, I reported that the war had turned around and progress was clear. In 2008, I wrote that we had won the Iraq war. And although recent bombings have grabbed headlines, overall violence continues to decrease. This brings us to Afghanistan, 2009. My latest embed with British 2 Rifles, which began in July, was extended on at least two occasions. The British Ministry of Defence (MoD) had recently agreed that I would spend roughly one more month with 2 Rifles. My scheduled embeds with the United States Air Force and Marines were specifically arranged around the British schedule, and I was enjoying reporting on the excellent British troops. However, on August 24th, with no warning, unseen faces of MoD discontinued my embed from 2 Rifles. The message that I was no longer embedded was emailed to me by Media Ops, just as I returned from an interesting firefight in the Green Zone. Luckily, none of our guys got hit, but I think the British soldiers may have killed some Taliban. I do not know the reason for the embed termination. My best guess is that it relates to my sustained criticism that the British government is not properly resourcing its soldiers. Before going further, it is essential to underscore the importance of the “Media Ops” in the war. When Media Ops fails to help correspondents report from the front, the public misses necessary information to make informed decisions about the war. Many soldiers in the British Media Ops are true professionals who strive constantly to improve at their tasks and work very well with correspondents. Their professionalism and understanding of the larger mission—ultimate victory—provide an invaluable service to the war effort. But there are a few who should not be in uniform and it takes only one roach leg to spoil a perfect soup. For example—without giving names so as not to tar and feather someone for his entire life when he still has a chance to change his behavior—the British Major running Media Ops at Camp Bastion has been particularly problematic. Even before my embed started with 2 Rifles, his words raised red flags among the correspondents about his priorities. I had a specific incident with this British Media Ops Major. The Major and I were driving in Camp Bastion around midday when it was very hot. A British soldier ran by wearing a rucksack. He was drenched in sweat under the blazing, dusty desert. I smiled because it’s great to see so many soldiers who work and train hard. Yet the Major cut fun at the soldier, saying he was dumb to be running in that heat. I nearly growled at the Major, but instead asked if he ever goes into combat. The answer was no. And, in fact, the Major does not leave the safety of Camp Bastion. That a military officer would share a foul word about a combat soldier who was prepping for battle was offensive. Especially an officer who lives in an air-conditioned tent with a refrigerator stocked with chilled soft drinks. Just outside his tent are nice hot and cold showers. Five minutes away is a little Pizza Hut trailer, a coffee shop, stores, and a cookhouse. This very Major had earned a foul reputation among his own kind for spending too much time on his Facebook page. I personally saw him being gratuitously rude to correspondents. Some correspondents—all were British—complained to me that when they wanted to interview senior British officers, they were told by this Major to submit written questions. The Major said they would receive videotaped answers that they could edit as if they were talking with the interviewee. (Presumably, senior British officers are avoiding the tough questions, such as, “So, when do you plan to send enough helicopters?”) When I asked a different Media Ops officer about meeting with a senior British General in Afghanistan, I was told that submitting a CV (curriculum vitae) would be helpful, to which I laughed. A CV? How about this: Name: Michael Yon Profession: Writer Experience: Years Notes: I will be in and affecting your battle space for years to come. (By the way, you are losing the war. Hiding from correspondents does not change that fact.) This war is moving fast and there is no time for games. If a general does not want to tell his story, someone will tell it for him. He will have failed by losing another winnable media battle. On a sidebar, before this article was published I was invited to the Netherlands by the esteemed James “Maggie” Megallas to attend an incredible Dutch remembrance for our World War II veterans. For those who don’t know him, James Megellas is a retired U.S. Army officer who commanded Company "H" of the 3rd Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment (PIR), 82nd Airborne Division during World War II. Maggie is the most-decorated officer in the history of the 82nd Airborne Division, having received a Distinguished Service Cross, a Silver Star, and been nominated for the Medal of Honor. Maggie at 92 and is an extraordinary man. He can give an eloquent speech for an hour without a single written note. He has spent a couple months in Afghanistan—in the worst places. He’s a true leader and a wise man, known to General McChrystal and General Petraeus. General Petraeus told me last week that CENTCOM had okayed Maggie’s trip to Afghanistan. Maggie is an American treasure. Last week in the Netherlands, “Maggie” was spending time General Petraeus and with European royalty, including Queen Beatrix of the Netherlands. General Petraeus and World War II veterans stayed several days at the same hotel Maggie and I were in. In Holland, folks were lining up to honor and pay tribute