America in SEA: the leviathan (Military Nuts)

Title: America in SEA: the leviathan
Description: any related american military news

stars - February 23, 2010 02:35 AM (GMT)

its puzzling that when america is the hegemon that underpins the entire region's security and long terms stability, no single dedicated thread has emerged to allow fellow readers to track and understand policy changes, military deployments and overall strategic direction of the american military. i hope this thread can make up for this deficit.

stars - February 23, 2010 02:41 AM (GMT)

QUOTE

The S-E Asian angle: Allies and partners
Joey Long , FOR THE STRAITS TIMES

22 February 2010
Straits Times
© 2010 Singapore Press Holdings Limited

THE Obama administration released its Quadrennial Defence Review (QDR) on Feb 1. The 2010 review - the fourth since 1997 - certainly has its 'same old, same olds'. But it also bears the new Democratic administration's stamp.

If the preceding 2006 QDR stressed the idea of the 'Long War' against terrorist networks, the 2010 QDR is more focused on the US prevailing in ongoing conflicts. It maintains, nevertheless, that the United States should develop the capacity to deter and thwart a broad range of security threats. These include adversarial states and terrorist groups.

While those pronouncements reflect Washington's plans to maintain a militarily muscular approach in dealing with threats to its physical security, they also expose its recognition that resources are limited. Other approaches are therefore necessary to advance US interests. Indeed, the 2010 QDR stresses the importance of 'revitalising defence relationships with allies and partners in key regions'.

The logic of that emphasis is plain. To relieve the stress on US resources, discourage free-riding, balance rising powers and preserve American access to the global commons, enhancing relations with allies and partners is vital. Such calculations underscore the US intention to firm up its defence relations with a specific group of South-east Asian states.

While the 2006 QDR made references to unnamed South-east Asian states as potential security partners, the 2010 review has been more explicit in identifying them. Broadly, they comprise three groups: formal allies, strategic partners and prospective strategic partners.

The first comprises Washington's treaty allies, the Philippines and Thailand;(note by stars:strategic partner) the second, Singapore; and the third, Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam. The QDR states that the US intends to 'enhance' its alliance relations with the Philippines and Thailand, 'deepen' its cooperation with Singapore, and 'develop new strategic relationships' with Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam.

Specifically, the areas where cooperation will be developed involve 'counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics, and support to humanitarian assistance operations in the region'. Mentioned too is the Pentagon's plan for US forces to be more 'forward-deployed' in the area, where their presence 'supports increased multilateral cooperation on maritime security and enhanced capabilities for assured access to the sea, air, space and cyberspace'.

How the US will advance these aims is discernible. The US Pacific Command (Pacom), whose area of operations covers South-east Asia, has developed strong military-to-military relations with the Philippines, Thailand and Singapore. War games and manoeuvres are conducted annually between Pacom forces and these states in exercises like Cobra Gold. Bilaterally, Pacom units have been deployed for counter-terrorism action in the Philippines. Other American units also engage Singapore in map planning exercises.

With Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam, the Americans have made similar attempts to nurture relations. Indonesia has been participating in Cobra Gold. Exercise Garuda Shield brings together American and Indonesian soldiers for peace support exercises. Malaysian and US air forces exchange combat tactics in Exercise Cope Taufan. And since 2008, Vietnamese and American officers have met annually for dialogues on security issues and defence cooperation.

What bears watching is what effort the US makes to bring defence relations with these states to the next level. A possible restoration of US assistance to Indonesia's Special Forces - suspended in the early 1990s because of the unit's alleged human rights abuses in then-East Timor - will need to be addressed. Also, if a basing agreement enabling US access to Cam Ranh Bay can be obtained, it will mark a significant milestone in Vietnam-US relations since the Vietnam War.

The military architecture in South-east Asia looks solidly underpinned by a strong US presence - for now. China has yet to extend its military reach into the region as has the US. If the 2010 QDR has anything to say about this, it is that Washington intends to keep it that way. Building sturdy defence relations and maintaining basing agreements in the region will enable Washington to prevent potential adversaries from denying the US access to the global commons in the region.

South-east Asian states, insofar as they seek to hedge against any aggressive Chinese behaviour, will welcome Washington providing a strategic counterweight to Beijing. At the same time, they will continue to engage China in bilateral and multilateral exchanges in order to enhance cooperation and balance US influence. No country in South-east Asia wants to be put in a position where it has to choose between the two powers.

If the regional military balance is maintained and diplomatic interactions remain robust, they will not have to.

The writer is assistant professor of history and international affairs at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies.

stars - February 23, 2010 02:44 AM (GMT)

QUOTE

Striking for its lack of vision and ambition
Richard Bitzinger, For The Straits Times
849 words
22 February 2010
Straits Times
© 2010 Singapore Press Holdings Limited

THE US Defence Department released its Quadrennial Defence Review (QDR) for this year on Feb 1. Anyone expecting a major shift in defence policy on the part of the Obama administration would have been sadly disappointed - or greatly relieved.

In fact, the QDR, mandated by the US Congress to be issued every four years, had little that was new. It kept in place the Pentagon's focus on fighting two major conflicts simultaneously. It reaffirmed President Barack Obama's commitment to defeating Al-Qaeda and the Taleban in Afghanistan, and continuing the security handover in Iraq. And it said all the usual things about countering weapons of mass destruction, strengthening allies, reforming the defence acquisition process, and keeping the overall United States military robust and capable of 'full-spectrum operations'. As Dr Gordon Adams, who oversaw defence budgeting for the Clinton administration, suggested in a recent interview in Defence News, former president George W. Bush would probably not have any serious qualms with the strategies laid out in the 2010 QDR.

The document reaffirms the overall force structure laid out earlier by the Bush administration, including the creation of 73 army combat brigade teams, maintaining 10 to 11 aircraft carriers (but only 10 carrier air wings), and acquiring several hundred fifth-generation Joint Strike Fighters. (note by stars: serious fighter gap implications on US future force projection ?)

So will the QDR turn out to be a proverbial damp squib of a defence policy document? As with many official documents, this one may be more important for what it did not say.

Traditionally, the QDR is the Pentagon's opportunity to 'think big' about the future. But the US has its hands full with two ongoing conflicts - along with numerous other operations, such as counter-piracy, counter-terrorism and humanitarian relief. It is no wonder, then, that Secretary of Defence Robert Gates has frequently criticised the US military for 'next-war-itis' - that is, of ignoring current 'muddy-boots' challenges for more lofty visions of an (often high-tech and antiseptic) future battlefield. Consequently, this QDR explicitly reaffirms that America's armed forces need to prevail in today's wars and not tomorrow's.

At the same time, there is a remarkable lack of discussion in the QDR of how the US military may have to deal with adversaries, such as Iran or North Korea, or with potential 'peer competitors' like China. Little attention is given in this document to fighting well-equipped state actors in conflicts beyond the next 10 years or so. Perhaps it is wise to concentrate on the here and now, but the QDR seems to have missed an opportunity to lay out Mr Obama's vision for a transformed force - if, that is, he has one.

This leads to another observation about what is missing from this QDR: the lack of any discussion of how the revolution in military affairs is affecting the restructuring of the US military. To be sure, the document speaks of fielding new 'enabling systems' - such as improved intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities, more resilient communications, and, above all, enhanced capabilities in cyberspace.

But the language of force transformation that gave a grander, more soaring vision to past QDRs is eerily absent in this document. Perhaps former defence secretary Donald Rumsfeld's vision of a transformed force ? la the revolution in military affairs was overly ambitious, but the prosaic nature of the 2010 QDR seems almost demoralising in comparison.

Finally, the QDR says little about what many are increasingly arguing will be the US military's growing conventional challenge in the mid term: China. In fact, China rates hardly a mention, other than the usual bromides about its role in continuing to 'shape an international system that is no longer easily defined', or that the US 'welcomes a strong, prosperous, and successful China that plays a greater global role'. In fact, many of the more alarmist passages about China were deliberately stripped from an earlier draft.

That said, it is important to note that the QDR specifically argues about the need to fight in 'anti-access environments' - almost certainly a reference to China, which other Pentagon documents claim is modernising its forces so as to be able to prosecute an 'area denial/anti-access' strategy. In other words, China would seek to prevent US forces from being able to operate too closely to Chinese territory or insert themselves into spaces where Chinese forces are militarily active (such as in a blockade or invasion of Taiwan). So China continues to occupy a shadowy middle ground - between a desired global partner and a feared potential peer competitor.

It is very likely that this QDR will be quickly shoved to the bottom of most inboxes. It may reassure those who fear that Mr Obama might plan to gut the military or turn it into a glorified international peacekeeping outfit. It is nonetheless a rather mundane paper that seems to avoid any new ideas.

The writer is a senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University.

stars - February 25, 2010 04:13 PM (GMT)

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/conte...0020302913.html

QUOTE

Off-message, Biden recasts the Obama agenda

By E.J. Dionne Jr.
Thursday, February 4, 2010

Vice President Biden is tired of seeing the Obama administration's economic stimulus plan demeaned, derided and dismissed, and he wanted to talk about it.

But a funny thing happened in the course of an interview at Biden's White House office on Tuesday afternoon. The vice president's passions poured forth not when he was offering his point-by-point defense of the economic recovery plan but on the question of whether the United States is in decline.

Late in the conversation, I asked Biden about the surprise applause line in President Obama's State of the Union speech -- "I do not accept second place for the United States of America." Will we hear more on the America-as-No.-1 theme?

What followed was a torrent, in red, white and blue.

"From me you're going to hear more," he replied emphatically. "I want to tell you something, because if we cede the ground to those who suggest that -- I don't mean foreigners, I mean domestic critics -- that somehow, we are destined to fulfill [historian Paul] Kennedy's prophecy that we are going to be a great nation that has failed because we lost control of our economy and overextended, then we might as well throw it in now, for God's sake. I mean it's ridiculous."

On he went: "Give me a break. So many people have bet on our demise that it absolutely drives me crazy. . . . There's sort of an attitude that is both politically directed by our Republican friends but also believed by a fair number of people that we just can't make this transition in the 21st century.

"We will continue to be the most significant and dominant influence in the world as long as our economy is strong, growing and responsive to 21st-century needs. And they relate to education, they relate to energy, and they relate to health care."

Biden, more self-aware than people give him credit for, realized what he had just done. "I've sort of gotten off the Recovery Act," he said with a rueful smile.

Yet by the end of the interview, I realized he had bumped into the hidden political issue of the 2010 elections. Beneath the predictable back-and-forth between Obama and his Republican adversaries over government spending lies a substantively important difference over how the United States can maintain its global leadership.

For Republicans, American power is rooted largely in military might and showing a tough and resolute face to the world. They would rely on tax cuts as the one and only spur to economic growth.

Obama, Biden and the Democrats, on the other hand, believe that American power depends ultimately on the American economy, and that government has an essential role to play in fostering the next generation of growth.

Notice that when Obama spoke about keeping America in first place, he said not a word about the military. He referred instead to the efforts of our competitors in the public sphere of the economy, and of our past complacency.

"Washington has been telling us to wait for decades, even as the problems have grown worse," Obama said. "Meanwhile, China is not waiting to revamp its economy. Germany is not waiting. India is not waiting. These nations aren't standing still. These nations aren't playing for second place. They're putting more emphasis on math and science. They're rebuilding their infrastructure. They're making serious investments in clean energy because they want those jobs."

Suddenly, Obama's approach is not about old-fashioned Democratic spending. It's about patriotism, competing successfully, investing to maintain American economic leadership. John F. Kennedy provided a slogan for such an effort 50 years ago: "Let's get America moving again."

Obama's handlers can be terribly tough on Biden for digressing from the narrow point they want him to make. So let the record show that he spent most of our interview ably defending how the stimulus money has been spent and what it has accomplished.

Biden's insistence on "pushing back" against unfounded criticisms of the program was clearly part of Obama's post-Scott Brown offensive, and it's bracing that the administration has finally seen the wisdom of a Napoleon axiom that is a favorite of Karl Rove's: "The whole art of war consists in a well-reasoned and extremely circumspect defensive, followed by rapid and audacious attack."

Transforming a listless national argument about the stimulus and health care into a larger debate over how to maintain American preeminence is both audacious and useful. Off-message, Biden found the right message.

stars - February 25, 2010 04:20 PM (GMT)

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/25/opinion/...&pagewanted=all

QUOTE

Op-Ed Contributor
Like Rome Before the Fall? Not Yet

By PIERS BRENDON
Published: February 24, 2010

VICE PRESIDENT JOE BIDEN complains that he is being driven crazy because so many people are betting on America’s demise. Reports of it are not just exaggerated; they are, he insists, ridiculous. Like President Obama, he will not accept “second place” for the United States. Despite the present crippling budget deficit and the crushing burden of projected debt, he denies that the country is destined to fulfill a “prophecy that we are going to be a great nation that has failed because we lost control of our economy and overextended.”

Mr. Biden was referring in particular to the influential book “The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers” by Paul Kennedy, a British historian who teaches at Yale. Published in 1988, the book argues that the ascendancy of states or empires results from the superiority of their material resources, and that the wealth on which that dominance rests is eroded by the huge military expenditures needed to sustain national or imperial power, leading inexorably to its decline and fall. The thesis seems a tad schematic, but Professor Kennedy maintains it with dazzling cogency. In any debate about the development of the United States, one would certainly tend to side with the detached historian rather than the partisan politician.

All too often, however, students of the past succumb to the temptation to foretell the future. For reasons best known to himself, for example, the eminent British historian A. J. P. Taylor predicted that the Second World War would reach its climax in the Spanish port of Vigo. Equally preposterous in its way was Francis Fukuyama’s claim that the conclusion of the cold war marked the end of ideological evolution, “the end of history.”

When indulging his own penchant for prophecy, Paul Kennedy too proved sadly fallible. In his book, he wrote that Japan would not stagnate and that Russia, clinging to Communism, would not boom economically by the early 21st century. Of course, Professor Kennedy did not base his forecasts on runes or entrails or stars. He weighed the available evidence and extrapolated from existing trends. He studied form, entered suitable caveats and hedged his bets. In short, he relied on sophisticated guesswork. However, the past is a map, not a compass. It charts human experience, stops at the present and gives no clear sense of direction. History does not repeat itself nor, as Arnold Toynbee would have it, does it proceed in rhythms or cycles. Events buck trends. Everything, as Gibbon said, is subject to “the vicissitudes of fortune.”

Still, history is our only guide. It is natural to seek instruction from it about the trajectory of earlier great powers, especially at a time when the weary American Titan seems to be staggering under “the too vast orb of its fate.” This phrase (loosely taken from Matthew Arnold) was used by the British politician Joseph Chamberlain to depict the plight of his nation in 1902. The country had indeed suffered a severe setback during its South African war and its global supremacy was under threat from mighty rivals in the United States and Germany. Yet the British Empire was at its apogee.

Paradoxically, the larger great powers grow, the more they worry about their vulnerability. Rudyard Kipling wrote this elegy to the empire, of which he was unofficial poet laureate, to mark its most spectacular pageant, Queen Victoria’s Diamond Jubilee in 1897.

Far-called, our navies melt away;

On dunes and headlands sinks the fire;

Lo, all our pomp of yesterday

Is one with Nineveh and Tyre!