to our World War II veterans and General Petraeus. I didn’t want to distract General Petraeus with any questions while he was so busy. But on about the third day, there was a tap on my shoulder and I was told that General Petraeus had some time if I wanted to talk. I asked the good General some tough questions on Afghanistan—the kind that would end discussions with timid people—yet, like normal, he fielded those questions with the candor that I so respect in him and have come to expect. The same has happened to me with the Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, and other top military leaders. Gates and Petraeus will field challenging, difficult questions and will take what you throw at them. Yet the British Media Ops in Afghanistan wants correspondents to submit written questions so they can provide tidy answers. That’s a sad joke and there are many correspondents, including me, who are not laughing. More on the trip to Netherlands will be forthcoming, but now back to Afghanistan: At Camp Bastion there are two tents at Media Ops. One tent is for the Media Ops staff and the other is for the itinerant correspondents. When ever the Internet died in the correspondents’ tent, the Major in question let the journalists use the Internet in the staff tent. That was helpful and appreciated. But he locked the door at night (the tent has a door) and kept it that way until the morning so that no correspondent would wake him with keyboard tapping. Not helpful on transmitting information. At a glance, that seems trivial stuff, really. But it’s not trivial when you know that these are the same Media Ops people—who do not leave their base or go on missions—who are spooling out “the message” to the media. They are clueless about the state of the war in Afghanistan. For instance, many of the Media Ops officers will insist that we have enough helicopters in Afghanistan. Those officers are either completely oblivious to the actuality of the situation or lying. General Petraeus told me straight up that we don’t have enough and that we doubled our helicopters in the last four months and are in the process of fielding “two more fistfuls.” (He did not give specific numbers.) Those BS-filled officers who deny the obvious are, in fact, symptomatic to why we are losing the war. When I deliver good news, out rolls the red carpet. Bad news, and it’s time to fight again. Only now it’s not Censoring Iraq, it’s Censoring Helmand. And it’s not the U.S. doing it this time, but the British government. The British people are demanding truth and they deserve accountability. They aren’t getting it from Camp Bastion. Some of the Media Ops guys in Afghanistan are good at something such as threatening future access if a correspondent shows “attitude” about being poorly treated. My answer is go to hell. They can take their access and. . . . I work for the soldiers, for the readers, and for the people in general. If Media Ops chooses to be an obstacle, that is their choice. After being summarily disembedded it took days—due to the helicopter shortage—to catch a helicopter from the Green Zone and head over to the posh Media Ops tent. There I found the same Major still up to his old attitude with some of the correspondents. Meanwhile, because of the abrupt embed, my scheduling problems were unfolding. The U.S. Marines, of whom I have never seen treat anyone like the British Major treats correspondents, wanted to take me. But the earliest I could embed with them was on 16 September. This fell at the same time I needed to punch out and head to Eindhoven in The Netherlands for the World War II remembrance ceremonies which I had been invited to long ago. The Royal Netherlands Air Force (RNAF) had made arrangements to fly me from Afghanistan to Eindhoven. Disembedded or not, it should have been a simple matter for me to have a few days, even out of pure courtesy, where I could settle some business with the U. S. Air Force and U.S. Marines. But the boss of Media Ops in Afghanistan, Lt Col Nick Richardson in Lashkar Gah, through the Major at Bastion, demanded that I leave the Regional Command South (RC-South) which is under British control. I said in essence, hold on, partner, are you saying that you are knowingly interfering with my ability to arrange an embed with the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Marines? Especially after you abruptly released me as correspondent? Because if that’s what Media Ops was saying, then we were going to have a Texas-sized fight. The boss of Media Ops in Afghanistan Lt. Col. Richardson has tweaked other peoples’ BS sensors on the helicopter issue, including Daniel Bennett at the Frontline Club. Richardson is doing more damage to the war effort than the Taliban media machine. By perpetrating falsehoods that undermine our combat capacity, Richardson has helped the enemy. Some of the smokescreens are less important but they are demonstrative of the pattern: On 20 August a, CH-47 helicopter was shot down by a Taliban RPG during a British Special Forces mission. Richardson reported that the aircraft landed due to an engine fire. Some hours later, while I was on a mission nearby, the Taliban were singing over the radios about shooting it down. I heard the rumble when the helicopter was destroyed by airstrikes. The Taliban knew they hit the helicopter. So who is Richardson lying to? Not the enemy…unless the enemy is the British public. Stephen Grey and others have noted the censorship: |
weasel1962 - September 30, 2009 09:41 AM (GMT)
I agree. Sometimes the problem could be with the person.