Aptly quoting these lines exactly a century later, when Britain gave up its last major colony, Hong Kong, this newspaper’s editorial page noted that the queen’s empire had been relegated to the history books; the United States had become the heir to Rome.

Now doom-mongers conjure with Roman and British analogies in order to trace the decay of American hegemony. In so doing they ignore Gibbon’s warning about the danger of comparing epochs remote from one another. It is obviously possible to find striking similarities between the predicament of Rome and that of Washington (itself modeled on classical lines, incidentally, because it aspired to be the capital of a mighty empire). Overstretch is common to both, for example: Rome defended frontiers on the Tigris, the Danube and the Rhine; America’s informal empire, controlled diplomatically, commercially and militarily, girdles the globe.

But the differences are palpable. The Roman economy depended on agriculture whereas the United States has an enormous industrial base, producing nearly a quarter of the world’s manufactured goods, and dominates the relatively new invention of the service economy.

Rome was prone to internecine strife whereas America is constitutionally stable. Rome was overwhelmed by barbarians whereas America’s armed forces are so powerful as to prompt dreams of what is known in military doctrine as “full spectrum dominance.” Even in an age of terrorism and nuclear proliferation, it is hard to visualize an attack on America as devastating as that inflicted by Vandals, Goths and Huns on Rome.

Similarly, the British Empire was a weak empire. It was acquired thanks to certain temporary advantages, and run on a shoestring. It governed the multitudes of India with 1,250 civil servants, and garrisoned its African colonies with a thousand policemen and soldiers, not one above the rank of colonel. The thin white line often broke under pressure.

Then Britain lost a whole generation of empire-builders during the First World War, and was virtually bankrupted by the Second. It was bailed out by the United States, which briefly sustained the British Empire as an auxiliary in the cold war. But its status as no more than a client was amply demonstrated in 1956, when President Dwight D. Eisenhower cracked the whip and stopped the Anglo-French invasion of Suez. The empire was quickly dismembered, its ghost surviving as the Commonwealth.

Stemming from a tiny island, the British Empire was once described as an oak tree in a plant pot. American dominion, by contrast, is rooted in a bountiful continent. But does not the organic metaphor imply that states, like other living things, will inevitably deteriorate and die? This suggestion was convincingly denied by Lord Palmerston, the champion of the Victorian “gunboat diplomacy” that brought China to its knees. To compare that country to a sick man or an old tree was an “utterly unphilosophical mistake,” he said, since a nation could adopt mechanical means of self-renovation. This, needless to say, China has done.

Despite its grave problems, there are some relatively simple steps America could take to recover its position. It could bring its military commitments into line with its resources, rely more on the “soft power” of diplomacy and economic engagement and, as George Washington said, take advantage of its geographically detached situation to “defy material injury from external annoyance.” Such a policy would permit more investment in productive enterprise and pay for butter as well as guns, thus vindicating Joe Biden’s faith in the recuperative capacities of the Great Republic.

On the other hand, Paul Kennedy may well be right to predict that the United States will shrink relatively in wealth, and therefore power, as its Asian and European rivals grow. Such contractions can be traumatic, as suggested by the experience of Britain, which, as Adlai Stevenson said, lost an empire without finding a role.

However, the British now tend to echo the historian Lord Macaulay, who said that the end of their physical empire would be the proudest day in their history if they left behind “the imperishable empire” of their arts and their morals, their literature and their laws. In other words, national self-esteem should not stem from global might but from cultural values and achievements. Faced by the prospect of decline, Americans could hardly do better than to cling to the noblest traditions of their own civilization.

Piers Brendon, a fellow of Churchill College, Cambridge, is the author of “The Decline and Fall of the British Empire.”

stars - March 1, 2010 11:55 AM (GMT)

anyone knows what are these global strike weapons ? interesting.

QUOTE

White House Is Rethinking Nuclear PolicyBy DAVID E. SANGER and THOM SHANKER
Published: February 28, 2010

WASHINGTON — As President Obama begins making final decisions on a broad new nuclear strategy for the United States, senior aides say he will permanently reduce America’s arsenal by thousands of weapons. But the administration has rejected proposals that the United States declare it would never be the first to use nuclear weapons, aides said.

Mr. Obama’s new strategy — which would annul or reverse several initiatives by the Bush administration — will be contained in a nearly completed document called the Nuclear Posture Review, which all presidents undertake. Aides said Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates will present Mr. Obama with several options on Monday to address unresolved issues in that document, which have been hotly debated within the administration.

First among them is the question of whether, and how, to narrow the circumstances under which the United States will declare it might use nuclear weapons — a key element of nuclear deterrence since the cold war.

Mr. Obama’s decisions on nuclear weapons come as conflicting pressures in his defense policy are intensifying. His critics argue that his embrace of a new movement to eliminate nuclear weapons around the world is naïve and dangerous, especially at a time of new nuclear threats, particularly from Iran and North Korea. But many of his supporters fear that over the past year he has moved too cautiously, and worry that he will retain the existing American policy by leaving open the possibility that the United States might use nuclear weapons in response to a biological or chemical attack, perhaps against a nation that does not possess a nuclear arsenal.

That is one of the central debates Mr. Obama must resolve in the next few weeks, his aides say.

Many elements of the new strategy have already been completed, according to senior administration and military officials who have been involved in more than a half-dozen Situation Room debates about it, and outside strategists consulted by the White House.

As described by those officials, the new strategy commits the United States to developing no new nuclear weapons, including the nuclear bunker-busters advocated by the Bush administration. But Mr. Obama has already announced that he will spend billions of dollars more on updating America’s weapons laboratories to assure the reliability of what he intends to be a much smaller arsenal. Increased confidence in the reliability of American weapons, Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr. said in a speech in February, would make elimination of “redundant” nuclear weapons possible.

"It will be clear in the document that there will be very dramatic reductions — in the thousands — as relates to the stockpile,” according to one senior administration official whom the White House authorized to discuss the issue this weekend. Much of that would come from the retirement of large numbers of weapons now kept in storage.

Other officials, not officially allowed to speak on the issue, say that in back-channel discussions with allies, the administration has also been quietly broaching the question of whether to withdraw American tactical nuclear weapons from Europe, where they provide more political reassurance than actual defense. Those weapons are now believed to be in Germany, Italy, Belgium, Turkey and the Netherlands.

At the same time, the new document will steer the United States toward more non-nuclear defenses. It relies more heavily on missile defense, much of it arrayed within striking distance of the Persian Gulf, focused on the emerging threat from Iran. Mr. Obama’s recently published Quadrennial Defense Review also includes support for a new class of non-nuclear weapons, called “Prompt Global Strike,” that could be fired from the United States and hit a target anywhere in less than an hour.

The idea, officials say, would be to give the president a non-nuclear option for, say, a large strike on the leadership of Al Qaeda in the mountains of Pakistan, or a pre-emptive attack on an impending missile launch from North Korea. But under Mr. Obama’s strategy, the missiles would be based at new sites around the United States that might even be open to inspection, so that Russia and China would know that a missile launched from those sites was not nuclear — to avoid having them place their own nuclear forces on high alert.

But the big question confronting Mr. Obama is how he will describe the purpose of America’s nuclear arsenal. It is far more than just an academic debate.

Some leading Democrats, led by Senator Dianne Feinstein of California, chairwoman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, have asked Mr. Obama to declare that the “sole purpose” of the country’s nuclear arsenal is to deter nuclear attack. “We’re under considerable pressure on this one within our own party,” one of Mr. Obama’s national security advisers said recently.

But inside the Pentagon and among many officials in the White House, Mr. Obama has been urged to retain more ambiguous wording — declaring that deterring nuclear attack is the primary purpose of the American arsenal, not the only one. That would leave open the option of using nuclear weapons against foes that might threaten the United States with biological or chemical weapons or transfer nuclear material to terrorists.

Any compromise wording that leaves in place elements of the Bush-era pre-emption policy, or suggests the United States could use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear adversary, would disappoint many on the left wing of his party, and some arms control advocates.

“Any declaration that deterring a nuclear attack is a ‘primary purpose’ of our arsenal leaves open the possibility that there are other purposes, and it would not reflect any reduced reliance on nuclear weapons,” said Daryl G. Kimball, the executive director of the Arms Control Association. “It wouldn’t be consistent with what the president said in his speech in Prague” a year ago, when he laid out an ambitious vision for moving toward the elimination of nuclear weapons.

Mr. Obama’s base has already complained in recent months that he has failed to break from Bush era national security policy in some fundamental ways. They cite, for example, his stepped-up use of drones to strike suspected terrorists in Pakistan and his failure to close the Guantánamo Bay detention facility by January as Mr. Obama had promised.

While Mr. Obama ended financing last year for a new nuclear warhead sought by the Bush administration, the new strategy goes further. It commits Mr. Obama to developing no new nuclear weapons, including a low-yield, deeply-burrowing nuclear warhead that the Pentagon sought to strike buried targets, like the nuclear facilities in North Korea and Iran. Mr. Obama, officials said, has determined he could not stop other countries from seeking new weapons if the United States was doing the same.

Still, some of Mr. Obama’s critics in his own party say the change is symbolic because he is spending more to improve old weapons.

At the center of the new strategy is a renewed focus on arms control and nonproliferation agreements, which were largely dismissed by the Bush administration. That includes an effort to win passage of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which was defeated during the Clinton administration and faces huge hurdles in the Senate, and revisions of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to close loopholes that critics say have been exploited by Iran and North Korea.

Mr. Obama’s reliance on new, non-nuclear Prompt Global Strike weapons is bound to be contentious. As described by advocates within the Pentagon and in the military, the new weapons could achieve the effects of a nuclear weapon, without turning a conventional war into a nuclear one.As a result, the administration believes it could create a new form of deterrence — a way to contain countries that possess or hope to develop nuclear, biological or chemical weapons, without resorting to a nuclear option.

stars - March 1, 2010 12:06 PM (GMT)

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/28/opinion/28sun1.html

QUOTE

New Think and Old Weapons
Published: February 27, 2010

Every four years the White House issues a “nuclear posture review.” That may sound like an anachronism. It isn’t. In a world where the United States and Russia still have more than 20,000 nuclear weapons — and Iran, North Korea and others have seemingly unquenchable nuclear appetites — what the United States says about its arsenal matters enormously.

President Obama’s review was due to Congress in December. That has been delayed, in part because of administration infighting. The president needs to get this right. It is his chance to finally jettison cold war doctrine and bolster America’s credibility as it presses to rein in Iran, North Korea and other proliferators.

Mr. Obama has already committed rhetorically to the vision of a world without nuclear weapons. But we are concerned that some of his advisers, especially at the Pentagon, are resisting his bold ambitions. He needs to stick with the ideas he articulated in his campaign and in speeches last year in Prague and at the United Nations.

These are some of the important questions the posture review must address:

THEIR PURPOSE: Current doctrine gives nuclear weapons a “critical role” in defending the United States and its allies. And it suggests they could be used against foes wielding chemical, biological or even conventional forces — not just nuclear arms. Mr. Obama’s aides have proposed changing that to say that the “primary” purpose of nuclear weapons is to deter a nuclear attack against the United States or its allies. This still invites questions about whether Washington values — and might use — nuclear forces against non-nuclear targets.

Given America’s vast conventional military superiority, broader uses are neither realistic nor necessary. Any ambiguity undercuts Washington’s credibility when it argues that other countries have no strategic reason to develop their own nuclear arms. The sole purpose of American nuclear forces should be to deter a nuclear attack against this country or its allies.

HOW MANY: President George W. Bush disdained arms control as old think, and Washington and Moscow have not signed an arms reduction treaty since 2002. Mr. Obama launched negotiations on a new agreement that would slash the number of warheads each side has deployed from 2,200 to between 1,500 and 1,675. The talks are dragging on, but there is hope for an agreement soon. Both sides should go deeper.

The review should make clear that the United States is ready to move, as a next step, down to 1,000 deployed warheads — military experts say half that number is enough to wipe out the assets of Russia, which is no longer an enemy. China, the only major nuclear power adding to its arsenal, is estimated to have 100 to 200 warheads. The treaty being negotiated says nothing about the nearly 15,000 warheads, in total, that the United States and Russia keep as backups — the so-called hedge. And it says nothing about America’s 500 short-range nuclear weapons, which are considered secure, or Russia’s 3,000 or more, which are chillingly vulnerable to theft.

The review should make clear that there is no need for a huge hedge, and that tactical weapons have an utter lack of strategic value — as a prelude to reducing both. Certainly no general we know of could imagine exploding a warhead on a battlefield. Today’s greatest nuclear danger is that terrorists will steal or build a weapon. That is best countered by halting proliferation and securing and reducing stockpiles and other material.

NEW WEAPONS: The United States built its last new warhead in 1989. So when aides to President George W. Bush called for building new weapons, with new designs and new capabilities, it opened this country to charges of hypocrisy and double standards when it demanded that North Korea and Iran end their nuclear programs.

Mr. Obama has said that this country does not need new weapons. But we are concerned the review will open the door to just that by directing the labs to study options — including a new weapons design — for maintaining the arsenal. The government has a strong and hugely expensive system for ensuring that the stockpile is safe and reliable. Mr. Obama has already vastly increased the labs’ budgets. The review should make clear that there is no need for a new weapon.

ALERT LEVELS: The United States and Russia each still have about 1,000 weapons ready to fire at a moment’s notice. Mr. Obama has rightly described this as a dangerous cold war relic. The review should commit to taking as many of those forces off hair-trigger alert as possible — and encourage Russia to do the same.

In April, Mr. Obama will host a much needed summit meeting on the need to better secure nuclear material from terrorists. In May, Washington will encourage a United Nations-led conference to strengthen the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the bedrock, and battered, agreement for curbing the spread of nuclear arms.

President Obama will also have to persuade the Senate to ratify the Start follow-on treaty, and we hope he will quickly press the Senate to approve the test ban treaty. He is also working with allies to revive nuclear talks with North Korea and to impose tougher sanctions on Iran. Getting the nuclear posture review right is essential for moving all of this ahead

should have plenty of pressure on iran and the DPRK this coming april/may.

YourFather - March 1, 2010 12:50 PM (GMT)

QUOTE

anyone knows what are these global strike weapons ? interesting.

If you mean Prompt Global Strike, it's just a fairly old idea (couple of years old) about putting conventional warheads on ICBMs. The idea being that while currently the US has the ability to strike any target anywhere around the world, there are some targets which are transient and may displace by the time weapons reach the target position.

edwin3060 - March 1, 2010 03:33 PM (GMT)

Prompt Global Strike is a bad idea, for the simple reason that other countries won't be able to determine if the launch is nuclear or non-nuclear until the warhead hits. In a tense situation a launch like this could have ominous consequences.

All this discussion about no first use ignores the reason why the US had that policy in the first place. The emphasis on nuclear weapons as deterrence, and to thin down enemy numbers (tactical nukes) allowed Eisenhower to downsize the military. With the upcoming fighter gap in the USAF, as well as the stalled plans for revitalising the equipment of the US Army and USMC, and the reduction in force of the US Navy, I don't think it is a good idea defence-wise to remove this nuclear ambiguity.

bdique - March 2, 2010 04:07 AM (GMT)

QUOTE (edwin3060 @ Mar 1 2010, 11:33 PM)

I don't think it is a good idea defence-wise to remove this nuclear ambiguity.

then they'll concede the moral high ground! in any case, I don't think that having tactical-sized nuke warheads will help address the downsizing issue. So I see a massive enemy formation coming...do I nuke until they become atoms and then send in the troops to wipe out the survivors, if any? (I assume away the idea that the weapons will be targeted at cities. I think the US is past the stage of indiscriminate bombing.) Its true that they are downsizing, but I'm very sure that the US is doing so without a cost to itself.

Shotgun - March 2, 2010 02:06 PM (GMT)

QUOTE

NEW WEAPONS: The United States built its last new warhead in 1989. So when aides to President George W. Bush called for building new weapons, with new designs and new capabilities, it opened this country to charges of hypocrisy and double standards when it demanded that North Korea and Iran end their nuclear programs

The Chinese think that the Americans are doing this intentionally to peeve the North Koreans to continue their nuclear development. That way, Japan and South Korea will always feel threatened by the North Koreans and be pressed to retain their bilateral defense agreements with the Americans under the extended nuclear deterrence policies.

stars - March 4, 2010 02:08 PM (GMT)

@YF

thanks for the reply. i appreciate it. but im more keen on the part that says a conventional weapon but has the destructive capability of a nuclear weapon (hyperbole ?)

does it have anything to do with the US research in massive bunker busters ?

@edwin3060,

i think its Obama trying to walk the talk after his first speech at the UN assembly that said he will push for a nuclear free world. not simply pulling the carpet out of DPRK and Iran's right to have nuclear weapons, it helps to save a bunch of money maintaining and storing old nukes that arent used.

I dont know much about nuclear balancing and deterrence, mind elaborating more on why will it undermine deterrence ? i understand what you mean by the US may suffer a decline in its conventional warfare capabilities but deterrence being compromised ? its not like the US is giving up nukes. its just shrinking the arsernal (although i understand your point about how it might be like additional insurance policy over a period of conventional strength decline)

edwin3060 - March 4, 2010 03:23 PM (GMT)

QUOTE (stars @ Mar 4 2010, 10:08 PM)

Well Obama has a pretty good record for going back on his over-idealistic promises (Govt transparency, wire-tapping, Gitmo, etc) so no one would be surprised if he kebelakan pusing on this issue also. In the first place no one wants for the nukes to be used-- so the non-use of the weapons is no argument against having them.

I guess I'm more on the conservative side-- the funding to upgrade their nuclear arsenal has not been confirmed, and the supposedly advanced nuclear warhead designs may not be able to be verified to work. Until they have a viable replacement warhead/triad of delivery systems, I don't think they should retire perfectly working older systems. Else we might end up with another F-35 fiasco, where major problems with the F-35 only surfaced after the administration successfully killed the F-22, leaving the US with an even greater fighter gap than they have now.

stars - March 5, 2010 07:35 AM (GMT)

dont think he's going to keblakang pusing on this one. he badly needs some policy success/fulfillment right now. cheap way to do it.

different world from the cold war and today. cant even test nukes anymore (NPT bans testing of nuke weapons, simulation test possible). pursuing a ballistic missile program today, equally likely to send mixed signals of potential US return to isolationism (buy nukes, bring home and cut back the troops) and/or contradictory policy stances (on one level, no nuke world, on the other level, from the US perspective, that it sees china as a potential enemy and must have a nuclear hedge to balance its military force, counter intuitively, increasing likelihood of conventional war) (chinese perspective, US china threat theory, need to spend more on defense to counterbalance US nukes and TMD/BMD shields) classic security dilemma that cuts both ways ?

i dont think Obama means to cut US nukes to the point where its deterrence capability its diminished. they can afford to cut back to a few hundred warheads and still have considerably more than china + their conventional superiority + TMD/BMD in the region + regional allies (japan and SK) to effectively deter any "china threat" . probably could be more stabilizing than destabilizing.

stars - March 5, 2010 07:51 AM (GMT)

QUOTE

Indonesia needs room to stretch
Michael Vatikiotis, For The Straits Times
5 March 2010
Straits Times

INDONESIAN President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono will engage with two of his country's closest allies this month. He will be making a long delayed visit to the country's southerly neighbour, Australia, while US President Barrack Obama will be making his own long delayed formal visit to Indonesia, a return to the country of his boyhood.

These visits will be opportunities to define Indonesia's relations with two of the Asia-Pacific's important 'Western' components. In doing so, Dr Yudhoyono will find himself having to walk a fine line between a full embrace of Western values and promoting the emerging sense of identity Indonesia wants to articulate as a medium-sized Asian power. Indonesia's foreign policy as articulated by Dr Yudhoyono tries hard to blur the distinction, promoting democracy and human rights as universal - neither Asian nor Western - and projecting a form of strategic ambiguity that makes the country an ally of nobody but friend of all.

This ambiguity works because Indonesia is far too big to ignore or pigeon-hole. It also helps cloak its profile as Asean's biggest member, and builds confidence with its neighbours. But that doesn't stop both Canberra and Washington from trying to elevate their ties with Jakarta to special status.The United States is courting Indonesia with a 'comprehensive partnership', while Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd's proposed Asia-Pacific Community originally envisaged Indonesia, rather than Asean as a whole, as a key member in South-east Asia.

When big powers come courting Indonesia, its neighbours grow uneasy. But at the same time, no significant strategic player in the region wants to see Indonesia left out of any critical alliance. After all, one only has to recall the 1960s and the unease created by Indonesia's founding president Sukarno's non-aligned and anti-colonial notions of 'New Emerging Forces' that brought the country close to joining the communist bloc.

History has taught Indonesia's policymakers to harness the country's strategic allure to more pressing non-traditional security issues on the domestic and global agenda. It is surely soothing to Indonesia's regional neighbours that the main thrust of the emerging partnership with the US is helping to strengthen the education system at home and forge a common position on climate change overseas.

Meanwhile, Indonesia's putative role as a key security partner for Australia has been thwarted by criticism from other Asean states of Canberra's Asia-Pacific Community blueprint. Besides, Jakarta and Canberra now have more pressing issues of common concern to deal with focused on waves of immigrants that pass through Indonesian waters in search of a new life in Australia.

The question is whether this careful layering of Indonesia's strategic ties goes too far in terms of appeasing its neighbours and falls short of meeting its foreign policy ambitions.

Lately, there has been a debate in Jakarta's policy circles about how constrained Indonesia should be by its Asean membership. There are those who would like to see it free to take singular rather than regional positions on issues like democracy in Myanmar, for example. The Yudhoyono administration has also expressed a desire to play a bigger role in regional and international efforts to resolve conflict, but feels constrained to act in its own neighbourhood by Asean conventions of strict non-interference and decision-making by consensus.

How might closer ties both with Australia and the US affect the region? It might help promote human rights and democratic values, open the door sooner to regional free trade mechanisms, and reduce the need for the presence of foreign forces.

Alas, these notions are fanciful, as it is unlikely that Asia's principal emerging powers India and China would make it easy for Indonesia to modify its low strategic profile. In many ways, Indonesia is cursed by geography - sprawled as it is across strategic passages between larger contesting powers.

Having said this, there are specific niches that Indonesia can and should fill with support from larger powers like the US. As an emerging medium-sized power, and the largest Muslim-majority democracy in the world, Indonesia is well placed to bridge the divide that has opened up between the Muslim and non-Muslim worlds. This gives Indonesia an advantage in places like Pakistan, Afghanistan and even Yemen, where, with a correctly calibrated approach and sufficient capacity, a lot of animosity towards the West could be defused.

Similarly, in the area of climate change, Indonesia, acting as a middleman, aligned neither to the developed nor the developing world, could help the stalled UN process move forward.

It is therefore gratifying to see ideas emanating from Jakarta such as a possible role for Indonesia in helping to train Afghanistan's police force, and the proposal to host an informal ministerial meeting on climate change ahead of the UN meeting in Mexico. In this regard, it would be helpful if Indonesia's neighbours spent less time carping about the country's shortcomings and instead lent more support to its creative diplomatic urges.

The writer is Asia regional director of the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue.

the irony of it is that musayarah mukafat (the way of compromise and accommodation) is an indonesian precept that has underpinned so much of ASEAN institutionalism and the reason for its institutional successes to its supporters, and for its slow, 'empty' talk-shop status accorded to it by its critics.

i dont agree with this post about appeasement. nothing can work in ASEAN without consensus or support from indonesia. Indonesian interests carry substantial weight in ASEAN decision-making process. but i think its statement about ASEAN policy and approach, holding back or watering down indonesia's foreign policy approach is something very interesting to think about.

what ASEAN will become and how security cooperation will be shaped in this region within the next two decades is likely to be shaped by what events may happen and unfold in indonesia when Barack Obama visits later this month. fascinating times to live in.

stars - March 5, 2010 08:02 AM (GMT)

http://www.siiaonline.org/?q=category/news...ations-news-rad

QUOTE

Devika Dayal Misra interviews SIIA Chairman Simon Tay.

INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPT

SIIA ST: The challenge is not to get too involved in a negative way. The chances that one side or the other will say 'choose me, or the other' is something that ASEAN wants to avoid. Preferably, ASEAN would want to have good relations with both in this area, and that countries in it really want, not really neutrality, but really the best of both worlds.

93.8 DDM: But the issue is: can they maintain the best of both worlds?

SIIA ST: Oh no, I think that is the desired outcome. A lot will depend on how bad the US-China relationship gets. Over the last month, things have gotten bad quite quickly. I mean, they're not really completely damaged, but there are some control factors in play. There's an underlying economic interdependence, whether they like it or not, but if things continue in this bad direction, then tensions will rise, and that will make it hard for ASEAN to remain friends to both sides.

93.8 DDM: Then the question becomes: who will steer the ASEAN relation ship in this situation?

SIIA ST: While ASEAN is one association, there is not always uniform interest and ability in the different countries. I think one key country will be Indonesia. In about three weeks, Indonesia will receive President Obama, if everything goes according to the schedule. Indonesia has already been a country which has dealt with China more than some of the other countries. If you look at the China-ASEAN FTA, or the CAFTA as what they call it, you will see that some of the main bugbears have been the attitude of Indonesian companies towards their market opening to Chinese goods. So for better or worse, I think the largest ASEAN member is bound to have influence.

Another country of course, would be Vietnam, which is the current ASEAN chair, (has) sizable economy, and of course, has relationships with both China and America.

93.8 DDM: So do you think ASEAN will still try and steer itself as a block with one country - perhaps Indonesia - playing a more important role, or do you think we might even see countries dealing with issues on a more bilateral basis?

SIIA ST: The bilateral level will always be there. Singapore has a bilateral FTA with China, just as we pursue the ASEAN (one). I think that my hope is the ASEAN member states will recognise that they either hang together, or they hang seperately, if you get the joke. I think that one of the challenges for ASEAN is to think of more common policies.

Now the FTA with China was an attempt in that direction. And similarly, for America, the fact that we now have the US-ASEAN summit started by Obama late year in the shadows of the APEC meeting in Singapore; I think that's important. Sort of a fulcrum to get ASEAN to think more as a group, rather than primarily as individual countries.

93.8 DDM: But the US does need a stable ally in ASEAN. After all it is distracted by events in the Middle East and in South Asia - might we see more of a reaching out to ASEAN now?

SIIA ST: The question is whether it reaches out in the right areas. You mentioned "ally". I think if the word "ally" is taken to mean military alliance, and some people do mean that, then that would clearly make China more and more nervous. Whether it be that more Chinese corps feel that they are being contained by America... one must remember Lee Kuan Yew's remarks in America, that America has to remain engaged in the region. Everyone accepts that, but when one of the reasons is "balance against China", some of the Chinese on the internet rarely take that well, and that causes a clear signal that Chinese people really want a more expansive China, which is surrounded by friends.

So the Americans have every reason to remain in the region. But they must do so more in terms of their Islamic engagement, cultural engagement, rather than to be a military presence.

93.8 DDM: One thorny issue has been the sales of the US arms package to Taiwan. At $6.4b, it was much larger than China had anticipated, and China's reaction has been to punish private US defence companies. Could this in the short term, be beneficial to ASEAN private enterprises in any way?

SIIA ST: The measures taken by China happen to be expected. I think that in some way, both sides are trying to measure their relationship. But for China, the Taiwan arms sales is not an unknown - they could see it coming - but they need to make a point. The question now is whether the Americans will just accept it as a point, or whether it would start a tit-for-tat, which would really become something... ties underneath would start to really be affected. So I hope not.

As to whether the ASEAN economies are ready to take advantage of this in terms of the military arms, I frankly doubt it. The ASEAN military expertise - except for Singapore - in terms of manufacturing, is not particularly strong.

93.8 DDM: That was Associate Professor Simon Tay, Chairman of the Singapore Institute of International Affairs, talking to me,Devika Dayal Misra, on 93.8 Live.

[transcribed by Lim May-Ann]

stars - April 6, 2010 03:47 AM (GMT)

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/06/world/06...&pagewanted=all

QUOTE

Obama Limits When U.S. Would Use Nuclear Arms
By DAVID E. SANGER and PETER BAKER
Published: April 5, 2010

WASHINGTON — President Obama said Monday that he was revamping American nuclear strategy to substantially narrow the conditions under which the United States would use nuclear weapons.

President Obama on Monday discussing his new nuclear strategy, which would limit the conditions for using such weapons.

But the president said in an interview that he was carving out an exception for “outliers like Iran and North Korea” that have violated or renounced the main treaty to halt nuclear proliferation.

Discussing his approach to nuclear security the day before formally releasing his new strategy, Mr. Obama described his policy as part of a broader effort to edge the world toward making nuclear weapons obsolete, and to create incentives for countries to give up any nuclear ambitions. To set an example, the new strategy renounces the development of any new nuclear weapons, overruling the initial position of his own defense secretary.

Mr. Obama’s strategy is a sharp shift from those of his predecessors and seeks to revamp the nation’s nuclear posture for a new age in which rogue states and terrorist organizations are greater threats than traditional powers like Russia and China.

It eliminates much of the ambiguity that has deliberately existed in American nuclear policy since the opening days of the cold war. For the first time, the United States is explicitly committing not to use nuclear weapons against nonnuclear states that are in compliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, even if they attacked the United States with biological or chemical weapons or launched a crippling cyberattack.

Those threats, Mr. Obama argued, could be deterred with “a series of graded options,” a combination of old and new conventional weapons. “I’m going to preserve all the tools that are necessary in order to make sure that the American people are safe and secure,” he said in the interview in the Oval Office.

White House officials said the new strategy would include the option of reconsidering the use of nuclear retaliation against a biological attack, if the development of such weapons reached a level that made the United States vulnerable to a devastating strike.

Mr. Obama’s new strategy is bound to be controversial, both among conservatives who have warned against diluting the United States’ most potent deterrent and among liberals who were hoping for a blanket statement that the country would never be the first to use nuclear weapons.

Mr. Obama argued for a slower course, saying, “We are going to want to make sure that we can continue to move towards less emphasis on nuclear weapons,” and, he added, to “make sure that our conventional weapons capability is an effective deterrent in all but the most extreme circumstances.”