I don't disagree that there will be specific bad eggs in the armed forces.
And yet, there is differing ways that can be managed.
Having said that, the letter by CJ to 90C was imho appropriately and timely written. It would take a d*ckhead to read it as negative and I don't think the saf's media team are d*ckheads.
I don't disagree that there will be specific bad eggs in the armed forces.
And yet, there is differing ways that can be managed.
Having said that, the letter by CJ to 90C was imho appropriately and timely written. It would take a d*ckhead to read it as negative and I don't think the saf's media team are d*ckheads.
ChineseJunk - September 30, 2009 11:36 AM (GMT)
"In 2006, Iraq was melting down and I had just written twelve dispatches that clearly stated we were losing in Afghanistan. Those dispatches caused a public uproar and the consequences were such that U.S. military refused to let me back into Iraq. Because of the U.S. military censorship in Iraq, I published a dispatch in the Weekly Standard titled, Censoring Iraq. General Petraeus emailed to me immediately, and if not for his intervention, there would have been Censoring Iraq II, III, IV, V…." :huh:
I am not at war with the SAF or MINDEF, but I will not suffer fools.
I can tell you there will be a Blue on Blue Part 3 to Part 78, one a week for the next 1.5 years. This is the ops tempo I'm prepared for under a short engagement scenario.
You can tell from the page views there has been a spike in interest in the blog.
My concept of info ops effectiveness doesn't come from counting page views, just as a bodycount doesn't mean much in conventional ops. One click from one important decision maker is worth more to me than a blizzard of page views.
I got that click today. :)
I am not at war with the SAF or MINDEF, but I will not suffer fools.
I can tell you there will be a Blue on Blue Part 3 to Part 78, one a week for the next 1.5 years. This is the ops tempo I'm prepared for under a short engagement scenario.
You can tell from the page views there has been a spike in interest in the blog.
My concept of info ops effectiveness doesn't come from counting page views, just as a bodycount doesn't mean much in conventional ops. One click from one important decision maker is worth more to me than a blizzard of page views.
I got that click today. :)
kilroy - September 30, 2009 01:06 PM (GMT)
| QUOTE (ChineseJunk @ Sep 30 2009, 07:36 PM) |
| You can tell from the page views there has been a spike in interest in the blog. My concept of info ops effectiveness doesn't come from counting page views, just as a bodycount doesn't mean much in conventional ops. One click from one important decision maker is worth more to me than a blizzard of page views. I got that click today. :) |
good to know that the important decision maker has clicked.
anyway, your post was highlighted on The Singapore Daily yesterday.
ChineseJunk - October 7, 2009 09:52 AM (GMT)
| QUOTE (Grunt @ Sep 30 2009, 03:21 PM) |
| Even people like Michael Yon is having problems with a specific officer in the British Army in relation to Public Affairs in Afghanistan. And he is much harsher than any local journalist/writer will ever be. |
I met Michael Yon today. ;)
|-|05| - October 7, 2009 10:34 AM (GMT)
hah, i've always "loved" how our government and stat boards answered without answering, and most people by it =P But their best weapons mostly is just ignoring you and after sometime people forget and it goes away, unless some one keeps bringing it to the forefront.
Also some of these media PR people take it personally when you write something bad about their employers.
If you ever get an answer from the SAF do let us know. Those are questions i want to know the answers too.
On a side note, i can imagine that it would take 30mins for the SAF to activate a recovery veh, No offense but the readiness level of alot of units during peace time, is very very poor.They get shoddy and complacent with their readiness levels because they think they would never get activated.
Also some of these media PR people take it personally when you write something bad about their employers.
If you ever get an answer from the SAF do let us know. Those are questions i want to know the answers too.
On a side note, i can imagine that it would take 30mins for the SAF to activate a recovery veh, No offense but the readiness level of alot of units during peace time, is very very poor.They get shoddy and complacent with their readiness levels because they think they would never get activated.