The release of the new strategy, known as the Nuclear Posture Review, opens an intensive nine days of nuclear diplomacy geared toward reducing weapons. Mr. Obama plans to fly to Prague to sign a new arms-control agreement with Russia on Thursday and then next week will host 47 world leaders in Washington for a summit meeting on nuclear security.

The most immediate test of the new strategy is likely to be in dealing with Iran, which has defied the international community by developing a nuclear program that it insists is peaceful but that the United States and its allies say is a precursor to weapons. Asked about the escalating confrontation with Iran, Mr. Obama said he was now convinced that “the current course they’re on would provide them with nuclear weapons capabilities,” though he gave no timeline.

He dodged when asked whether he shared Israel’s view that a “nuclear capable” Iran was as dangerous as one that actually possessed weapons.

“I’m not going to parse that right now,” he said, sitting in his office as children played on the South Lawn of the White House at a daylong Easter egg roll. But he cited the example of North Korea, whose nuclear capabilities were unclear until it conducted a test in 2006, which it followed with a second shortly after Mr. Obama took office.

“I think it’s safe to say that there was a time when North Korea was said to be simply a nuclear-capable state until it kicked out the I.A.E.A. and become a self-professed nuclear state,” he said, referring to the International Atomic Energy Agency. “And so rather than splitting hairs on this, I think that the international community has a strong sense of what it means to pursue civilian nuclear energy for peaceful purposes versus a weaponizing capability.”

Mr. Obama said he wanted a new United Nations sanctions resolution against Iran “that has bite,” but he would not embrace the phrase “crippling sanctions” once used by Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton. And he acknowledged the limitations of United Nations action. “We’re not naïve that any single set of sanctions automatically is going to change Iranian behavior,” he said, adding “there’s no light switch in this process.”

In the year since Mr. Obama gave a speech in Prague declaring that he would shift the policy of the United States toward the elimination of nuclear weapons, his staff has been meeting — and arguing — over how to turn that commitment into a workable policy, without undermining the credibility of the country’s nuclear deterrent.

The strategy to be released on Tuesday is months late, partly because Mr. Obama had to adjudicate among advisers who feared he was not changing American policy significantly enough, and those who feared that anything too precipitous could embolden potential adversaries. One senior official said that the new strategy was the product of 150 meetings, including 30 convened by the White House National Security Council, and that even then Mr. Obama had to step in to order rewrites.

He ended up with a document that differed considerably from the one President George W. Bush published in early 2002, just three months after the Sept. 11 attacks. Mr. Bush, too, argued for a post-cold-war rethinking of nuclear deterrence, reducing American reliance on those weapons.

But Mr. Bush’s document also reserved the right to use nuclear weapons “to deter a wide range of threats,” including banned chemical and biological weapons and large-scale conventional attacks. Mr. Obama’s strategy abandons that option — except if the attack is by a nuclear state, or a nonsignatory or violator of the nonproliferation treaty.

The document to be released Tuesday after months of study led by the Defense Department will declare that “the fundamental role” of nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear attacks on the United States, allies or partners, a narrower presumption than the past. But Mr. Obama rejected the formulation sought by arms control advocates to declare that the “sole role” of nuclear weapons is to deter a nuclear attack.

There are five declared nuclear states — the United States, Britain, France, Russia and China. Three states with nuclear weapons have refused to sign — India, Pakistan and Israel — and North Korea renounced the treaty in 2003. Iran remains a signatory, but the United Nations Security Council has repeatedly found it in violation of its obligations, because it has hidden nuclear plants and refused to answer questions about evidence it was working on a warhead.

In shifting the nuclear deterrent toward combating proliferation and the sale or transfer of nuclear material to terrorists or nonnuclear states, Mr. Obama seized on language developed in the last years of the Bush administration. It had warned North Korea that it would be held “fully accountable” for any transfer of weapons or technology. But the next year, North Korea was caught aiding Syria in building a nuclear reactor but suffered no specific consequence.

Mr. Obama was asked whether the American failure to make North Korea pay a heavy price for the aid to Syria undercut Washington’s credibility.

“I don’t think countries around the world are interested in testing our credibility when it comes to these issues,” he said. He said such activity would leave a country vulnerable to a nuclear strike, and added, “We take that very seriously because we think that set of threats present the most serious security challenge to the United States.”

He indicated that he hoped to use this week’s treaty signing with Russia as a stepping stone toward more ambitious reductions in nuclear arsenals down the road, but suggested that would have to extend beyond the old paradigm of Russian-American relations.

“We are going to pursue opportunities for further reductions in our nuclear posture, working in tandem with Russia but also working in tandem with NATO as a whole,” he said.

An obvious such issue would be the estimated 200 tactical nuclear weapons the United States still has stationed in Western Europe. Russia has called for their removal, and there is growing interest among European nations in such a move as well. But Mr. Obama said he wanted to consult with NATO allies before making such a commitment.

The summit meeting that opens next week in Washington will bring together nearly four dozen world leaders, the largest such gathering by an American president since the founding of the United Nations 65 years ago. Mr. Obama said he hoped to use the session to lay down tangible commitments by individual countries toward his goal of securing the world’s nuclear material so it does not fall into the hands of terrorists or dangerous states.

“Our expectation is not that there’s just some vague, gauzy statement about us not wanting to see loose nuclear materials,” he said. “We anticipate a communiqué that spells out very clearly, here’s how we’re going to achieve locking down all the nuclear materials over the next four years.”

A version of this article appeared in print on April 6, 2010, on page A1

here we go, the next move on iran and the DPRK. de-legitimize nukes, playing down a washington bent on destroying "axis of evil" (no-nuke policy unless you are a NPT-breach-er) and reducing the risk of nuclear MAD.

shifts the ball/onus to DPRK and Iran. Nukes only go further in endangering their own security.

edwin3060 - April 7, 2010 05:47 PM (GMT)

Otoh there is no obligation for North Korea nor Iran to reciprocate. They have consistently taken the stance that as long as other countries possess nuclear weapons, they should be allowed to do so as well. Will Obama (or future Presidents) denuclearize the US just to apply some theoretical pressure on these rogue states?

From the historical perspective, Eisenhower relied on the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons to justify the drawdown of the conventional US Military after WWII/Korean War. Currently the conventional forces are still overstretched, and Obama is reducing the nuclear deterrence. I don't think that it is a smart move from a national security POV.

Callsign 24 Seira - April 7, 2010 11:43 PM (GMT)

Singapore and the United States: Cooperation on Transnational Security Threats
Evelyn Goh

Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Singapore
Paper prepared for 26th Annual Pacific Symposium, Honolulu, Hawaii

Singapore is Washington’s closest security partner in Southeast Asia. In
assessing the cooperation between the two countries on transnational security threats, this paper presents optimistic findings. The paper is divided into three sections.

First, it discusses the security concerns and priorities in Singapore since September 2001, and evaluates how well they align with U.S. priorities, taking into account key aspects of bilateral cooperation to date.
The second section addresses the question of what can be done to enhance security and defense cooperation between the two countries, including regional counter-terrorism and maritime security issues.

The final section concludes by placing the analysis in a broader Southeast Asian context.

Click here for the article:
http://www.ndu.edu/inss/symposia/Pacific2005/goh.pdf

Comments anyone?

stars - April 8, 2010 12:46 PM (GMT)

@edwin3060:

all very true and fair. its possible Obama might not even get the bill to reduce nuclear arms (possible but unlikely) passed. but i dont think he seeks the entirely nuke-free US. its reducing it down to a significant level, maybe 1500-2000 warheads down from the 11,000-12,000 it has now ?

@callsign24

interesting article, thanks. its abit dated though. i think you'd find this more interesting, but its more of a historical perspective

http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/WorkingPapers/WP185.pdf

post 2005 cooperation has gone up quite abit. CTF151/CTF 150. the trilateral patrols in SOM initated by uncle sam. coastal radars given to malaysia by uncle sam. US, AUS and indonesia cooperation in detachment 88. our own naval information infusion center that helps to integrate information and disseminate information. thats something really important.

something interesting anyway, from the ST article today about indonesia defense minister visiting our ik2c center,

http://www.straitstimes.com/BreakingNews/S...ory_511772.html

user posted image

im not too sure who the guy in shorts. definitely isnt RSN since our kit dosent have shorts. RAN or USN paccom guy attached there ?

YourFather - April 8, 2010 01:57 PM (GMT)

Aussie? Or a Kiwi?

stars - April 8, 2010 02:22 PM (GMT)

http://www.navy.gov.au/Uniform_Ranks

user posted image

seems like at least an aussie leftenant (do they use the british term too ?)

dacis2 - April 9, 2010 07:38 AM (GMT)

I think the majority of the Commonwealth pronounces "lieutanant" the right way. :P

stars - April 9, 2010 12:56 PM (GMT)

QUOTE (dacis2 @ Apr 9 2010, 03:38 PM)

I think the majority of the Commonwealth pronounces "lieutanant" the right way. :P

nah, its a time honored british naval tradition thing.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lieutenant

edwin3060 - April 9, 2010 11:30 PM (GMT)

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8611864.stm

The Iranian response to Obama's nuclear plan-- unveiling faster uranium centrifuges.

stars - April 10, 2010 03:08 AM (GMT)

the 90 cents paper put this up today as an editorial piece. one of the definite must-reads.

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/09/opinion/...?pagewanted=all

QUOTE

Op-Ed Contributor
Obama’s Nuclear Modesty

By PETER D. FEAVER
Published: April 8, 2010

PRESIDENT OBAMA’S new policy on the use of atomic weapons, called the Nuclear Posture Review, has brought to the public eye a longstanding debate over what’s known as “declaratory doctrine”: what the United States government is willing to say publicly and in advance about the conditions under which it will use its nuclear arsenal. A calm reading of the document shows that the changes in terms of doctrine aren’t nearly as epochal as the White House would have us believe or its critics would have us fear.

The administration claims this new declaration will create strong incentives for states to eschew nuclear weapons. Critics, many of them my fellow Republicans, claim it substantially weakens America’s deterrence against attacks with non-nuclear weapons of mass destruction. My view is that the new policy buys a trivial new incentive at the cost of a modest loss in deterrence. Reasonable people can disagree as to whether the bargain is worth it, but it is a bargain on the margins.

This is the key sentence from the posture review: “The United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and in compliance with their nuclear nonproliferation obligations.”

This apparently walks back from a Bush-era declaration that underscored the possibility that the United States might use nuclear weapons if it suffered a chemical or biological attack. Instead, the Obama administration is saying it will respond to chemical or biological assaults only with “a devastating conventional military response.”

The administration’s defenders have promoted this as a bold step in fulfilling the president’s commitment to reducing the role of nuclear weapons in national security strategy. Critics see it as a reckless act of self-constraint. But there is less here than meets the eye.

First, under the declaration, America still threatens to use nuclear weapons against nuclear states that are party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty — read: Russia and China — if they hit us with a nuclear weapon or with a chemical, biological or cyber-attack.

Second, the United States leaves open the possibility that it will use nuclear weapons against “non-state actors” (think Al Qaeda) who seek weapons of mass destruction. Since non-state actors reside within actual nations, this means that our strike might hit the territory of those states offering a safe haven, regardless of their status under the nonproliferation treaty.

Third, the new doctrine clearly implies that the United States reserves the right to threaten to use nuclear weapons against states that are not party to the nonproliferation treaty. And, of course, it explicitly states that the no-nukes assurance does not apply to states that are in violation of the treaty, a list that includes Iran, North Korea and Syria.

Crucially, since the new policy does not delineate what it means for states to be “in compliance” with the nonproliferation treaty, the United States has a major loophole. Presumably, the Obama administration will not take a potential target’s word on whether it is meeting the obligations — after all, Iran claims to be in compliance with the treaty, while the Nuclear Posture Review explicitly notes that it is not.

Some worry that for the purposes of this doctrine the Obama administration would be limited by the provisions of the nonproliferation treaty designating the United Nations Security Council and the International Atomic Energy Agency as the arbiters of who is in compliance. If so, that would seem to tie Washington’s hands. But the new doctrine, in fact, is coy on this point. I suspect the White House intends to do what every previous administration has done: reserve the right to determine for itself what constitutes compliance when making security decisions.

Thus the most controversial part of the new policy boils down to this: we will not threaten to use nuclear weapons against a state that launches a non-nuclear attack against us unless we deem it to be in violation of Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty obligations.

And the Obama administration even gave itself an escape clause from that limited rule. “Given the catastrophic potential of biological weapons and the rapid pace of bio-technology development,” the new policy reads, “the United States reserves the right to make any adjustment in the assurance that may be warranted by the evolution and proliferation of the biological weapons threat.”

It’s a rather dense clause, but in explaining it, White House officials drew a distinction between non-nuclear threats that they view as only “crippling” and potential threats that might be “devastating.” They made clear that the administration reserves the right to determine which sorts of attacks might cross that line into “devastating,” and thus warrant a nuclear response.

So, is the entire declaratory doctrine a meaningless exercise in rhetoric? Not entirely. For one, it does weaken our deterrence ability slightly. Deterrence depends on an adversary fearing that we will respond in a devastating way to an attack. Policy makers like to think of our nuclear deterrence strategy as an “umbrella,” one that includes scenarios that the adversary is certain will engender our nuclear response, and others in which it believes that the chances of retaliation are too high to risk.

If adversaries believe what is stated in the new Obama doctrine, the umbrella is a bit smaller, with fewer scenarios in both the “certain" and the “likely enough” categories. Thus, when it comes to strategic ambiguity, the critics have a point. (Paradoxically, the more our adversaries buy into the administration’s spin that this is a drastic change, the stronger the critics’ point. If adversaries stick to a lawyerly reading of the text, the critique loses force.)

In the final analysis, what may be most important about the new doctrine is the light it shines on the assumptions and strategic logic that motivate the national security thinking of the Obama administration. The administration clearly believes that announcing new limits on our nuclear posture will be a strong reason for rogue states to become compliant. This seems hopelessly idealistic: we’ve given Iran and North Korea plenty of stronger incentives, with no progress.

Nonetheless, all the loopholes the administration has built into the new declaration seem a tacit acknowledgment that it understands that such idealism is not a reliable guarantor of American national security. President Obama may be willing to oversell his new doctrine for symbolic value, but a careful reading of the policy shows that he is duly wary of selling out the national security of the United States.

Peter D. Feaver, a professor of political science at Duke, was on the National Security Council staff under Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush.

stars - April 30, 2010 02:22 AM (GMT)

Robert Gates
SECDEF

Helping Others Defend Themselves

QUOTE

The Future of U.S. Security Assistance

In the decades to come, the most lethal threats to the United States' safety and security--a city poisoned or reduced to rubble by a terrorist attack--are likely to emanate from states that cannot adequately govern themselves or secure their own territory. Dealing with such fractured or failing states is, in many ways, the main security challenge of our time.

For the Defense Department and the entire U.S. government, it is also a complex institutional challenge. The United States is unlikely to repeat a mission on the scale of those in Afghanistan or Iraq anytime soon--that is, forced regime change followed by nation building under fire. But as the Pentagon's Quadrennial Defense Review recently concluded, the United States is still likely to face scenarios requiring a familiar tool kit of capabilities, albeit on a smaller scale. In these situations, the effectiveness and credibility of the United States will only be as good as the effectiveness, credibility, and sustain-ability of its local partners.

This strategic reality demands that the U.S. government get better at what is called "building partner capacity": helping other countries defend themselves or, if necessary, fight alongside U.S. forces by providing them with equipment, training, or other forms of security assistance. This is something that the United States has been doing in various ways for nearly three-quarters of a century. It dates back to the period before the United States entered World War II, when Winston Churchill famously said, "Give us the tools, and we will finish the job." Through the Lend-Lease program, the United States sent some $31 billion worth of supplies (in 1940s dollars) to the United Kingdom over the course of the war. U.S. aid to the Soviet Union during those years exceeded $11 billion, including hundreds of thousands of trucks and thousands of tanks, aircraft, and artillery pieces.

Building up the military and security forces of key allies and local partners was also a major component of U.S. strategy in the Cold War, first in Western Europe, then in Greece, South Korea, and elsewhere. One of the major tenets of President Richard Nixon's national security strategy, the Nixon Doctrine, was to use military and economic assistance to help U.S. partners and allies resist Soviet-sponsored insurgencies without using U.S. troops in the kind of military interventions that had proved so costly and controversial in Korea and Vietnam.

ADVISORY DUTY
The global security environment has changed radically since then, and today it is more complex, more unpredictable, and, even without a superpower adversary, in many ways more dangerous. The U.S. military, although resilient in spirit and magnificent in performance, is under stress and strain fighting two wars and confronting diffuse challenges around the globe. More broadly, there continues to be a struggle for legitimacy, loyalty, and power across the Islamic world between modernizing, moderate forces and the violent, extremist organizations epitomized by al Qaeda, the Taliban, and other such groups. In these situations, building the governance and security capacity of other countries must be a critical element of U.S. national security strategy.

For the most part, however, the United States' instruments of national power--military and civilian--were set up in a different era for a very different set of threats. The U.S. military was designed to defeat other armies, navies, and air forces, not to advise, train, and equip them. Likewise, the United States' civilian instruments of power were designed primarily to manage relationships between states, rather than to help build states from within.

The recent history of U.S. dealings with Afghanistan and Pakistan exemplifies the challenges the United States faces. In the decade before 9/11, the United States essentially abandoned Afghanistan to its fate. At the same time, Washington cut off military-to-military exchange and training programs with Pakistan, for well-intentioned but ultimately shortsighted--and strategically damaging--reasons.

In the weeks and months following the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. government faced a number of delays in getting crucial efforts off the ground--from reimbursing the Pakistanis for their support (such as their provision of overflight rights to U.S. military aircraft) to putting in place a formal Afghan military. The security assistance system, which was designed for the more predictable requirements of the Cold War, proved unequal to the task. The U.S. government had to quickly assemble from scratch various urgently needed resources and programs. And even after establishing funding streams and authorities, the military services did not prioritize efforts to train the Afghan and, later, the Iraqi security forces, since such assignments were not considered career enhancing for ambitious young officers. Instead, the military relied heavily on contractors and reservists for these tasks.

More recently, the advisory missions in both the Afghan and the Iraqi campaigns have received the attention they deserve--in leadership, resources, and personnel. Within the military, advising and mentoring indigenous security forces is moving from the periphery of institutional priorities, where it was considered the province of the Special Forces, to being a key mission for the armed forces as a whole. The U.S. Army has established specialized Advisory and Assistance Brigades--now the main forces in Iraq--and is adjusting its promotion and assignment procedures to account for the importance of this mission; the U.S. Air Force is fielding a fleet of light fighter jets and transport aircraft optimized to train and assist local partners, and it recently opened a school to train U.S. airmen to advise other nations' air forces; and the U.S. Navy is working with African countries to improve their ability to combat smuggling, piracy, and other threats to maritime security.

One institutional challenge we face at the Pentagon is that the various functions for building partner capacity are scattered across different parts of the military. An exception is the air force, where most of these functions--from foreign military sales to military training exchanges--are grouped under one civilian executive (the equivalent of a three-star general) to better coordinate them with larger goals and national strategy. This more integrated and consolidated approach makes better sense for the Pentagon and for the government as a whole.

The United States has made great strides in building up the operational capacity of its partners by training and equipping troops and mentoring them in the field. But there has not been enough attention paid to building the institutional capacity (such as defense ministries) or the human capital (including leadership skills and attitudes) needed to sustain security over the long term.

The United States now recognizes that the security sectors of at-risk countries are really systems of systems tying together the military, the police, the justice system, and other governance and oversight mechanisms. As such, building a partner's overall governance and security capacity is a shared responsibility across multiple agencies and departments of the U.S. national security apparatus--and one that requires flexible, responsive tools that provide incentives for cooperation. Operations against extremist groups in the Philippines and, more recently, Yemen have shown how well-integrated training and assistance efforts can achieve real success.

But for all the improvements of recent years, the United States' interagency tool kit is still a hodgepodge of jury-rigged arrangements constrained by a dated and complex patchwork of authorities, persistent shortfalls in resources, and unwieldy processes. The National Security Act that created most of the current interagency structure was passed in 1947, the last major legislation structuring how Washington dispenses foreign assistance was signed by President John F. Kennedy, and the law governing U.S. exports of military equipment was passed in 1976. All the while, other countries that do not suffer from such encumbrances have been more quickly funding projects, selling weapons, and building relationships.

BRIDGING THE POTOMAC

In 2005, to address the country's most pressing needs, the Defense Department obtained authorities that enable the military to respond to unforeseen threats and opportunities by providing training and equipment to other countries with urgent security needs. These new tools came with an important innovation: their use requires the concurrence of both the secretary of defense and the secretary of state in what is called a "dual key" decision-making process. In recent years, the secretaries have used these authorities to assist the Lebanese army, the Pakistani special forces, and the navies and maritime security forces of Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines.

Those authorities and programs--and the role of the Defense Department in foreign assistance writ large--have stirred debates across Washington. I never miss an opportunity to call for more funding for diplomacy and development and for a greater emphasis on civilian programs. I also once warned publicly of a "creeping militarization" of aspects of U.S. foreign policy if imbalances within the national security system were not addressed. As a career CIA officer who watched the military's role in intelligence grow ever larger, I am keenly aware that the Defense Department, because of its sheer size, is not only the 800-pound gorilla of the U.S. government but one with a sometimes very active pituitary gland.

Nonetheless, it is time to move beyond the ideological debates and bureaucratic squabbles that have in the past characterized the issue of building partner capacity and move forward with a set of solutions that can address what will be a persistent and enduring challenge. Last year, I sent Secretary of State Hillary Clinton one proposal that I see as a starting point for discussion of the way ahead. It would involve pooled funds set up for security capacity building, stabilization, and conflict prevention. Both the State Department and the Defense Department would contribute to these funds, and no project could move forward without the approval of both agencies. A number of other countries--in particular the United Kingdom, the primary model for this proposal--have found that using pooled funds from different ministries is an effective way of dealing with fragile or failing states. What I find compelling about this approach is that it would create incentives for collaboration between different agencies of the government, unlike the existing structure and processes left over from the Cold War, which often conspire to hinder true whole-of-government approaches.

Whatever approach we take to reforming and modernizing the United States' apparatus for building partner capacity, it should be informed by several principles. First, it must provide agility and flexibility. Under normal budgeting and programming cycles, a budget is put together one year, considered and passed by Congress in the next, and then executed in the third. This is appropriate and manageable for predictable, ongoing requirements. But as recent history suggests, it is not well suited to dealing with the emerging and unforeseen threats--or opportunities--often found in failed and failing states.

Second, there must be effective oversight mechanisms that allow Congress to carry out its constitutional responsibility to ensure that these funds are spent properly. Tools that foster cooperation across the executive branch could also enhance cooperation across the jurisdictional boundaries of congressional committees--thereby actually strengthening congressional oversight in the national security arena.

Third, security assistance efforts must be conducted steadily and over the long term so as to provide some measure of predictability and planning for the U.S. government and, what is more significant, for its partners abroad. Convincing other countries and leaders to be partners of the United States, often at great political and physical risk, ultimately depends on proving that the United States is capable of being a reliable partner over time. To be blunt, this means that the United States cannot cut off assistance and relationships every time a country does something Washington dislikes or disagrees with.

Fourth, any government decision in this area should reinforce the State Department's leading role in crafting and conducting U.S. foreign policy, including the provision of foreign assistance, of which building security capacity is a key part. Proper coordination procedures will ensure that urgent requirements for military capacity building do not undermine the United States' overarching foreign policy priorities.

Finally, everything must be suffused with strong doses of modesty and realism. When all is said and done, there are limits to what the United States can do to influence the direction of radically different countries and cultures. And even the most enlightened and modernized interagency apparatus is still a bureaucracy, prone to the same parochial and self-serving tendencies as the system it has replaced.

Helping other countries better provide for their own security will be a key and enduring test of U.S. global leadership and a critical part of protecting U.S. security, as well. Improving the way the U.S. government executes this vital mission must be an important national priority.

- how about us ? is the SAF our "800 pound gorilla" in our policy toolkit ? is there a risk that we are overmilitarizing any potential solution ?

edwin3060 - April 30, 2010 05:38 PM (GMT)

I don't think so. Our military is very constrained in its actions and (because we aren't really fighting overseas) don't have the political influence and power that US Generals like Petraeus have. Not to mention that the best people in the military are co-opted into our government so that there is alignment of personal interests, should they be a factor. I also don't think that MINDEF and MFA have as adversarial a relationship as the DOD and State Department.

Moving on to the article itself, I think that what Gates is not mentioning, perhaps because of political reasons, is that the Nixon administration engaged with other countries regardless of ideological differences. This is something that Democratic administrations, with their emphasis on their version of 'Human Rights' and 'Political/Personal Freedoms' have more problem with compared to more realist Republican administrations. If the US is to maintain its influence around the globe, it will have to abandon much of its strident tone w.r.t some issues in order to build a coalition, just like it did against the Soviet Union.

stars - May 13, 2010 10:25 AM (GMT)

this came out last week, so i guess its fine to post this up right now.

QUOTE

Keeping peace with hard and soft power

THE four-star admiral's office sits 200m above historic Pearl Harbour, offering the Commander, United States Pacific Command (Pacom), a stunning view. Pearl Harbour is where most of the United States' Pacific Fleet is home- ported.

Admiral Robert Willard's career in the US Navy spans 37 years, during which he flew F-14 fighter jets and commanded the US aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln. He even flew a Soviet jet in the famous Tom Cruise movie Top Gun.

Pacom is the biggest and oldest US combatant command - indeed, it is the biggest unified military command on the planet. In total, Adm Willard leads 325,000 soldiers, airmen and sailors, together with 180 ships, 1,500 aircraft and 85,000 Marines.

Powerful as his position is, however, the admiral is a study in humility.

'Please do not bother about these scars. It was an accident,' he says, pointing to a string of scars on his arms and cheeks, evidence of an eventful triathlon the previous weekend.

The vast scope of Pacom's mission would make even the hardest of veterans circumspect. Its so-called area of responsibility spans 51 per cent of the world's oceans - from California to India - 50 per cent of the world's population and six of the world's biggest militaries.

'If I were to describe one mission that Pacom has always had, it is to keep this region secure, secure in the interests of the United States, as well as for its regional allies and partners,' says Adm Willard.

'We have been sailing these waters for 150 years and contributing to the security of the region for that long. And when we look at these regions, like the South China Sea, East China Sea, the sea lanes of communications that criss-cross from the Malacca Strait and Singapore Strait, these are very strategic international bodies of water...'

The admiral might have been a tad disingenuous when it came to history, failing to mention that America's history in the Pacific began in 1854, when the Black Ships of US Commodore Matthew Perry forcibly opened up Japan to global trade.

But his overall point is clear: For half of the 20th century, the US European Command faced the Soviet Union across the Fulda Gap on the plains of Central Europe. In the 21st century, Pacific Command will have to maintain the peace in the Asia-Pacific, failing which it could well see itself fighting America's next war.

Last month, Admiral Willard gave The Straits Times unprecedented access to the soldiers, airmen and sailors at Pacom. One central message came through in the scores of interviews this newspaper conducted: For more than 60 years after World War II, America has paid for peace and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region in blood and treasure. It will continue to work with countries in the region to keep the peace, so that it would never have to marshal the gods of war.
Touched by history

VISITORS to the Pacific Command - or Honolulu, for that matter - would not be able to find one spot that has not been touched, in one way or another, by history.

At Pearl Harbour sit the Arizona Memorial and the USS Missouri, what one tour guide calls the 'two bookends' to America's involvement in World War II. On Dec 7, 1941, Japanese bombers sank the battleship Arizona, causing 1,177 deaths. Nearly four years later, the Japanese surrendered to the allies on board the USS Missouri.

Over at Hickam Air Force Base, a mess hall was attacked by Japanese aircraft, leading to the death of nearly 200 airmen. Today, the walls of the building, now the headquarters of Pacific Air Forces (Pacaf), still bear the massive gashes wreaked by Japanese gunfire.

'Somehow I think the ghosts of that fateful day still walk up and down these corridors,' says Major-General Jan-Marc Jouas, director of operations, plans requirements and programmes at Pacaf. 'The history helps us remember, and we can only hope that it never happens again,'

Japan survived defeat in World War II, and thanks to American protection and patronage, became a leader power in Asia with which the US has to contend.

Adm Willard and his officers do not say so explicitly, but the relationship between America, Asia's foremost power, and China, set to be the region's - if not the world's - greatest power, might take a similar trajectory. Add to this other contemporary challenges - including the Taiwan Strait and North Korea, and transnational threats such as smuggling, terrorism and pandemics - and the Pacom Commander has his hands pretty much full.

This is not to say that Pacom is not gearing up for its main challenges. Its mission statement, as stated in a document released last year, makes all the right noises about regional cooperation and peaceful development, but makes no bones it is committed to 'fighting to win'.

And it probably will, in the foreseeable future at any rate, given the resources it commands. At the first sign of trouble, Marines based in Honolulu and other parts of Asia can be deployed within six hours. Recently, airmen based at Hickam flew thousands of kilometres in massive C-17 transport planes to Haiti after the country was devastated by an earthquake in January.

'That is nothing - we do that all the time,' says Staff Sergeant Brad Valenzuela, a C-17 crew chief.

But Pacom's hard power tells only half the story. Officers are quick to emphasise what they call 'Phase Zero'.

'One way to look at Phase Zero is simply the effort to develop and maintain the regional environment we want to live in: alliances, partnerships, and outreach efforts to reinforce security and stability,' explained one officer. 'From that perspective, all the other phases are an aberration - an exception to the rule, where we want to get back to Phase Zero (a peaceful steady state) as rapidly and effectively as possible.'

This, in essence, is the US military's take on soft power. Last year, the US Navy had a new advertising campaign, touting it to be the 'force for good'. The tagline was rubbished by people inside and outside the navy, but it provided a good snapshot into the new thinking of the US military.