Grunt - October 7, 2009 12:34 PM (GMT)
| QUOTE (ChineseJunk @ Oct 7 2009, 05:52 PM) | ||
I met Michael Yon today. ;) |
I'm glad.
I'm keen to get a signed copy of his book, as I think his war correspondent work is top drawer. I'm green with envy that you've got a signed copy of his book.
BTW, when your book comes out. I also want a signed copy. I 'chope' (Hokkein for reserve) first, OK!
Grunt - October 13, 2009 09:49 AM (GMT)
MINDEF Public Affairs should read this RSIS Commentary dated 12 Oct 2009, in particular, how the British army draws upon TA reservists in the media called the MOG V and how reservists can be utilised for the civilian skill sets to augment capability and skill gaps. If they are not doing this, the question is: Why are they not? Too stupid? I hope not. Or are they too much in the biz as usual... one size fits all, template approach. Media communications/relations is a command responsibility. The respective heads need to work with MINDEF Public Affairs to get coverage. If they don't, they don't deserve promotion to a higher command. If MINDEF Public Affairs can't do work, then the respective commanders at COL & 1 star and above (like the Division Commanders) need to by-pass them and continue to cultivate the media on their own.
They should also read xtemujin's comments on standards of photos taken at the ASEAN Armies Rifle Meet 2009 Website.
They should also read xtemujin's comments on standards of photos taken at the ASEAN Armies Rifle Meet 2009 Website.
| QUOTE ( xtemujin) |
| I've looked at the photos shown and shake my head in disbelief. Where is the dedicated photo ops unit ? |
I cannot believe that the organizing committee full of LTCs cannot find a good photographer in their own unit/division to take some good photos (if the dedicated photo unit is not available) and have them cleaned up before posting. See this picture thread for what xtemujin means. No pride in the work product (i.e. poor photos & poor website, plus no captions for the photos released). For contrast just look at the photos released by D. Myles Cullen and Sgt. Eric Rutherford on the US side when Gen. George W. Casey Jr. and Maj. Gen. Patrick Wilson, deputy commanding general, Army National Guard, both visited Singapore. If you look at the F-15SG arrival at Mountain Home, they even got someone dressed up as a pirate, to make the picture news worthy. Objectively, we suck at public affairs and MINDEF Public Affairs can do much better to engineer media reports/coverage.
IMO, MINDEF Public Affairs looks hardly involved - in the work we are doing in Indonesia and even events in Singapore. Objectively, they seem to suck at getting the details right in the news cycle, which reduces coverage. There is a difference between low key PR and piss poor media planning. Sadly, MINDEF Public Affairs is not doing low key work. I shudder to think what will come out (on the quality and the obvious lack of pride in media work) when our guys deploy for CFT-151 again. We are really not ready, as we can't even answer letters in a timely fashion and get the basics like photos right.
bdique - October 13, 2009 03:55 PM (GMT)
Those who frequent MP.net know that everyday there's a thread started called "Today's Pics", and the pics are often from the MINDEF websites of the various nations the forum members are from...
USN, US Army, USAF, UK Armed Forces, ADF, heck, even PLA have dedicated websites looking real snazzy with regular updates showing pictures from operations, trainings, daily routines...and I feel having pics/vids in both quality and quantity kinda shows how proud you are of your military in its many facets...
USN, US Army, USAF, UK Armed Forces, ADF, heck, even PLA have dedicated websites looking real snazzy with regular updates showing pictures from operations, trainings, daily routines...and I feel having pics/vids in both quality and quantity kinda shows how proud you are of your military in its many facets...
FIVE-TWO - October 13, 2009 07:31 PM (GMT)
| QUOTE (bdique @ Oct 13 2009, 11:55 PM) |
| Those who frequent MP.net know that everyday there's a thread started called "Today's Pics", and the pics are often from the MINDEF websites of the various nations the forum members are from... USN, US Army, USAF, UK Armed Forces, ADF, heck, even PLA have dedicated websites looking real snazzy with regular updates showing pictures from operations, trainings, daily routines...and I feel having pics/vids in both quality and quantity kinda shows how proud you are of your military in its many facets... |
what have I been saying about our equipment not being "poster pretty"?
kanzer - October 14, 2009 12:41 AM (GMT)
| QUOTE (FIVE-TWO @ Oct 14 2009, 03:31 AM) | ||
what have I been saying about our equipment not being "poster pretty"? |
unker...we got cyberpioneer leh...you mean still not poster pretty meh?
bdique - October 14, 2009 01:52 AM (GMT)
that one poster pretty, but one set of photos takes weeks to produce...unlike other militaries, which seem to have a frequency of just a day or two...