Says Admiral Patrick Walsh, commander of the Pacific Fleet: 'We tend to lean forward and look at what is in the realm of the possible, and ways in which we can contribute to the overall stability and security of the region. We are no longer in a position to say that other people's problems are not our problem.'

Such thinking is not confined to Pacom's top generals. Even the Marines tout this 'soft power' line.

As they come, Marines are as hard as nails. One army officer diplomatically calls them 'intense'. The Marines say - perhaps only half in jest - that their colleagues in the navy, air force and army are 'fat and lazy'.

I spoke to Colonel Russell Smith, assistant chief of staff at US Marine Corps Forces, Pacific. We conducted the interview on the colonel's sofa. The strapping colonel wore combat boots - quite strange, given the office setting. I sat next to his massive combat backpack.

He told me that the Marines now had three basic questions for partner countries: How can the US help? What can the US learn from them? And how can both parties work better together?

'We do not try to go out into the region and be arrogant... We want to be sensitive to (other) cultures,' he insisted, adding: 'The US has not done a good job throughout the globe about being culturally sensitive, but we are learning as we grow.'

We are in a new world when the world's toughest soldiers take to sounding touchy-feely. [comment: uncle 5-2 what you think of touchy-feely now ? :D]

Pacom's soft power mission is aided by the fact its soldiers come from diverse backgrounds. The USS Chafee, for example, is home to sailors whose parents hail from 15 countries, many of them from Asia. Major Derrick Cheng, a public affairs officer at the 25th Infantry Division, for one, was born in the Philippines and joined the US Army after watching war movies such as Platoon.

Pacom has also set up the Centre of Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance which specialises in disaster preparedness, consequence management and health security. Since its setting up in 1994, it has helped more than a dozen countries, including Thailand, the Philippines and Fiji.

Lieutenant-General (Retired) John Goodman, the centre's director, refused to make the link explicitly, but the assistance given to such countries could eventually translate into influence.

'To help a country become more prepared for possible disasters is not only a good thing to do, but might influence our relationship with it. I would hope our politicians will consider that,' said the retired Marine general.

Rise of competing powers

A CYNICAL take on Pacom's soft-power strategy is that it arises from a recognition of America's ebbing powers. US President Barack Obama might argue for increased global cooperation, but the cynics' counter to that is that Washington now realises that it cannot effect change as unilaterally as it did in the past.

There is a grain of truth to this. America is not about to disappear as the preponderant power in the region, but the rise of powers such as China and India does mean that its power will decline in relative terms.

In the centre of the Pacific Air Forces building is a memorial called the Courtyard of Heroes. The black concrete structure commemorates the airmen who perished in the Japanese attacks on Pearl Harbour and in the wars that ensued.

Unlike their World War II predecessors, modern-day Americans do not cherish honour, endurance and valour - the old-fashioned verities - complained Ms Jessica Higa, a member of the Hickam History Club.

'Our generation is losing these values. This is worrying,' she said.

williamc@sph.com.sg

This is the first of two parts on the US Pacific Command. The second will appear tomorrow.

stars - May 13, 2010 10:29 AM (GMT)

QUOTE

US Pacific Fleet is here to stay

Senior Writer William Choong visited the US Pacific Command headquarters in Honolulu, Hawaii, last month. We carry today the second part of his look at the biggest and oldest US combatant command.

DOCKED at Changi Naval Base, the USS Chafee cut a sharp silhouette against the clear blue sky. One of the US Navy's most high-tech ships, the USS Chafee is a US$1.2 billion (S$1.6 billion) symbol of America's commitment to Asia.

The ship is named after Senator John Chafee, a Marine company commander during the Korean War. Coincidentally, the Chafee's current commanding officer, Commander Choi Heedong, was born in Korea and migrated to the United States in his teens.

I met Commander Choi earlier at the US Pacific Command (Pacom) headquarters in Honolulu. After returning home, I asked him some follow- up questions, and he graciously invited me on board the Chafee for an unequal exchange: He would offer me a generous Navy lunch and tour of the ship, while I could pepper him with questions.

'The sacrifices of Senator Chafee in Korea paved the way for someone like me to have the opportunity to command a ship like this,' he said.

The Chafee bristles with enough firepower to dwarf that of many smaller navies. It is packed to the gills with missiles, computers and radars. It can track about 1,000 aerial and naval targets simultaneously.

'If I know that Osama bin Laden is, say, in Room 1159 at the Raffles Hotel, we can target him with our Tomahawk missile. There's no collateral damage. It's a very precise weapon, very expensive, and we are very judicious with its use,' said Commander Choi. 'We don't employ it unless we really need to.'

In a sense, this is the way Pacom employs its military power: It has dollops of it on tap but is always measured in its use. A key strategy document released in April last year stated that the US, together with its allies and partners in Asia, will adopt a multilateral approach to foster stability and tackle challenges.

The emphasis on regional cooperation does not signal a departure from Pacom's primary responsibility to 'fight and win', wrote Admiral Timothy Keating, who relinquished his command of Pacom in October last year. Rather, it underscores the complexity of Asia's security environment and is aimed at supporting conditions that preclude the necessity of war.

The latter is summed up in the phrase 'partnership, readiness and presence'. That sounds plausible enough, but the critical question for many Asian leaders is whether that is a subtle way of saying the US will contain China's growing power.

Senior Pacom officials in Honolulu stress that Pacom's overall strategy is not to challenge China. When pressed, they would only concede that the US is cognisant of its interests, and those of many other Asian countries, in maintaining a robust presence in the region so as to 'pre- empt any threat'.

The available evidence suggests that is not an idle boast. In recent years, the US has moved several attack submarines from the Atlantic to the Pacific. By next year, Hawaii will house 20 of the US Air Force's cutting edge F-22 Raptors.

As one staff officer put it candidly: 'North-east Asia is where our big conventional threats are: China and North Korea. But we have to be very careful about saying that China is a threat.'

Take, for example, the 613th Air and Space Operations Centre (AOC) located at Hickam Air Force Base. Housed in a nondescript hangar, the AOC is the 24/7 'brains' of the 13th Air Force.

Manned by close to 300 people, the AOC is ready for all missions, from humanitarian missions to a full-scale war. In recent years, it has tracked missile launches in North Korea and deployed aircraft to support operations in places as far away as Iraq and Afghanistan.

Pacom also conducts more than 400 exercises a year with its regional counterparts, including Cope Tiger (a trilateral exercise involving the air forces of Singapore, Thailand and the US) and Cobra Gold and Yama Sakura (bilateral exercises involving the US military and its Thai and Japanese counterparts, respectively).

These exercises cannot be described as US instruments to contain China. One could say, though, that they help the US win friends and gain influence - in case things go awry.

'We can operate together and see what each nation's air forces are capable of. There is also the more human aspect of developing friendships and partnerships,' said Major-General Jan-Marc Jouas, director of operations at Pacific Air Forces.

Emerging challenges

PACOM paints a pretty picture of regional cooperation, but there are many challenges in its domain. The growing naval power of emergent powers such as China and India is one.

India, in turn, frets about China's 'string of pearls' strategy - allegedly establishing naval ports around the Indian Ocean rim. Pacom officials consider India to be a 'special partner', and they take care not to say that New Delhi could be used as a balance vis-a-vis China. But they are apparently less concerned than their Indian colleagues about China's alleged 'string of pearls'.

'I do not know if this is a string of pearls or a string of investment or loans (to countries building the ports). So, I don't necessarily accept the label at face value but would want to investigate further,' said Admiral Patrick Walsh, commander of the Pacific Fleet.

A more immediate challenge for Pacom is America's alliance with Japan. Since the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) took power in September last year, the people on the island of Okinawa have been pressing the DPJ government to stick to its campaign promise to withdraw all US military forces from the island.

Such a move would contravene a 2006 deal between the US and Japan, which called for a more moderate move, whereby 8,000 US Marines would be moved from Okinawa to Guam and another 10,000 moved to the north of Okinawa.

Officers at the Marine Forces Pacific headquarters understand the grievances of ordinary Okinawans. After all, growing urban sprawl in Okinawa has expanded right up to the Marine Corps Air Station at Futenma. Unsurprisingly, air operations have caused much inconvenience to the people living nearby.

The US Marines suggest, however, that the DPJ government stick to the letter of the 2006 deal - or provide an acceptable alternative.

Mr Brad Glosserman, executive director at Pacific Forum CSIS, a think-tank based in Honolulu, paints a stark picture: The DPJ is taking Japan's alliance with the US for granted.

'The alliance is not in the DPJ's DNA,' he said. 'This is not to say they're against the alliance, but they do believe that come hell or high water, the Americans will be there for them, no matter what.'

In the long term, the biggest challenge for Pacom is China.

According to some projections, China would have a blue-water navy by 2020. More importantly, China is reported to be developing anti-ship ballistic missiles - weapons that could target aircraft carriers approaching the Taiwan Strait. This would challenge one of America's highest national interests - freedom of navigation - and undermine Washington's security guarantees to the region.

China has rejected such concerns, saying its naval development is part of its 'peaceful rise'. But not many observers are convinced. One of them is Admiral Robert Willard, commander of Pacom. China's growing capabilities would affect security not only in the Taiwan Strait, but also the South China and East China seas, he said.

'These anti-access capabilities come with other investments China is making in power projection capabilities that at least, at first glance, are not defensive in nature. From a technical standpoint, we will continue to work on capabilities that will enable us in to operate in the worst circumstances,' said Adm Willard.

Adm Willard was being diplomatic. Adm Keating, his predecessor, was far more direct. Speaking to The Straits Times last year, he said of the Chinese developing anti-access capabilities: 'You might make it painful, but you won't prevail. So why bother?'

While the US Air Force has invited many air forces, including those from Singapore and India, to participate in its exclusive Red Flag series of air exercises, China has not been invited.

Said Maj-Gen Jouas: 'I won't call China an ally or partner, but it is not an adversary... (Inviting China to Red Flag) is not something that we're contemplating, but it's also not something that we have ruled out altogether.'

Still the superior force

FOR years, Asian leaders have fretted over Washington's lack of attention to the region. During the administration of President George W. Bush, US officials skipped meetings in Asia as the Iraq and Afghanistan wars devoured their attention.

To his credit, President Barack Obama has hit all the right notes, calling himself the first 'Pacific president'. But a recent focus on domestic priorities has again left Asians questioning whether they are suffering from benign neglect.

Adm Willard sought to dispel such perceptions. Though the US military has shrunk significantly since the end of the Cold War, its commitments to Asia have remained largely unchanged, he noted.

Admittedly, 35,000 troops - about a tenth of Pacom's total strength of about 330,000 - have been redeployed to Iraq and Afghanistan. But Pacom has actually demanded more of its naval and air forces to fill in the gaps in Asia, he said.

Pacom continues to deploy in the region daily about 60 of its 180 ships. At any one time, about a third of the Pacific Fleet's ships are deployed at sea, another third is docked for repairs, while the remaining third is in training.

Says Adm Willard: 'In my discussions with senior military leaders and heads of states, I am asked the same question: What is the the staying power of the US? We have been here and will always be here. I can assure you that the US is in the region to stay.'

Last October, Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew summed up the collective anxiety when he addressed a Washington audience. Noting China's military modernisation, he said bluntly that China's development of a blue-water fleet 'cannot just be to deter foreign intervention in a conflict between Taiwan and the mainland'.

'In the end, whatever the challenges, US core interest requires that it remains the superior power on the Pacific. To give up this position would diminish America's role throughout the world,' said MM Lee.

williamc@sph.com.sg

38Ž - May 13, 2010 02:00 PM (GMT)

I’m not too sure, gestures at different time are confusing. Probably Lao Lee is in China so he contributed this prior to his visit:

user posted image

QUOTE

U.S.-China Relations
During an important policy conference president Barack Obama said the Chinese yuan (RMB) is kept at an artificially low level, giving China an unfair advantage in selling its exports. Obama did not call China a currency manipulator, but he said the U.S. has "to make sure that our goods are not artificially inflated in price and their goods are not artificially deflated in price." U.S. exports to China in 2008 were $69.7 billion compared with imports of $337.8 billion, a deficit of $268 billion. Imports were five times the value of exports.

China has resisted calls to up-value the yuan, suspecting these are attempts to slow its growth. Yet Western economists unanimously agree that the yuan is undervalued by 24% to 40% and that the currencies of Hong Kong, Malaysia, Taiwan and Singapore also need to rise in order to correct their trade imbalances with the U.S. But as long as the yuan doesn't appreciate neither can the currencies of other East Asian countries, unless they're willing to lose their market share in exports.

Buzz Premier Wen Jiabao of China has said, "We will not yield to any pressure of any form forcing us to appreciate." China has urged the U.S. to maintain the value of the dollar and has reduced its holdings in U.S. Treasuries by 3.7%, or $34 billion. China attacked the U.S. policy of selling arms to Taiwan, threatening sanctions against American firms and noncooperation on international issues. Thus, China resisted American initiatives on climate change in Copenhagen and has not backed tougher sanctions against Iran. Beijing has also expressed great anger over President Obama's meeting with the Dalai Lama at the White House, issuing a terse statement that the U.S. had "grossly violated the norms governing international relations."

At the Copenhagen summit on climate change Western media reported that Premier Wen refused to attend a meeting of key leaders called by President Obama, sending Vice Foreign Minister He Yafei in his stead. This meant that Obama, a President, had to call on Wen, a premier. The Financial Times ran a front-page photo capturing the moment: a U.S. President leaning forward with arms outstretched, apparently pleading with a Chinese premier, who remained seated with hands folded and fingers interlaced, looking stone-faced. Xinhua, China's leading newspaper, knew the picture did not show China in a good light; it ran a photograph of Premier Wen looking less imperious.

What has changed in U.S.--China relations? The U.S. economy has tanked, with China holding more than $2.4 trillion in U.S. Treasuries and other assets, which means the U.S. needs China's cooperation in order to stabilize its economy.
The increase in tensions between the two nations caused an American leader close to the White House to ask me why China's posture has changed. I could not explain why. So when I met the Chinese state councillor in January, I showed him the FT photo. The state councillor responded that it was a misunderstanding.

I then added that foreign officials, including Singapore's, in negotiating with Chinese officials on joint statements have found them to be pushier and tougher to deal with. The state councillor responded in succinct Chinese, "When we are not strong we should not be proud, and when we are strong we will still not be proud." I agreed and complimented him on his speech in Jakarta in which he had pointed out that China's per capita GDP was modest, ranking 104th in the world.

Tit for Tat

Meanwhile, various commercial disputes have arisen between China and the U.S., making people wonder if these developments will lead to more protectionism and affect the global economy. The issues include antidumping duties on U.S. chicken products; levies on Chinese-made tires and oil well pipes; allegations by the U.S. that China has raised the international prices of several raw materials through export restrictions while keeping input costs lower for manufacturers in China; and China's censorship of Google ( GOOG - news - people ) and whether that constitutes an unfair barrier to trade.

In its quest to become a world power China has chosen to take the path of the "peaceful rise." It projects the image of a cuddly Chinese panda, compared with the fierce American grizzly bear. Chinese leaders are in the midst of finding the right balance between keeping a low profile and exerting their growing influence. As a result, astute observers find China fumbling from time to time in its reach for the right balance in its public positions.

http://www.forbes.com/global/2010/0412/opi...ent-events.html

Iowa_BB61 - May 13, 2010 04:28 PM (GMT)

Any news on where we were be getting the pandas the Chinese promised us?

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1r06d6AbMwg
Cute and Cuddly?

stars - May 18, 2010 03:56 PM (GMT)

http://www.asahi.com/english/TKY201005140485.html

QUOTE

Editor's note: This is the seventh installment of an interview series that appeared in the vernacular Asahi Shimbun under the title "Brave, grave new world."

* * *

With his insightful analyses of trends in international politics, Lee Kuan Yew can be considered the world's 'Chief intelligence officer.' Having brought prosperity to the island-nation of Singapore during the past half century, Lee was asked for his thoughts about surviving in the 'new world.'

* * *

Question: Do you think the Asia-Pacific region is already in a post-America era?

Answer: No. Post-America may take place in another 30 to 50 years. I do not see the Chinese being able to equal the American technology either in civilian or in military terms nor in the purchasing power of the American market. Although the numbers are with China, per-capita GDP is still low. And even after 30 years when they exceed U.S. GDP, their per capita will be low. Power is the projection of both economic strength, military capability and political influence.

In the second half of this century, we have to see again. Because by then, the Chinese would have caught up by technology. Not completely, because the Americans will advance further, but they will be closing the gap. And although their per capita may be lower, their total resources for 1,400 million people will be greater than America. Therefore, they have more resources to spend on political purposes and military purposes.

So, that may tip the balance, not completely to their side, but in a more equalized position for power (and influence) in the Pacific. That's my view. I may be wrong.

Q: Some economic historians, like Niall Ferguson, have recently argued that once a great power starts to decline, it does not usually decline in an orderly fashion. In fact, in most cases they declined precipitously. Do you think the United States could decline precipitously?

A: Well, there is an off-chance that the United States will lose confidence in itself, will not be so creative, so inventive and creating breakthroughs in new technologies and not attracting new talents from abroad. I don't see the United States in the next 10, 20, 30 years losing that capability.

Talent will not go to China. Talent will go to America because Americans speak English and everybody fits in. It's a country that embraces immigrants. To go and settle in China, you have to master the Chinese language. And you must get used to the Chinese culture. And that is a very difficult hurdle to clear.

Even Singapore-Chinese doing business in China find that they need about one to two years to adjust to a different way of life and a different way of thinking. So in my assessment, Niall Ferguson is spelling out an off-chance. There could be a precipitous loss of confidence of Americans in America, in which case foreign talents also lose confidence in America. I don't see that happening.

Q: What role do you think the United States will likely play in the Asia-Pacific region, particularly in terms of its military commitment and military presence and its alliance structure?

A: Well, it is a constantly adjusting position because although the Chinese cannot match the Americans in capabilities and in asymmetrical warfare, they can inflict enormous damage on the Seventh Fleet. And with their submarines, they may even sink an aircraft carrier. The submarines are bought from Russia. They are very silent Kilo types. They have several.

In fact, we have done naval exercises with the Americans with our submarines and we showed them we had their aircraft carriers on target. So I think they had considered that. Therefore, power projections cannot depend on aircraft carriers. They will need bases. Hence, the bases in Japan, in Thailand. [stars: where do we fit in ? are we really only a glorified logistics depot for the americans ? ]

Pity the Subic base closed down, but that's the choice of the Filipinos. But I think Okinawa is a very important staging point for them. Nearer to Asia than Guam.

Q: There are now problems between the United States and Japan on Okinawa base relocation issues. What implications do you think this tension will have for the Asia-Pacific region?

A: I think it is natural for the Okinawans to want to be free of American troops because you have acts of rape and all sorts of problems. But from a national point of view, for your own security and the balance in Asia, if you removed the bases from Okinawa to the mainland or Hokkaido, which is rather cold for the Americans, it is still workable.

But if you remove all bases of America, I think your position and that of Asia, that position will be weaker strategically because you cannot balance against China and your (population of about) 120 million against 1.3 billion, soon to be 1.4 billion.

It's not a matter of quality. It's a matter of numbers. And the Japanese people, never mind the government of the day, will have to decide where is their longer-term interest and which is more important? Your security or your convenience of the Okinawa people?

Q: Do you think that Asian people, including the people in Southeast Asia, regard the U.S.-Japan security relationship as a sort of a stabilizer?

A: Absolutely. As far as I am concerned, I have no doubts it is a stabilizer. And I am sure many would not like to say so, but they think so. They know it, but we say it to make it easier for the Americans. And for the Japanese. Nobody can accuse us of being in the pay of the Americans. They don't give us any aid. We are not a satellite country. We don't have any treaties with them. We have an independent declarant. We allow them to keep their logistics here for forward actions in the Gulf region. That's all.

Q: You have mentioned "balance" in relation to China in the past. Could you elaborate on this idea a little? As far as I know, you recently said it in the United States, and it stirred controversy among Chinese Netizens. So it may have been offensive to some people in China.

A: Well, the Global Times, which is an offshoot of the People's Daily, translated "balance" as zhiheng, which means "to conscribe," and not pingheng, which is "to balance." So naturally, you give that interpretation, which is to conscribe China, it must have aroused Chinese anger. Why should I say that as a Chinese?

But I am saying what I am saying not because I am Chinese or because I am anti-China, but because I represent Singapore, and this is in my national interest that there should be a balance in the Pacific. Without America, you can take Japan, you can put North and South Korea together, you can put the whole of ASEAN together, you can even get India together. You can't balance China. India is too far away and they can't project the forces into the Pacific. But the Americans can.

Q: When you refer to this balance, is it a sort of balance of power?

A: Yes, of course. Balance of power and balance of influence. Balance of economic influence. Trade, investments.

Q: In some cases in history, the balance of power has led to very conflictual relationships between major powers.

A: That was in Europe. In Asia, it is just between two. In Europe, the balance was a confederation of three or four countries against four or five countries. That is different.

Q: Perhaps it could lead to a sort of encirclement policy against China?

A: No, I don't think so. China is too big to be encircled. Japan may be able to monitor submarines coming out from north of Shanghai. But you can't stop submarines coming out from Hainan Island. I've noticed they've got a very big submarine base in Hainan. Everybody knows that. Deep water. So I don't see any encirclement as possible.

But there's a balance, there's a forward base in place of an aircraft carrier because the aircraft carrier is vulnerable.

Q: Do you perhaps envision the future of Asia-Pacific stability as sort of multipolar?

A: No, I don't see multipolar. It is bipolar. And Japan is part of the American pole. I mean, there's no other country with the economic or military capabilities or technology capabilities other than Japan.

And Japan on their own because of numbers, regardless of the quality of her technology and the capabilities of her people, just cannot balance China. It's not possible.

Q:Where does ASEAN fit in? How does ASEAN come into play?

A: At the moment if you asked me, ASEAN is more leaning toward America. But as time goes on, more and more of the continental ASEAN--Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, Burma--will have to consider China's view because their markets (for raw produce and minerals) will be in China. It is growing rapidly.

So over time, ASEAN will be divided between archipelago ASEAN and mainland ASEAN. I think archipelago ASEAN will find it more comfortable if there's a balance. Eventually, the Chinese will have a blue water fleet with an aircraft carrier. It's a matter of time--30 years, 40 years, 50 years--definitely.

So if there is a balance, we have more room. If there is no balance, there is no shade in between. We have two big trees and find some shade between the spreading branches of the two big trees.

Q: You said that India was far away. But India now seems to have finally awoken from its long sleep. In what way do you think India should get involved in providing a stabilizing effect for the Asia-Pacific region?

A: India's military role will be confined to South Asia and she cannot project her forces into the Pacific. She might be able to project her forces into the Straits of Malacca because it's near the Andaman Islands and she's got bases there. But to go beyond Singapore upwards will be a difficult problem for her.

So militarily, I would say India is confined to the Indian Ocean and the Straits of Malacca, the Northern Straits of Malacca. Land projections across the Himalayas or across Bangladesh or Burma are very difficult. Similarly for the Chinese. So unless there's a huge deterioration of relations, I do not see a repeat of 1962.

Q: Relations between India and the United States have improved very much, especially in the past decade or so. President Barack Obama even called India a "natural ally." Do you think the relationship is developing into an alliance?

A: Well, I am not sure they are natural allies forever. Because for a long time, the United States favored Pakistan because India was in alliance with and buying her weaponry and trading with Russia. So she was in the other bloc. Now the Russians have lost that ability, but the Indians still maintain their military relations and supplies of military equipment and hardware, aircraft. I am not sure if submarines are also (included).

But it will take some time for the Russian Republic to find the strength it had with the Soviet Union, with the whole empire. But nevertheless, their military technology is considerable and Putin has shown he is going to keep that up. And so you see they are producing updates of Sukhoi and the MiGs and selling them around the world.

Q: The United States also seems to be interested in selling arms to India, but I think this seems to be evolving into something much larger.

A: No, it's much larger because their interests are aligned. The Americans would want another heavyweight at the other end of the tug-of-war role. And the other heavyweight is India. It may not have the GDP, either total--its total GDP is less than one-third of China. But the number of population is not very far off China, and they may even become larger than China by 2050 or 2060.

So it is useful for the United States to have a stabilizer in South Asia. And I think the United States must be realistic enough to see that, at the rate India is growing, she cannot project her military forces beyond the Straits of Malacca. The Chinese can project not their whole weight, but some weight to the Indian Ocean, routes to Myanmar. They have a seaport in Myanmar and routes to the port in Pakistan. But this is a long logistic line.

Q: How can ASEAN continue to play a central role in Asia in the regional architecture?

A: Well, it has to stay cohesive and not divided. And for the present phase, the Chinese want it to be cohesive and to carry the whole of ASEAN with them. So they've got this ASEAN Plus Three. They have not abandoned ASEAN. I mean, these three in military terms can easily outweigh ASEAN in total strategic terms because of the archipelago across the Indian and South China Sea, and the votes in the United Nations.

It is important for (China's) total global strength to have ASEAN with them. So ASEAN finds itself an attractive partner to China, to India and to America. Where the final proximity or togetherness will be, I cannot say. It depends upon how things evolve and what benefits China can give us compared with the Americans.

But as I have said, for 30, 40 or even 50 years, ASEAN will have more benefits but of course diminishing over time from America as against China. China will draw us in because of the huge market and low cost products--food, vegetables, minerals. But America has a high investment technology and she buys expensive products, which is a result of multinationals investing in these countries.

The Chinese cannot equal that. I mean, we now have about 4,500 Chinese companies here (in Singapore and) 4,000 Indian companies. But none of them can equal the Americans or the Japanese or the Europeans MNCs in sophistication of the products. It will take the Chinese some time to catch up.

Q: There have been so many regional architectures, whether it is ASEAN Plus Three, ASEAN Plus Six, EAS, APEC and the others. Now, Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd has proposed the creation of an Asian Pacific Community on top of this. Do you think we have to do something to streamline this?

A: It will be decided not by the Australians but by the Chinese. If the Chinese find that it is useful to have a structure that Prime Minister Kevin Rudd has proposed, then that will be carried out. I doubt it. There is no advantage for China in this proposal. They may not openly reject it. Instead they will say, "Yes, we will consider it."

They have already decided that ASEAN is important to them. It is their southern belly, strategically and economically. They want to be the major influence in ASEAN. They don't mind the Australians competing for ASEAN's loyalty. China will have to compete with America and Japan together.

Q: Prime Minister Hatoyama has recently proposed an East Asia Community. It is still relatively vague but his passion is unmistakable. What do you think about this proposal?

A: I prefer to wait and see what happens whether strategic thinkers in Japan will conclude that this is in Japan's interest.

Q: Why the reservation?

A: Japan alone cannot be a counterweight to China. You may have no counterweight if you are part of the Chinese bloc. If America supports you, you can bargain with China. Without America's support, you have no chips to play with.

Let's be realistic. The Americans do not want Japan in China's bloc. You are either with America or with China, period. [stars: then what about us ? can we straddle both and emerge unscathed ?]

Q: Realistically speaking, you may be right. But at the same time, it will be a nightmare scenario in which Japan will be forced to choose between the Chinese camp or the American camp.

A: No, you don't have to choose. You just stay where you are. Status quo is the best option for Singapore and maybe for Japan also.

Q: But you said China is not interested in maintaining a stabilizing status quo. So it could be more difficult for us.

A: Well, in 20, 30, 40, 50 years, maybe. But we will see how rapidly China develops.

Q: Japan actually lost two decades. They lost one in the 1990s, and another lost decade ensued. You have observed Japan for more than 70 years since the 1940s. What went wrong with Japan in your view?

A: Japan's leaders were older and they had no new thinking. The faction leaders were all older and did not allow younger Japanese to take over the leadership although they were more attuned to the present state of the world. They could have changed Japan's economic political policies and made Japan more relevant to today's world.

Next, you have a fundamental problem--an aging population. So despite many stimulus packages, there was no real recovery. Old people don't change their motorcars yearly nor their television sets or buy new suits. They do not go for expensive dinners and other luxury spending. They've got all the things they need, and you have not been able to stimulate domestic consumption.

Today you have about three Japanese for about one retiree. My principal private secretary has calculated that in 2030, you have two to one retiree. In 2055, you have only 1.5 working for one retiree. How is that sustainable?

Yet you sent "pure-blooded" Japanese from Brazil or nurses from Philippines back because they couldn't speak or pass Japanese or for other reasons. Japanese people's demand for purity is extreme, considering your position. How can you continue that policy?

Your government urges women to have more children. That is slower and more difficult than getting more immigrants. The lifestyle of your educated women has changed. They are quite happy to be single, they are traveling around the world. They are earning their own living and don't have to get married if they don't like to.

Many have married foreigners because they don't want to be slaves of their husbands and their husband's parents. Many Japanese women working in SIA (Singapore Airlines) have married our air stewards. They watch how Singapore women live where husbands do not boss their wives (and) live separate from in-laws in flats bigger than in Japan.

Japan will have to change its way of life. You can reverse low birthrates at high costs like France and Sweden. They give generous support for nurseries, kindergartens and office facilities for the babies of married employees. But it's a slow process.

Q: In your book "From Third World To First," you said: "I discovered early in office that a few problems confronted me in government which other governments have not met and solved. So I made a practice of finding out who else had met the problem we faced. How they had tackled it and how successful they had been."

I think all policymakers should be aware of this insightful perspective.

What countries can we learn from or emulate in terms of addressing common challenges, new ideas and new frontiers?

A: Well, each country has valuable lessons for us. America shows how an entrepreneurial culture ensures a dynamic economy. Their best do not become salarymen. Bill Gates left Harvard to start Microsoft. They have venture capitalists who support good projects and help build the management.

Our GIC (Government of Singapore Investment Corp.) and Temasek put money in these venture capitalist companies, as well-established insurance companies do. If one out of 10 makes good, it would more than cover the losses on the other nine. We were conscribed by what we have inherited from the British.

Secondly, they renew leaders with every generation. I don't think we can do that. Our ambassador in Washington reports every new administration revises unsuccessful policies. Singapore cannot afford to do that.