FIVE-TWO - October 14, 2009 06:36 AM (GMT)
| QUOTE (kanzer @ Oct 14 2009, 08:41 AM) | ||||
unker...we got cyberpioneer leh...you mean still not poster pretty meh? |
maybe my standards too high? ;D
Grunt - October 14, 2009 07:32 AM (GMT)
Guys, you should watch this video on the ADF in Afghan and its complexities, including friendly fire incidents involving the ADF.
homing - October 14, 2009 08:10 AM (GMT)
Some people in SAF dun like to be told off when they are that fault. My personal experience in 2006 NDP national eduction show/preview 2 is very bad.
| QUOTE |
| The "NDP"show is ending with the fireworks diplay going off, there at the full view of the crowd a LT in charge of the moving platform beating his men with a tick file. I shout that him to stop the beating as I know that the platform had stuck due to the bad ground conditions which resulted the platform unable to merge with the rest during the show. Only when I said to the LT to stop or else I will report to his OC, that he stop the beatings. He immediately slip away when I told my trainer what has happen. Moments later a LT-Col walk by and I reported the accident to him. The LT was the same person who later proposed to his girl friend to marry him using the national stadium big screen. The 90cent paper latter had the "happy couple" at the 1st page the next day........ <_< The whole accident witness by our future NS personnel (school children there for the preview). |
I guess the LT walk away "scott free", as many people here in MN know a "lim kopi session" is the most he got. ............ <_<
ChineseJunk - October 14, 2009 03:20 PM (GMT)
I'll be rolling out fresh topics in the next few updates, including an interview with a parent of an NSF who died in a training incident. Please reflect on his account of how the system treated his family.
Next week's topic will discuss why I turned down an offer to write a book on Ops Blue Orchid.
Grunt - October 14, 2009 03:41 PM (GMT)
| QUOTE (ChineseJunk @ Oct 14 2009, 11:20 PM) |
| I'll be rolling out fresh topics in the next few updates, including an interview with a parent of an NSF who died in a training incident. Please reflect on his account of how the system treated his family. Next week's topic will discuss why I turned down an offer to write a book on Ops Blue Orchid. |
Thanks for the update.
bdique - October 14, 2009 04:12 PM (GMT)
har...must wait until next week ah...got teaser? :P
btw CJ i've always found the posts really amazing reads, keep it up! :D
btw CJ i've always found the posts really amazing reads, keep it up! :D
ChineseJunk - October 15, 2009 12:47 AM (GMT)
bdique - October 15, 2009 02:19 AM (GMT)
| QUOTE (ChineseJunk @ Oct 15 2009, 08:47 AM) |
| I've something for you shutterbugs to comment on. Mock Exercise |
commented!
uh, I might have misunderstood, but comment on photo quality or the design? (this is happy, academic-ish break from too much numbers the past week :P)
stars - October 15, 2009 03:40 AM (GMT)
| QUOTE (Grunt @ Oct 13 2009, 05:49 PM) |
| MINDEF Public Affairs should read this RSIS Commentary dated 12 Oct 2009, in particular, how the British army draws upon TA reservists in the media called the MOG V and how reservists can be utilised for the civilian skill sets to augment capability and skill gaps. If they are not doing this, the question is: Why are they not? Too stupid? I hope not. Or are they too much in the biz as usual... one size fits all, template approach. Media communications/relations is a command responsibility. The respective heads need to work with MINDEF Public Affairs to get coverage. If they don't, they don't deserve promotion to a higher command. If MINDEF Public Affairs can't do work, then the respective commanders at COL & 1 star and above (like the Division Commanders) need to by-pass them and continue to cultivate the media on their own. |
wow this article came up in the editorials in the 90 cent papers today. the timing is just, uncanny ?
Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?