Japan, you impressed us on how you train workers to strive for perfection in what they do. So Japan produces defect-free TV sets and until recently, flawless cars. But you restore your high standards. I am most impressed by the solidarity of Japanese workers, their drive to increase productivity to benefit companies and workers. And they have intense loyalty to company.

So I had your chairman of the (Japan) Productivity Center, Kohei Goshi, that I have narrated in my memoirs. His thinking is deep and profound. He said productivity is like a marathon without a finishing line.

* * *

The founding father of Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew served as prime minister from 1965, after Singapore gained independence from Malaysia, until 1990. He helped achieve economic development and social stability by aggressively promoting foreign investment, and turned Singapore into an economic superpower in Southeast Asia by converting its industrial structure into one centered on exporting manufactured goods, transport, communications and finance. He has continued to maintain a voice in Singapore politics as senior minister and minister mentor since stepping down as prime minister. His oldest son, Lee Hsien Loong, 58, is Singapore's current prime minister.

appeared on the straits times yesterday or on saturday i think. cant recall. on MM's most recent trip to Japan before he went over to China and visited Jiang Zemin.

stars - May 25, 2010 06:20 AM (GMT)

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/24/opinion/....html?th&emc=th

QUOTE

Op-Ed Contributors
An Arsenal We Can All Live With
By GARY SCHAUB Jr. and JAMES FORSYTH Jr.
Published: May 21, 2010

THE Pentagon has now told the public, for the first time, precisely how many nuclear weapons the United States has in its arsenal: 5,113. That is exactly 4,802 more than we need.

Last week, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton testified before the Senate to advocate approval of the so-called New Start treaty, signed by President Obama and President Dmitri Medvedev of Russia last month. The treaty’s ceiling of 1,550 warheads deployed on 700 missiles and bombers will leave us with fewer warheads than at any time since John F. Kennedy was president. Yet the United States could further reduce its reliance on nuclear weapons without sacrificing security. Indeed, we have calculated that the country could address its conceivable national defense and military concerns with only 311 strategic nuclear weapons. (While we are civilian Air Force employees, we speak only for ourselves and not the Pentagon.)

This may seem a trifling number compared with the arsenals built up in the cold war, but 311 warheads would provide the equivalent of 1,900 megatons of explosive power, or nine-and-a-half times the amount that Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara argued in 1965 could incapacitate the Soviet Union by destroying “one-quarter to one-third of its population and about two-thirds of its industrial capacity.”

Considering that we face no threat today similar to that of the Soviet Union 45 years ago, this should be more than adequate firepower for any defensive measure or, if need be, an offensive strike. And this would be true even if, against all expectations, our capacity was halved by an enemy’s surprise first strike. In addition, should we want to hit an enemy without destroying its society, the 311 weapons would be adequate for taking out a wide range of “hardened targets” like missile silos or command-and-control bunkers.

The key to shrinking our nuclear arsenal so radically would be dispersing the 311 weapons on land, at sea and on airplanes to get the maximum flexibility and survivability.

Ideally, 100 would be placed on single-warhead intercontinental ballistic missiles, like the Minuteman III systems now in service. These missiles, which have pinpoint accuracy, are scattered around the country in such a way that only one potential enemy, Russia, would have any chance of rendering the arsenal impotent with a surprise strike. (And it is likely that our unilateral cuts would entice Moscow, which has been retiring its systems at a fast clip in recent years, to follow suit.) Equally important, these missile sites are easily detected and monitored, which would reassure our friends and provide a credible threat to our enemies.

The sea leg of the plan would involve placing 24 Trident D-5 missiles, each with a single nuclear warhead, on each of our Ohio-class submarines. Today’s fleet of 14 can be cut to 12, with eight on patrol at a given time, together carrying 192 missiles ready to launch. The Tridents are extremely effective, as they can be moved around the globe on the submarines, cannot be easily detected, and present a risk to even hardened targets. And should any of our allies feel that our cuts in seaborne missiles are worrisome, we can remind them that the British and French will keep their complementary nuclear capabilities in the Atlantic.

Finally, for maximum flexibility in our nuclear arsenal, each of our B-2 stealth bombers could carry one air-launched nuclear cruise missile. While we have 20 such bombers, we assume that one would be undergoing repairs at any given time, giving us the final 19 warheads in our 311-missile plan. Our B-2 fleet is more than adequate for nuclear escalation control and political signaling, and giving it an exclusive role in our nuclear strategy would allow us to convert all our B-52H bombers to a conventional role, which is far more likely to be of use in our post-cold-war world.

While 311 is a radical cut from current levels, it is not the same as zero, nor is it a steppingstone to abandoning our nuclear deterrent. The idea of a nuclear-weapon-free world is not an option for the foreseeable future. Nuclear weapons make leaders vigilant and risk-averse. That their use is to be avoided does not render them useless. Quite the opposite: nuclear weapons might be the most politically useful weapons a state can possess. They deter adversaries from threatening with weapons of mass destruction the American homeland, United States forces abroad and our allies and friends. They also remove the incentive for our allies to acquire nuclear weapons for their own protection.

We need a nuclear arsenal. But we certainly don’t need one that is as big, expensive and unnecessarily threatening to much of the world as the one we have now.

Gary Schaub Jr. is an assistant professor of strategy at the Air War College and James Forsyth Jr. is a professor of strategy at the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies.

A version of this op-ed appeared in print on May 24, 2010, on page A25 of the New York edition.

stars - June 14, 2010 03:47 AM (GMT)

a little behind the curve, but dennis C blair has been fired from office.

http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/ti...lair/index.html

QUOTE

Updated May 21, 2010

Dennis C. Blair, a retired admiral, announced in May 2010 that he was resigning as director of national intelligence in the Obama administration. His often tumultuous tenure was marked by frequent clashes with White House officials and other spy chiefs in America's still fractured intelligence apparatus.

Mr. Blair's exit after little more than a year came as the White House was facing thorny decisions about Iran's nuclear program, the future of Afghanistan and the spread of militancy from Pakistan's tribal areas. It also fueled new doubts about the success, and wisdom, of the major intelligence overhaul in 2004 that created the spymaster position

The departure of Mr. Blair had been rumored for months, but was made official when President Obama called him on May 20 and asked him to step down.

Mr. Blair's relationship with the White House was rocky since the start of the Obama administration, and he fought a rear-guard action against efforts by the Central Intelligence Agency to cut down the size and power of the national intelligence director's staff. He was the first high-ranking member of the Obama national security team to depart.

Mr. Blair's departure could strengthen the hand of the C.I.A operatives, who have bristled at directives from Mr. Blair's office. Mr. Blair had been outspoken about reining in the C.I.A.'s covert activities, citing their propensity to backfire and tarnish America's image.

The Obama administration has largely embraced the C.I.A. operations, especially the agency's campaign to kill militants in Pakistan's tribal areas with drone aircraft.

Born out of the intelligence debacle before the Iraq war, the intelligence director's post was intended to force greater cooperation within a hidebound intelligence bureaucracy, and to ensure that America's spies were better equipped to prevent a repeat of the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks.

The relationship between Mr. Blair and Mr. Obama had been characterized as professional but not close, and some administration officials said Mr. Blair often felt cut out of discussions about important security matters.

Tensions among the White House, the intelligence director and Congressional oversight committees escalated after a young Nigerian man nearly detonated a bomb on a trans-Atlantic flight on Dec. 25, 2009. White House officials openly criticized Mr. Blair and his staff for a litany of missed signals that could have prevented the man, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, from boarding the plane.

They laid particular blame on the National Counterterrorism Center, one agency that Mr. Blair supervised. A May 2010 report released by the Senate Intelligence Committee was particularly critical of the NCTC's failures to piece together the information that could have put Mr. Abdulmutallab on a "no-fly" list.

American officials said that Mr. Blair had also angered the White House by pushing for closer intelligence ties to France, an arrangement opposed by Mr. Obama.

Some intelligence experts and Republican lawmakers say they believe that the White House has tried to micromanage America's spy agencies, and there was a particularly tense relationship between Mr. Blair and John O. Brennan, the White House counterterrorism director.

But Mr. Blair also fought battles inside the intelligence ranks. In the summer of 2009, he clashed with Leon E. Panetta, the C.I.A. director, over the appointment of the senior American spies overseas. Mr. Panetta went so far as to issue a memorandum to C.I.A. operatives telling them to disregard a directive that Mr. Blair had sent a day earlier.

Mr. Blair considered Mr. Panetta's move an act of insubordination, intelligence officials said.

Mr. Blair came to the job determined to cement the intelligence chief's authority over 16 disparate spy agencies.

THE SPY CHIEF'S CAREER

He had intimate experience with intelligence during a 34-year Navy career. A brainy retired four-star admiral whose jobs included commander of the United States Pacific Command, he is also an Asia expert.

Mr. Blair did not have a long relationship with President Obama when he was selected to be national intelligence director, but he did have close ties to the Clinton family, and was a Rhodes scholar at Oxford with Bill Clinton.

He was the Central Intelligence Agency's first associate director of military support, and served a tour on the National Security Council. He was also director of the Joint Staff at the Pentagon, and commanded the Kitty Hawk Battle Group and the destroyer Cochrane. In civilian life, Mr. Blair was president of the Institute for Defense Analyses, a nonprofit largely financed by the federal government to analyze national security issues for the Pentagon, from 2003 to 2006.

Mr. Blair had to step down as president of the Institute for Defense Analyses amid concerns that his positions on several corporate boards constituted a conflict of interest. The Pentagon's inspector general later concluded that he had violated the institute's conflict-of-interest standards by serving on the board of a military contractor working on the Air Force F-22 jet while the institute was evaluating the program for the Pentagon. The inspector general found, however, that Mr. Blair did not influence the organization's analysis of the F-22 program.

He is known as a cerebral and intense workaholic. Yet he also tried to water ski behind a Navy destroyer while commanding the ship in Japan. An avid fisherman who speaks Russian, he was in the same Naval Academy graduating class as Oliver North and Senator Jim Webb of Virginia. He was passed over for chairman of the Joint Chiefs by Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, who considered him too independent and was wary of his views on engagement in Asia.

Mr. Blair was born on Feb. 4, 1947, in Kittery, Me. He graduated from Annapolis and earned a master's degree at Oxford on a Rhodes scholarship. He is married, with two grown children, a son and a daughter.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/conte...0052004343.html

QUOTE

Dennis C. Blair to resign as director of national intelligence

Dennis Blair has announced he is resigning as National Intelligence Director. The announcement came after a meeting with the President, where officials say it became clear that the President had lost confidence in Blair.

Dennis C. Blair will resign Friday as the nation's intelligence director after a tenure marred by the recent failures of U.S. spy agencies to detect terrorist plots and by political missteps that undermined his standing with the White House.

Blair, a retired U.S. Navy admiral, was pushed out 16 months after he became President Obama's surprise pick to be the nation's third director of national intelligence. His departure is likely to renew debate over whether the DNI position, a daunting job created amid sweeping intelligence reforms after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, is fundamentally flawed.

Obama praised Blair's integrity in a prepared statement and said that under his leadership the nation's intelligence services had "performed admirably and effectively at a time of great challenges to our security."

Blair's offer to step down came during a phone conversation with Obama on Thursday in which the president said he planned to put someone new in the director position, according to an official familiar with the exchange. Blair's exit creates a critical national security vacancy at a time when U.S. spy agencies are under pressure to step up their defenses against emerging terrorist threats.

His departure had been rumored in Washington for months, but the nature of his resignation -- without a replacement ready to be named -- suggested a lack of coordination.

The U.S. official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss internal deliberations, said Obama had first raised the possibility of replacing Blair in discussions with him earlier this week. The White House had indicated a preference that Blair stay in the job until a successor could be named. But Blair refused after learning that the president had decided to look for a new director, the official said.

Blair issued a statement saying that it was "with deep regret that I informed the President today that I will step down." He added that during the Obama administration, U.S. spy agencies had become "more integrated, agile, and representative of American values." Blair becomes the highest-ranking member of the administration to resign.

Current and former U.S. officials said the White House had discussed the position with former senator Chuck Hagel (R-Neb.), who serves as co-chair of Obama's intelligence advisory board; James R. Clapper, a retired Air Force lieutenant general serving as undersecretary of defense for intelligence; and John Hamre, a former deputy secretary of defense who leads the Defense Policy Board.

Clapper is a leading candidate to replace Blair, a senior White House official said Thursday night, speaking on the condition of anonymity because the search continues. Officials said Hagel told the White House he would not be interested in the position. The former senator was abroad and could not be reached for comment.

Blair had been charged with carrying out Obama's campaign pledge to move the country away from controversial programs -- including the CIA's use of harsh interrogation methods -- that administration officials argued had damaged the nation's standing around the world. But much like his predecessors, Blair struggled to gain traction in a position that is widely seen as lacking adequate authority to oversee an often fractious community of 16 spy services.

Blair sometimes made public remarks that revealed his frustration with the way the intelligence community functions, and that were seen as embarrassing to the administration.

In January, Blair questioned the administration's failure to use a new team of specially trained interrogators to question the suspect in the attempted bombing of a Detroit-bound airliner on Christmas Day. The unit was created for such scenarios, Blair said in Senate testimony, adding, "And duh . . . the decision was made on the scene."

Beyond such blunt statements, the timing of Blair's departure suggests that the White House had lost confidence in him after the agencies he oversees failed to detect relatively unsophisticated terrorist plots. The Christmas Day incident involved a Nigerian man who is accused of smuggling an explosive onboard the aircraft in his underwear. Earlier this month, a naturalized U.S. citizen apparently trained by a Pakistani terrorist group parked a vehicle packed with explosives in the middle of Times Square.

Blair often seemed sidelined by other key members of Obama's national security team. Blair lost a public turf fight with CIA Director Leon Panetta over who had the power to appoint the top U.S. intelligence representative in countries overseas. John O. Brennan, the president's main counterterrorism adviser, is a CIA veteran who has assumed the role of de facto intelligence chief within the White House, often serving as the administration's public face on national security issues.

Blair attended a state dinner at the White House on Wednesday evening. But it was Panetta who accompanied national security adviser James L. Jones this week on a trip to Pakistan to press the government in Islamabad to expand its military campaign against insurgent groups.

David Gompert, who was recently named Blair's principal deputy, will become acting director until the Senate confirms a replacement.

Other members of Obama's security team have also been singled out for criticism in recent months, including Attorney Gen. Eric H. Holder Jr. and the director of the National Counterterrorism Center, Michael E. Leiter. But both are seen as having stronger political connections to the White House than Blair.

Blair was perceived as holding a particularly unmanageable job. His two predecessors also departed after relatively brief tenures in which they struggled to prevail in turf battles with other agencies and to implement changes.

Blair's resignation comes just days after the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence issued a scathing report on U.S. spy agencies' handling of the Christmas Day attack. The report documented 14 distinct failures to take steps that might have prevented the attempted bombing.

Blair responded to the report with a statement saying that the intelligence community is "aggressively focused on potential threats," but acknowledging that "institutional and technological barriers remain."

Staff writers Karen DeYoung, Peter Finn, Anne E. Kornblut, Ellen Nakashima and Michael D. Shear and staff researcher Julie Tate contributed to this report.

View Full Version: America in SEA: the leviathan