ChineseJunk - October 15, 2009 04:03 AM (GMT)
| QUOTE (bdique @ Oct 15 2009, 10:19 AM) | ||
commented! uh, I might have misunderstood, but comment on photo quality or the design? (this is happy, academic-ish break from too much numbers the past week :P) |
Imagine you're in an NDP EXCO. Would you pass this page?
So far no one has hit the target.
Please look out for the reply this weekend. :)
Grunt - October 15, 2009 04:09 AM (GMT)
| QUOTE (stars @ Oct 15 2009, 11:40 AM) | ||
wow this article came up in the editorials in the 90 cent papers today. the timing is just, uncanny ? Quis custodiet ipsos custodes? |
Yes. 'Who will watch the Guardians?'. My favourite phrase from the military science fiction novels by Robert A. Heinlein, best made famous by 'Star Ship Troopers'.
bdique - October 15, 2009 04:24 AM (GMT)
| QUOTE (Grunt @ Oct 15 2009, 12:09 PM) | ||||
Yes. 'Who will watch the Guardians?'. My favourite phrase from the military science fiction novels by Robert A. Heinlein, best made famous by 'Star Ship Troopers'. |
Or a wonderful graphic novel, titled simply "Watchmen" :)
LazerLordz - October 15, 2009 04:46 AM (GMT)
| QUOTE (ChineseJunk @ Oct 15 2009, 12:03 PM) | ||||
Imagine you're in an NDP EXCO. Would you pass this page? So far no one has hit the target. Please look out for the reply this weekend. :) |
CJ, I find an issue with the respective elements in the layout. It doesn't look balanced, the alignment of the text box and graphics are all over the place and there's too much empty space on the left. Also, the title text should ideally be aligned with the dominant image..
Photos wise, the image of the Colours party is tilted. And the cropped image of the Parade Commanders do not do justice to the parade because ideally, I'd prefer to see him juxtaposed against a wider backdrop of the audience.
Well..my two cents anyway..:)
LazerLordz - October 15, 2009 04:49 AM (GMT)
| QUOTE (bdique @ Oct 15 2009, 12:24 PM) |
| Or a wonderful graphic novel, titled simply "Watchmen" :) |
That was an amazing graphic novel and movie. :lol:
|-|05| - October 15, 2009 06:14 AM (GMT)
90cent paper today got editorial on media officers in the SAF lol
FIVE-TWO - October 15, 2009 11:13 AM (GMT)
part of the problems with the pictures are that they are not posed, I believe, but snapped during training or parade. if you want poster pretty standards, you need to pose and account for background, lighting, eye contact, etc. for example I would have adjusted the colours so that their orientation are uniform, for one.
edwin3060 - October 15, 2009 01:05 PM (GMT)
| QUOTE (|-|05| @ Oct 15 2009, 02:14 PM) |
| 90cent paper today got editorial on media officers in the SAF lol |
Anybody willing to post a scan of the editorial for those of us unfortunate enough to be out of Singapore?
superspitfire - October 15, 2009 02:42 PM (GMT)
| QUOTE (LazerLordz @ Oct 15 2009, 12:46 PM) | ||||||
CJ, I find an issue with the respective elements in the layout. It doesn't look balanced, the alignment of the text box and graphics are all over the place and there's too much empty space on the left. Also, the title text should ideally be aligned with the dominant image.. Photos wise, the image of the Colours party is tilted. And the cropped image of the Parade Commanders do not do justice to the parade because ideally, I'd prefer to see him juxtaposed against a wider backdrop of the audience. Well..my two cents anyway..:) |
page's too bland, needs a dominating picture. Best if Parade Commander and Parade Sergeant Major's pictures are equally bigger and with background of parade.
The picture of the 25PDR needs to be clear of the smoke. Better if the flash is seen. (ahh...still remember this year's NDP of the 25PDR...getting a good shot of the flash is like the jackpot... :D).
Seriously, notice the SAF Colours. (2nd from right of the Colours picture). Where's the spear tip (or something. Please enlighen me...)?
xtemujin - October 15, 2009 03:19 PM (GMT)
Oklah, insert expletive here, like someone mentioned in CJ Blog.
I also can't see it at first.
Colours party right handjob.
I also can't see it at first.
Colours party right handjob.
stars - October 15, 2009 03:44 PM (GMT)
| QUOTE (edwin3060 @ Oct 15 2009, 09:05 PM) | ||
Anybody willing to post a scan of the editorial for those of us unfortunate enough to be out of Singapore? |
I'd gladly oblige. although its exactly the same article that brother grunt posted one page back i think.
reproduced under fair use act
| QUOTE |
| Advancing diplomacy via citizen soldiers Ong Weichong, For The Straits Times 15 October 2009 © 2009 Singapore Press Holdings Limited THE archetypical image of a National Serviceman is that of a citizen soldier who dutifully answers the call-up for mobilisation and yearly in-camp training. Less conspicuous are the contributions of NSmen in overseas missions. In the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF), professional servicemen are known as regulars, conscripts as Full-Time National Servicemen (NSFs) and reservists as Operationally-Ready NSmen. According to the Army Museum of Singapore, the SAF medical relief mission to the former East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) in 1970 witnessed the first deployment of NSmen in an overseas mission. Since then, NSmen have participated in various overseas missions - including the recently concluded deployment of the RSS Persistence and its 296-man task force in the Gulf of Aden. The 54-strong SAF medical team dispatched on Oct 3 to the quake-devastated Padang Pariaman in Indonesia is an all- regular force. The necessity of rapid deployment precluded the deployment of NSmen - who must first volunteer their services in order to be deployed overseas. Indeed, the NSman's role has evolved from 'Rising to the Defence of Singapore' in the 1960s to a 'Global, More Capable and Always Ready' one in the 1990s. At the policy level, the notion of an 'Always Ready' NSman capable of overseas deployment has been embraced. But the readiness of Singaporeans to accept the extended deployment of their citizen soldiers to foreign shores is another matter. The Republic of Singapore Air Force (RSAF) started training NSF Air Crew Specialists only in August 1994. It was as recent as 1995 that the RSAF took in its first NSF aircraft technicians. In the light of Singapore's dwindling birth rate, these were necessary steps. The involvement of NSmen in the mission to evacuate Singaporeans from Cambodia in 1997 underscored the integral role played by Singapore's citizen airmen and the blurring of the Regular/NSman line. Since then, more NS aircrew have been deployed in overseas missions. Social attitudes when it comes to the deployment of citizen soldiers overseas, however, have lagged behind policy. After more than 40 years of nation-building, NS has become embedded in the national psyche. This acceptance, however, is premised on the defence of Singapore, and it is grounded in the implicit trust that the state will not risk the lives of its citizen soldiers unnecessarily. For the majority of Singaporean families, the challenges of globalisation manifest themselves tangibly in lost employment opportunities - not in transnational security threats that seem a world away. In short, it is difficult to convince most Singaporean parents of the legitimacy and rationale of sending their sons to solve the problems of others. Hence, when the SAF does deploy overseas, the overwhelming majority of those involved tend to be regulars rather than NSFs or NSmen. This, however, should not preclude the deployment of Singapore's citizen soldiers, particularly if they have expertise lacking in the SAF. One area where civilian expertise can be tapped is media operations (or MO) - the vital link between the military and public opinion crucial to the success of any overseas operation. In the British Army, MO in all theatres are run by a specialist unit consisting of volunteer reservists drawn from a broad spectrum of media specialists, including public relations, photography, marketing, broadcasting and journalism. The complete withdrawal of regular personnel from MO might not be practicable or desirable within the SAF context, but civilian expertise can be used to supplement or plug gaps in capabilities. In the near future, the SAF will find itself increasingly deployed in security, stability, transition and reconstruction, humanitarian and disaster relief, and a multitude of other-than-war missions overseas. These are operations where civilian expertise in MO, international law, medicine, veterinary medicine, civil engineering and a host of other disciplines would be crucial to mission success. The deployment of NSmen who are subject-matter experts in overseas missions would go a long way towards boosting the capabilities of the task force. The NSmen of the SAF have come a long way from being the 'home guard' of the 1960s. The citizen soldiers of the 3rd Generation SAF are now 'Global, More Capable and Always Ready'. Not to utilise NSmen to advance defence diplomacy efforts would be to ignore the invaluable contributions that Singapore's citizen soldiers can make. It would also ignore the immense strides made over the past 40-odd years in blurring the regular-citizen soldier divide. The writer is an associate research fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, NTU. |